Jordi Fairhurst

Despite recent interest and widespread insistence on the ethical dimension of Wittgenstein’s work, no work has systematically gathered the connections between Wittgenstein and metaethics. This Element offers the first comprehensive analysis of Wittgenstein’s contributions and influences to metaethics. To this end, initially it examines Wittgenstein’s influence in the development of different (and even opposed) metaethical positions within both the moral cognitivist and non-cognitivist traditions. Subsequently, it discusses how Wittgenstein’s work not only played an important role in the development of the cognitivist and non-cognitivist metaethical tradition but also inspired a debate over the feasibility of metaethics as a philosophical endeavour altogether. Lastly, it employs the exegetical vantage point acquired through the Element to develop a novel pluralist Wittgensteinian metaethics, where we seek to clarify the metaphysical, epistemological and semantic presuppositions of moral thought, talk and practice on a case-by-case basis by means of an assortment of complementary local descriptions (rather than global theories), thereby gradually working towards a better grasp of morality as a whole.

When disagreements cut deep, epistemic agents face a predicament. Although disagreements have been widely hailed for their epistemic benefits, deep disagreements are often plagued with argumentative hurdles preventing the attainment of such epistemic goods. This raises an important question: What should one do when faced with a deep disagreement? This article develops a case-sensitive framework to help epistemic agents tailor their argumentative course of action to the rich complexity of deep disagreements in hopes of yielding positive epistemic outcomes.

Pleasants and Laves have resorted to Wittgenstein’s observations about the phenomenon of certainty to argue in favour of the idea of universal moral certainties. To substantiate their proposal, they offer a kindred example of universal moral certainty: the wrongness of killing innocent, non-threatening human beings. Recently, numerous scholars (see e.g., Ariso (Philosophical Investigations 45(1):58–76, 2022a; Philosophical Investigations 45(1):91–97, 2022b; Philosophia 53:651–662, 2025); Brice (Philosophia 41(2):477–487, 2013); Fairhurst (Ethical Perspectives 26(2):271–298, 2019; Philosophical Investigations 47(1):119–136, 2024); Rummens (The Philosophical Forum 44(2):125–147, 2013)) have levelled damaging criticisms against Pleasants’ and Laves’ proposal. This paper sets out to address these criticisms by offering a novel example of universal moral certainty. Specifically, it resorts to the results obtained by Curry’s theory of Morality-as-Cooperation to argue that the goodness of cooperation may be a universal moral certainty.

This paper analyses how deep disagreements should be conceptualised. It critically examines the most prominent definitions and theories available and assesses their capacity to capture the phenomenon. We argue that, although existing accounts provide valuable insights that further our understanding of deep disagreements, they are imprecise for various reasons. Subsequently, we argue that these imprecisions motivate a more exhaustive meta-epistemological reflection regarding how we should go about defining and theorizing about deep disagreements. Finally, we provide said reflection by developing a family-resemblance conception of deep disagreements and arguing for methodological pluralism when theorizing about this phenomenon. Such proposal is defended on the basis that ignoring the heterodoxy of deep disagreements comes at the expense of philosophical unclarity or imprecision.

This paper critically examines how deep disagreements should be conceptualised. Initially, it analyses the most prominent definitions and theories of deep disagreements and assesses their capacity to capture the phenomenon. It argues that although existing accounts provide valuable insights that further our understanding of deep disagreements, they are imprecise for various reasons. Subsequently, the paper contends that these imprecisions motivate the need for a more exhaustive meta‐epistemological reflection regarding how epistemologists should go about defining and/or theorising about deep disagreements. It ends by briefly outlining the options available. We can either continue to defend a given account of deep disagreement and adapt it to address the criticism or argue that “deep disagreement” does not represent an epistemologically interesting class. A third option, the one favoured in the paper, is to defend a pluralistic conception of deep disagreements. A thorough development of pluralism, however, is left to future research.

This paper develops a theoretical framework to better understand how implicit biases about social identity (e.g., gender, race, class, seniority, or institutional affiliation) may influence different stages of knowledge production. To do so, it makes use of hinge epistemology to describe how inter- (results of applications of mathematical rules) and extra-mathematical (e.g., stereotypes and prejudices) factors play a role in our mathematical practices and knowledge production. Accordingly, we will describe how these different factors confer or remove normative power from mathematical pieces in a broad economy of credibility. By doing so, we intend to unify two strands of hinge epistemology that have hitherto been separate: that of mathematical practices and that of testimonial justification. The upshot of this proposal is the development of a theoretical framework that enables more effective, appropriately informed measures to ameliorate both epistemic injustice in social contexts and epistemic harm within mathematics.

