Jörg Tremmel

While the unprecedented lockdown measures were at the heart of the debate in the first year of the pandemic, the focus since then has shifted to vaccination issues. The reason, of course, is that vaccines and vaccinations have become available by now. All experts agree: If mankind had failed to develop vaccines against SARS-CoV-2, the death toll would have been much higher. This issue seeks to explore what could be described as a “generational approach to vaccinations”. The question “What can we do to avoid future pandemics?” is related to different aspects of the failures and successes of humanity’s vaccination strategy against SARS-CoV-2. Pathogens are among the existential risks to humanity that could potentially kill a large part of it in a very short time. For all the tragedy and horror it has brought upon the world, the Corona virus has not been lethal on such a large, all-encompassing scale. But it could serve as a wake-up call for more and better prevention in the future, put differently: as a call to build a “preventive society”. When people look back to the year 2022 from the year 2200, will they think of the absence of mandatory vaccination as a dangerous anachronism? And will the unequal global distribution of vaccines be seen as an unbearable vice of our epoch? And will “human infection studies” still be dismissed as unethical if a dangerous new virus boards human bodies? If intergenerational justice means improving the life chances and living conditions of future generations to the largest possible extent, then its link to (the avoidance) of infectious diseases is obvious. We should protect future generations from foreseeable damage if we have the power to do so. “We” is humankind in its entirety. Politically, humanity is divided into many single nations. But biologically, as members of the same species, we share the same vulnerability regardless of ethnicity. The regular reader of this journal might wonder why this issue of IGJR has a different structure. An unprecedented pandemic calls for an unprecedented reaction and therefore IGJR 1/2021 and 2/2021 are special issues that deal with this disruptive event. We have invited several health experts, politicians and scholars alike to share their perspectives in short opinion pieces (instead of regular peer-reviewed articles). And we are exploring something new: the publication of a FRFG policy paper. This policy paper starts off with a historical overview on how pandemics have afflicted humanity in the past. It separates moral from legal duties and formulates “epidemiological imperatives” – the way of thinking of a responsible and solidary individual facing the task of preventing an outbreak of epidemics in a community. With the discovery of vaccines, and their availability, the catalogue of duties is increased by one more: to get the jabs as an act of solidarity with others, including future generations. This would prevent states from being forced to take disease control measures that bring about drastic collateral damage. During the first two years of the Corona pandemic, states have imposed lockdowns. The closure of schools has put a special burden on the youngest members of society. This could have been prevented during the second and the further waves. The policy paper also calls for more government funding for prophylactic vaccine research and for the designation of vaccines as “global public goods”. The issue then moves on to a section dedicated to opinion papers by various different authors. The first paper, written by Agnes Binagwaho and Kedest Mathewos (both from University of Global Health Equity, Rwanda), focuses on the issue of health inequity, a concern which has gained more and more traction during the Covid-19 pandemic. The paper examines how vaccine distribution during the pandemic was mainly focused on the global north and how such actions might affect future generations’ perception of what is just, fair and morally correct. The second paper, by Samantha Vanderslott (University of Oxford), focuses on the right and wrongdoings connected to pandemic preparedness and response. The third paper, authored by Rajeev Sadanandan (Health Systems Transformation Platform, India), talks about the lessons that can and should be drawn from child immunisations. The fourth paper, by Adriano Mannino (LMU and Parmenides Foundation, Munich), delves into the question how future generations will assess our actions and our response to the current pandemic. The fifth and final paper, written by Jörg Tremmel (FRFG and University Tübingen), is centered around the question whether human infection studies could have been implemented during the early stages of the pandemic to minimise deaths and severe infections. The issue concludes with two reviews on recent books by Alberto Giubilini and Katie Wright. In his review of Giubilini’s The Ethics of Vaccination, Marius Kunte notes that it contains a “thought-provoking plea” for individual, collective and institutional obligations to reach high vaccination rates. Judith Kausch-Zongo concludes her review of Wright’s Gender, Migration and the Intergenerational Transfer of Human Wellbeing with a special emphasis on the book’s empirical findings, and praises it in its entirety as “undoubtedly important”. Both books serve as poignant reminders of how sustainable societies can only emerge once the challenges revolving around its most vulnerable members have been properly addressed.

