Joonho Lee

The truth thesis of virtue, widely adopted by Neo-Aristotelians, holds that virtue requires accurate beliefs about what is going on in given circumstances and what actions or values should be pursued, beliefs that constitute or at least inform the right reason that virtuous people follow when choosing to act virtuously. However, is this theoretical commitment indispensable for virtue theory? This essay aims to challenge the attractiveness of that thesis by examining the story of Shun 舜, a moral exemplar, in Mengzi 孟子 5A2. In this passage, Mengzi approvingly recounts how Shun trusted his vicious brother Xiang 象 and showed hospitality to him, despite knowing that Xiang had just tried to murder him. I argue that given its phenomenological and epistemic features, Shun’s psychological state is best understood as involving self-deception, and that given Shun’s status as an exemplar of virtue, Mengzi’s virtue theory supposes there to be a particular sort of epistemic cost for being virtuous, contrary to the truth thesis of virtue. This observation will shed light on how epistemic irrationality could play an important role in one’s moral motivation.

The harmony thesis about a virtuous person, widely held by neo-Aristotelians, supposes that someone highly vulnerable to temptation is not virtuous at all. However, is that the only plausible picture of a virtuous person’s psychology? This essay aims to offer an alternative picture by discussing the account of virtue in the thought of Mengzi 孟子 and his conception of moral exemplars. First, I analyze the Mengzian moral exemplar as depicted in _Mengzi_ 1A7—specifically, the susceptibility of the nobleman (_junzi_ 君子) to compassion and the relevant temptation. Then, I explain how this differs from neo-Aristotelian virtue ethical theories. This passage shows that there is a certain price to being virtuous in Mengzi’s virtue theory. By examining various ways of addressing this challenge, I explore Mengzi’s solution to it, which will shed light on Mengzi’s own way of specifying virtue and its significant advantage as a potential alternative to certain other approaches.