This paper explores a path towards the resolution of the existing stalemate between competing theories in hinge epistemology. Initially, it is diagnosed that the stalemate stems from a theoretical assumption regarding the nature of hinges and a methodological assumption regarding how hinges ought to be investigated. Specifically, it is assumed in the literature about hinges that the features of hinges display a theoretical unity to be explained by one global theory. Subsequently, it is shown that by questioning both assumptions it is possible to make progress towards resolving the stalemate. Accordingly, a new approach to hinge epistemology is developed where hinges are said to exhibit diverse features to be clarified by a variety of centres of variation. On this account, different hinge theories are rectified to complementary centres of variation by expressly restricting them to the cases with the hinges that the theories can clarify, allowing us to move away from the stalemate and towards a more nuanced account of hinges.

This paper shows that Wittgenstein's later explorations of the meaning of expressive moral judgements reach far deeper than has so far been noticed. It is argued that an adequate description of the meaning of expressive moral judgements requires engaging in a grammatical investigation that focuses on three interwoven components within specific language-games. First, the ethical reactions expressed by moral words and the additional purpose they may fulfil. Second, the features of the actions which are bound up with moral words and are constitutive of our moral evaluations. And, finally, the forms of life in which expressive moral judgements and moral language-games are embedded.

This paper studies the ethical significance of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus. First, I elucidate what Wittgenstein means by the point of the book being ethical. I defend that the ethical point and significance of the Tractatus is to delimit the ethical and, thereby, show or make manifest what it is to live a good ethical life. Second, I study how the correct method of philosophy propounded by the Tractatus contributes to ethics and the attainment of the good ethical life. I argue that, although philosophy is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for achieving a good ethical life, it serves as useful tool that can help one undergo the required ethical changes to achieve said life.

The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, it analyses the similarities that stem from Wittgenstein’s (Philosophical Investigations (1953)) and Brandom’s (Making it Explicit (1994)) commitment to pragmatics in the philosophy of language to account for moral utterances. That is, the study of the meaning of moral utterances is carried out resorting to the study of the acts being performed in producing or exhibiting these utterances. Both authors offer, therefore, a pragmatic solution in order to account for the meaning of our moral vocabulary and discursive practices. Secondly, it argues that both approaches lead to differing understandings of the role of “truth” and “falsity” in moral discourse. On the one hand, Wittgenstein’s remarks on ethics demonstrate a dismissive attitude towards the notions of truth and falsity in moral discourse. On the other hand, Brandom seems to be committed to a weak version of moral cognitivism: he takes assertions (which express beliefs, i.e. doxastic commitments) as the fundamental linguistic activity in the game of giving and asking for reasons and provides an anaphoric theory of truth to account for “truth” and “falsity” in our discourse. Additionally, it analyses how these differences bear on the Frege–Geach problem.

Epistemologists have developed a diverse group of theories, known as hinge epistemology, about our epistemic practices that resort to and expand on Wittgenstein's concept of ‘hinges’ in On Certainty. Within hinge epistemology there is a debate over the epistemic status of hinges. Some hold that hinges are non-epistemic (neither known, justified, nor warranted), while others contend that they are epistemic. Philosophers on both sides of the debate have often connected this discussion to Wittgenstein's later views on mathematics. Others have directly questioned whether there are mathematical hinges, and if so, these would be axioms. Here, we give a hinge epistemology account for mathematical practices based on their contextual dynamics. We argue that 1) there are indeed mathematical hinges (and they are not axioms necessarily), and 2) a given mathematical entity can be used contextually as an epistemic hinge, a non-epistemic hinge, or a non-hinge. We sustain our arguments exegetically and empirically.