While the unprecedented lockdown measures were at the heart of the debate in the first year of the pandemic, the focus since then has shifted to vaccination issues. The reason, of course, is that vaccines and vaccinations have become available by now. All experts agree: If mankind had failed to develop vaccines against SARS-CoV-2, the death toll would have been much higher. This issue seeks to explore what could be described as a “generational approach to vaccinations”. The question “What can we do to avoid future pandemics?” is related to different aspects of the failures and successes of humanity’s vaccination strategy against SARS-CoV-2. Pathogens are among the existential risks to humanity that could potentially kill a large part of it in a very short time. For all the tragedy and horror it has brought upon the world, the Corona virus has not been lethal on such a large, all-encompassing scale. But it could serve as a wake-up call for more and better prevention in the future, put differently: as a call to build a “preventive society”. When people look back to the year 2022 from the year 2200, will they think of the absence of mandatory vaccination as a dangerous anachronism? And will the unequal global distribution of vaccines be seen as an unbearable vice of our epoch? And will “human infection studies” still be dismissed as unethical if a dangerous new virus boards human bodies? If intergenerational justice means improving the life chances and living conditions of future generations to the largest possible extent, then its link to (the avoidance) of infectious diseases is obvious. We should protect future generations from foreseeable damage if we have the power to do so. “We” is humankind in its entirety. Politically, humanity is divided into many single nations. But biologically, as members of the same species, we share the same vulnerability regardless of ethnicity. The regular reader of this journal might wonder why this issue of IGJR has a different structure. An unprecedented pandemic calls for an unprecedented reaction and therefore IGJR 1/2021 and 2/2021 are special issues that deal with this disruptive event. We have invited several health experts, politicians and scholars alike to share their perspectives in short opinion pieces (instead of regular peer-reviewed articles). And we are exploring something new: the publication of a FRFG policy paper. This policy paper starts off with a historical overview on how pandemics have afflicted humanity in the past. It separates moral from legal duties and formulates “epidemiological imperatives” – the way of thinking of a responsible and solidary individual facing the task of preventing an outbreak of epidemics in a community. With the discovery of vaccines, and their availability, the catalogue of duties is increased by one more: to get the jabs as an act of solidarity with others, including future generations. This would prevent states from being forced to take disease control measures that bring about drastic collateral damage. During the first two years of the Corona pandemic, states have imposed lockdowns. The closure of schools has put a special burden on the youngest members of society. This could have been prevented during the second and the further waves. The policy paper also calls for more government funding for prophylactic vaccine research and for the designation of vaccines as “global public goods”. The issue then moves on to a section dedicated to opinion papers by various different authors. The first paper, written by Agnes Binagwaho and Kedest Mathewos (both from University of Global Health Equity, Rwanda), focuses on the issue of health inequity, a concern which has gained more and more traction during the Covid-19 pandemic. The paper examines how vaccine distribution during the pandemic was mainly focused on the global north and how such actions might affect future generations’ perception of what is just, fair and morally correct. The second paper, by Samantha Vanderslott (University of Oxford), focuses on the right and wrongdoings connected to pandemic preparedness and response. The third paper, authored by Rajeev Sadanandan (Health Systems Transformation Platform, India), talks about the lessons that can and should be drawn from child immunisations. The fourth paper, by Adriano Mannino (LMU and Parmenides Foundation, Munich), delves into the question how future generations will assess our actions and our response to the current pandemic. The fifth and final paper, written by Jörg Tremmel (FRFG and University Tübingen), is centered around the question whether human infection studies could have been implemented during the early stages of the pandemic to minimise deaths and severe infections. The issue concludes with two reviews on recent books by Alberto Giubilini and Katie Wright. In his review of Giubilini’s The Ethics of Vaccination, Marius Kunte notes that it contains a “thought-provoking plea” for individual, collective and institutional obligations to reach high vaccination rates. Judith Kausch-Zongo concludes her review of Wright’s Gender, Migration and the Intergenerational Transfer of Human Wellbeing with a special emphasis on the book’s empirical findings, and praises it in its entirety as “undoubtedly important”. Both books serve as poignant reminders of how sustainable societies can only emerge once the challenges revolving around its most vulnerable members have been properly addressed.

