Epistemic instrumentalism is often thought to face an insurmountable barrier, the ‘too few reasons’ problem. This has prompted some epistemologists to turn to a rival social kind of epistemic instrumentalism that claims epistemic normativity is instrumental to the goals of communities rather than individuals. This paper argues that this is a mistake as regular epistemic instrumentalism is better able to address the too few reasons problem than its social counterpart. In Sect. 2, I outline the tw…
Read moreEpistemic instrumentalism is often thought to face an insurmountable barrier, the ‘too few reasons’ problem. This has prompted some epistemologists to turn to a rival social kind of epistemic instrumentalism that claims epistemic normativity is instrumental to the goals of communities rather than individuals. This paper argues that this is a mistake as regular epistemic instrumentalism is better able to address the too few reasons problem than its social counterpart. In Sect. 2, I outline the two few reasons objection, highlighting that it contains two separate problems: The problem of indifference and the problem of avoidance. I offer a dual strategy for the instrumentalist that appeals to doxastic non-voluntarism, and show how this improves upon standard instrumentalist defences. In Sect. 3, I argue that social instrumentalism does not improve upon the regular kind. It fails to capture instrumentalist motivations, and also fails to offer a compelling solution to the too few reasons problem. Insights from social epistemology can, however, be used to strengthen regular instrumentalism. I conclude that epistemic instrumentalists should not be motivated to take the social turn.