Pleasants has developed the idea of basic moral certainties. Analogous to Wittgenstein's basic empirical certainties, they are best described as universal moral certainties which are natural and nonpropositional, and show unreflectively in the way we act. A clear-cut example is the wrongness of killing innocent human beings. Philosophers have levelled three damaging criticisms against Pleasants' proposal by (i) offering counterexamples to his proposed example of moral certainty, (ii) highlighting some disanalogies between moral certainties and Wittgenstein's basic empirical certainties and, lastly, (iii) showing the lack of arguments and evidence offered by Pleasants to substantiate the claim that moral certainties are natural. To address these criticisms, Laves has revised Pleasants' proposal by providing numerous amendments. In this paper, I develop some concerns about Laves' proposed amendments and indicate that, at present, they are unable to fully overcome the criticisms levelled against the idea of basic moral certainty. Whether Laves' proposal can escape these troubles demands further attention.

This paper studies Wittgenstein’s later observations on moral disagreements. First, it examines the practice of reason-giving and justification in moral disa-greement. It argues that, for Wittgenstein, moral reasons are descriptions which are used to justify a moral evaluation. Second, it explains that the adequacy and conclusiveness of moral reasons and justifications are dependent on their appeal to whomever they are given, not on how the world is. Third, it shows that Wittgenstein’s remarks on the inconclusiveness of moral reasons and jus-tification do not entail a commitment to moral relativism. Lastly, it shows how Wittgenstein’s observations can be used in future investigations to develop a new picture of deep moral disagreements.

This paper shows that Wittgenstein's later explorations of the meaning of expressive moral judgements reach far deeper than has so far been noticed. It is argued that an adequate description of the meaning of expressive moral judgements requires engaging in a grammatical investigation that focuses on three interwoven components within specific language-games. First, the ethical reactions expressed by moral words and the additional purpose they may fulfil. Second, the features of the actions which are bound up with moral words and are constitutive of our moral evaluations. And, finally, the forms of life in which expressive moral judgements and moral language-games are embedded.

Este artículo estudia las observaciones tardías de Wittgenstein sobre los des-acuerdos morales. Primero, examina las prácticas de justificación y dar razones en los desacuerdos morales. Argumenta que, para Wittgenstein, las razones morales son descripciones que se utilizan para justificar una evaluación moral. Segundo, explica que la idoneidad y el carácter concluyente de las razones y justificaciones morales dependen de su atractivo para quienquiera que se presenten, no de cómo es el mundo. Tercero, muestra que las observaciones de Wittgenstein sobre el carácter inconcluyente de las razones y justificaciones mora-les no implican un compromiso con el relativismo moral. Finalmente, muestra como las observaciones de Wittgenstein pueden usarse en futuras investigaciones para desarrollar una nueva imagen de los desacuerdos morales profundos. This paper studies Wittgenstein’s later observations on moral disagreements. First, it examines the practice of reason-giving and justification in moral disagreement. It argues that, for Wittgenstein, moral reasons are descriptions which are used to justify a moral evaluation. Second, it explains that the adequacy and conclusiveness of moral reasons and justifications are dependent on their appeal to whomever they are given, not on how the world is. Third, it shows that Wittgenstein’s remarks on the inconclusiveness of moral reasons and justification do not entail a commitment to moral relativism. Lastly, it shows how Wittgenstein’s observations can be used in future investigations to develop a new picture of deep moral disagreements

This paper offers a novel interpretation of Wittgenstein’s early conception of ethics and the good ethical life. Initially, it critically examines the widespread view according to which Wittgenstein’s early conception of ethics and the good ethical life involves having a certain ethical attitude to the world. It points out that this reading incurs in some mistakes and shortcomings, thereby suggesting the need for an alternative reading that avoids and amends these inadequacies. Subsequently, it sets out to offer said reading. Specifically, it is argued that the good ethical life is predicated on a good exercise of the ethical will and solving the riddle of life, both of which demand a certain view of, and not an attitude to, the world. This view is the view of the world sub specie aeterni.

This paper discusses the meta-ethical implications of Wittgenstein’s later moral philosophy. According to Lovibond and Brandhorst, Wittgenstein provided a novel conception of moral facts, properties and objects by adopting deflationism. Lovibond argues that Wittgenstein’s seamless conception of language together with his non-foundational epistemology and non-transcendent understanding of rationality involves a change of perspective towards a plausible and non-mystificatory moral realism. Meanwhile, Brandhorst argues that Wittgenstein’s provides a deflationist conception of moral truths from which we obtain a deflationist conception of moral facts. This paper argues, on the contrary, that the attribution of deflationism does not do justice to Wittgenstein’s later work. It is concluded, therefore, that the appeal to deflationism does not afford or substantiate the exegetical claims made by Lovibond and Brandhorst.