Intergenerationelle Gerechtigkeit behandelt die Unterschiede zwischen Generationen, während intragenerationelle Gerechtigkeit die Unterschiede innerhalb einer Generation thematisiert. Innerhalb von Gleichaltrigen gibt es immer diverse Ungleichheiten, und je nach Kontext werden sie zu Ausgangspunkten für jeweils eine spezifische Gerechtigkeitsfrage. Geht es um Arm und Reich, so ist dies die »soziale Gerechtigkeit«, geht es um Männer und Frauen so ist dies die »Geschlechtergerechtigkeit – und diese Liste ließe sich erweitern auf Gerechtigkeit zwischen Kranken und Gesunden, Familien und Kinderlosen, Menschen unterschiedlicher Hautfarben usw..

More than some other fields of ethics, climate ethics is related to pressing real-world problems. Climate ethicists have a responsibility to be precise about the status of the problems they discuss. The non-identity problem (NIP) plays are a prominent role in the climate ethics literature. In a widely discussed statement, Derek Parfit claimed that a risky climate policy is not harmful for (distant) future people. But this ignores the “insignificant-causal-factors rejoinder”. The Parfitian assertion is still treated as serious problem to theories of climate justice in key philosophical texts, and this may mislead climate policy decision-makers. Philosophers should acknowledge that the NIP, when applied to climate change, is “just” a thought experiment and should communicate it in this way to people outside the philosophical community.

Among the many headlines that followed the 2018 midterm elections in the United States, one stood out as very good news for political representation: the election of Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. Irrespective of one’s political leanings – Republican or Democrat – it is an extraordinary achievement for a 29-year-old woman and daughter to a Puerto Rican to be elected into the House of Representatives. Against a predominantly old, male, and white sitting Congress, her election means a step towards better representation of certain demographics in American policy-making processes. Ocasio-Cortez represents a minority around the world, as young- people are notoriously underrepresented in political parties and trade unions – in fact, in political decision-making processes writ large. And this despite the fact that a 29-year-old will have to live a lot longer with the intended and unintended consequences of political decisions taken in 2018. In other words, while younger people are disproportionately affected by political decisions, they are at the same time heavily underrepresented in organisations and processes leading to the decisions. The first prize of the Intergenerational Justice Prize 2017/18 was awarded to Mona Lena Krook and Mary K. Nugent who contribute to this debate by arguing that lowering the eligibility age to run for office leads to better representation of the youngest and next-youngest cohorts in parliament. Drawing on data from 144 countries and 192 parliaments, they first show that the average “waiting period” for citizens – defined as the difference between the legal voting age and the legal age for holding office – is 5.3 years. By combining these data with MPs’ ages from around the world, they are able to show a strong correlation between eligibility age and MPs’ ages. In their words, the results show that “the average impact of reducing the minimum age to stand for office from 25 to 18 would be to increase the proportion of MPs under 45 by over 5 percentage points”. Based on literature on women and young people in politics, the authors attribute these effects to the mobilising character of a lower age requirement. It allows citizens to compete in elections at a younger age and this increases the probability of younger people being represented in parliament. Aksel Sundström and Daniel Stockemer, also among the winners of the Intergenerational Justice Prize 2017/18, take a closer look at the age of parliamentarians and investigate which political parties can help to foster the election of young parliamentarians, and to what extent. After all, political parties act as gatekeepers because they are in control of the list of candidates running for election. Drawing on theories of party politics, the authors argue for five different factors that could possibly explain the share of young MPs: the age of the party leader, the age of the party, the size of party support, the party’s ideology, and the party’s formal recruitment procedure for candidates. In other words, the authors theorise that having a young network, a large outreach, and an ideology or organisational