In this paper I offer a novel interpretation of Wittgenstein's claim that ‘ethics is transcendental’. Initially, I set out to offer said interpretation by resorting to both Wittgenstein's understanding of ethics and his understanding of the transcendentality of logic—which entails taking Wittgenstein as endorsing a Kantian understanding of the notion ‘transcendental’. This leads to the claim that ethics is transcendental insofar as it is the condition of a certain ethical experience. Nevertheless, this interpretation involves some inadequacies due to certain incompatibilities between the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and the aforementioned Kantian understanding of the notion ‘transcendental’. I identify the peculiarities of Wittgenstein's understanding of the notion ‘transcendental’, and on this basis, I set forth a novel interpretation of 6.421. Specifically, I argue that ethics is transcendental insofar as it is internal to or constitutive of a certain mystical view: viewing the world sub specie aeterni as something valuable.

Pleasants argues in favour of the idea of basic moral certainties. Analogous to Wittgenstein’s basic empirical certainties, basic moral certainties are universal certainties that cannot be justified, asserted or meaningfully doubted. They are a fundamental condition of morality as such, thus allowing us to carry out other moral operations. Brice and Rummens have criticized Pleasants’ proposal, arguing that basic moral certainties are significantly disanalogous to Wittgenstein’s basic empirical certainties. Brice argues that Pleasants does not differentiate between a bottom-up and a top-down approach to basic certainties nor does he acknowledge the difference that this distinction constitutes in the foundational role of a certainty. Meanwhile, Rummens claims that basic moral certainties are not universal. Conversely, they are moral hinges embedded in certain culturally and historically specific moral language-games. Pleasants has provided a response to these criticisms, while defending the universality and naturalism of basic moral certainties. In this article, I single out the problems in Pleasants’ response to the criticisms introduced by Brice and Rummens. I argue that Pleasants must present further arguments in order to demonstrate that basic moral certainties are analogous to basic empirical certainties. I also argue that the existence of basic moral certainties that coalesce with numerous exceptions and suspensions generates significant problems in Pleasants’ proposal. I advance two cases regarding euthanasia that meaningfully challenge and doubt Pleasants’ central basic moral certainty: the wrongness of killing innocent human beings. Additionally, both cases are employed to meaningfully doubt and challenge Pleasants’ basic moral certainty of the badness of death.

The aim of the present article is twofold. Firstly, it aims to study the problems arising from the notion of rule proposed by Peter Winch in The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy to account for all meaningful behavior. On the one hand, it will analyze the problems in the argument posed by Winch in order to state that all meaningful behavior is governed by rules. On the other hand, it will focus on the problems concerning his conception of rules and rule-following, with specific emphasis on pointing out the issues that arise from the criterion posed by Winch in order to determine when a rule is being followed. Secondly, it aims to reassess Winch’s proposal and reformulate, accommodate and define his notion of rule in an intentional account of meaningful behavior, thus solving the problems presented. In addition, it will provide a criterion that allows to determine when a rule is being followed.

The Transcendental Reading of the Tractatus argues that Wittgenstein endorses, under the notion of ‘metaphysical subject’, the existence of a willing subject as a transcendental condition of ethics and representation. Tejedor aims to reject this reading resorting to three criticisms. The notion of ‘willing subject’ does not appear explicitly in, nor can it be deduced from, the Tractatus, the metaphysical subject and the willing subject are not synonymous or analogous notions and, finally, Wittgenstein abandons the notion of ‘willing subject’ at the end of the Notebooks. The aim of this article is twofold. Firstly, it analyzes the critique introduced by Tejedor and presents three problems that demonstrate that Tejedor’s critique cannot adequately reject the Transcendental Reading. Secondly, it sets forth an alternative reading of the Tractatus that overcomes the issues that stem from the Transcendental Reading. This alternative reading conceives the metaphysical subject as an ethical subject and a willing subject. Additionally, it advances an alternative account of the transcendental character of ethics that does not defend the existence of a transcendental subject understood as a condition of ethics and representation in the Tractatus.