structure that attracts the young should increase a party’s share of young MPs. To test their hypotheses, the authors use data on over 6,000 Members of the European Parliament ever elected and match them with information on party characteristics. Rather surprisingly, their various statistical models show no noteworthy effect of any of the party characteristics on the representation of young MPs in the European Parliament, 1979-2019. Only parties with a more libertarian ideology, as opposed to an authoritarian ideology, are predicted to have somewhat younger MEPs. But the effects are small. This suggests that, irrespective of their individual features, there are hardly any noteworthy differences between parties’ ability to promote the election of young MPs. It follows that other parties may want to adopt other means to accomplish a better representation of the young; the authors’ suggestion of applying youth quotas within parties provides one potential avenue. In the final article by the winners of this year’s Intergenerational Justice Prize, Thomas Tozer discusses the potential of quotas in his normative contribution on the representation of the young. He makes a case for the normative desirability of “descriptive representation” of the young within political parties and trade unions. Specifically, he argues that democracy requires the promoting of substantive equality and people’s substantive interests and that descriptive representation of the young can achieve both. This is because the young have unique concerns that are significant and because their concerns might be affected by representatives’ behaviour. Quotas that require parties and trade unions to enrol a certain share of young members, Tozer argues, might be an option but not ideal because people choose to become members of such organisations. As an alternative, he proposes the creation of incentives for young people to join parties and trade unions, such as free membership. In the book review section, Emily Ford assesses Richard Katz and Peter Mair’s Democracy and the Cartelization of Political Parties. The book’s central argument is that parties are developing or have already developed into cartels, driven by a desire to maintain their position in the face of declining political participation. They limit political competition between them and try to deter new party entry. Ford’s review overall is positive and she recommends the book to scholars and students as a discussion of the social pressures that parties are exposed to and how they are coping with them. In a second book review, Anna Braam writes about Ian Gough’s Heat, Greed and Human Need. Climate Change, Capitalism and Sustainable Wellbeing, a recent study which suggests three steps for countries to accomplish staying below a 1.5°C rise above pre-industrial temperatures: eco-efficient production, changing patterns of consumption, and a reduction of absolute consumption. According to Braam, the book’s interdisciplinary approach – drawing on economic, ecological, political and social aspects of climate change – is convincing, and the book’s argument is credible, especially regarding the rich countries. Ann-Kristin Kölln Antony Mason Maria Lenk Jörg Tremmel Markus Rutsche

Human activity has reshaped all parts of the Earth system. For this reason, a vast majority of geologists at the 35th International Geological Congress in Cape Town (September 2016) spoke out in favor of changing the classification of geological epochs and of declaring a new world age – the Anthropocene. This chapter points at implications that the proclamation of the Anthropocene should have for the currently relevant concept of democracy. In particular, it is argued that the transition into a new phase of geology also necessitates a further advancement of our form of government. Democracy, as it has been conceived of and practiced until now, has to a large extent ignored the problem of ‘presentism’. This chapter suggests an extension of the 300-years-old separation of powers between the legislative, executive and judicial branch. It is argued that in order to make our political system more future-oriented, there is a need for a new (fourth) branch which ensures that the interests of future generations be taken into account within today's decision-making process. A newly-established ‘future council’ should have the right to introduce legislation, integrating the competences of this new institution with those of parliament. The chapter concludes with a discussion about the legitimacy of offices for future generations (OFGs) as the embodiment of the proposed future branch.

Among the many headlines that followed the 2018 midterm elections in the United States, one stood out as very good news for political representation: the election of Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. Irrespective of one’s political leanings – Republican or Democrat – it is an extraordinary achievement for a 29-year-old woman and daughter to a Puerto Rican to be elected into the House of Representatives. Against a predominantly old, male, and white sitting Congress, her election means a step towards better representation of certain demographics in American policy-making processes. Ocasio-Cortez represents a minority around the world, as young- people are notoriously underrepresented in political parties and trade unions – in fact, in political decision-making processes writ large. And this despite the fact that a 29-year-old will have to live a lot longer with the intended and unintended consequences of political decisions taken in 2018. In other words, while younger people are disproportionately affected by political decisions, they are at the same time heavily underrepresented in organisations and processes leading to the decisions. The first prize of the Intergenerational Justice Prize 2017/18 was awarded to Mona Lena Krook and Mary K. Nugent who contribute to this debate by arguing that lowering the eligibility age to run for office leads to better representation of the youngest and next-youngest cohorts in parliament. Drawing on data from 144 countries and 192 parliaments, they first show that the average “waiting period” for citizens – defined as the difference between the legal voting age and the legal age for holding office – is 5.3 years. By combining these data with MPs’ ages from around the world, they are able to show a strong correlation between eligibility age and MPs’ ages. In their words, the results show that “the average impact of reducing the minimum age to stand for office from 25 to 18 would be to increase the proportion of MPs under 45 by over 5 percentage points”. Based on literature on women and young people in politics, the authors attribute these effects to the mobilising character of a lower age requirement. It allows citizens to compete in elections at a younger age and this increases the probability of younger people being represented in parliament. Aksel Sundström and Daniel Stockemer, also among the winners of the Intergenerational Justice Prize 2017/18, take a closer look at the age of parliamentarians and investigate which political parties can help to foster the election of young parliamentarians, and to what extent. After all, political parties act as gatekeepers because they are in control of the list of candidates running for election. Drawing on theories of party politics, the authors argue for five different factors that could possibly explain the share of young MPs: the age of the party leader, the age of the party, the size of party support, the party’s ideology, and the party’s formal recruitment procedure for candidates. In other words, the authors theorise that having a young network, a large outreach, and an ideology or organisational structure that attracts the young should increase a party’s share of young MPs. To test their hypotheses, the authors use data on over 6,000 Members of the European Parliament ever elected and match them with information on party characteristics. Rather surprisingly, their various statistical models show no noteworthy effect of any of the party characteristics on the representation of young MPs in the European Parliament, 1979-2019. Only parties with a more libertarian ideology, as opposed to an authoritarian ideology, are predicted to have somewhat younger MEPs. But the effects are small. This suggests that, irrespective of their individual features, there are hardly any noteworthy differences between parties’ ability to promote the election of young MPs. It follows that other parties may want to adopt other means to accomplish a better representation of the young; the authors’ suggestion of applying youth quotas within parties provides one potential avenue. In the final article by the winners of this year’s Intergenerational Justice Prize, Thomas Tozer discusses the potential of quotas in his normative contribution on the representation of the young. He makes a case for the normative desirability of “descriptive representation” of the young within political parties and trade unions. Specifically, he argues that democracy requires the promoting of substantive equality and people’s substantive interests and that descriptive representation of the young can achieve both. This is because the young have unique concerns that are significant and because their concerns might be affected by representatives’ behaviour. Quotas that require parties and trade unions to enrol a certain share of young members, Tozer argues, might be an option but not ideal because people choose to become members of such organisations. As an alternative, he proposes the creation of incentives for young people to join parties and trade unions, such as free membership. In the book review section, Emily Ford assesses Richard Katz and Peter Mair’s Democracy and the Cartelization of Political Parties. The book’s central argument is that parties are developing or have already developed into cartels, driven by a desire to maintain their position in the face of declining political participation. They limit political competition between them and try to deter new party entry. Ford’s review overall is positive and she recommends the book to scholars and students as a discussion of the social pressures that parties are exposed to and how they are coping with them. In a second book review, Anna Braam writes about Ian Gough’s Heat, Greed and Human Need. Climate Change, Capitalism and Sustainable Wellbeing, a recent study which suggests three steps for countries to accomplish staying below a 1.5°C rise above pre-industrial temperatures: eco-efficient production, changing patterns of consumption, and a reduction of absolute consumption. According to Braam, the book’s interdisciplinary approach – drawing on economic, ecological, political and social aspects of climate change – is convincing, and the book’s argument is credible, especially regarding the rich countries. Ann-Kristin Kölln Antony Mason Maria Lenk Jörg Tremmel Markus Rutsche

While other instruments to prevent the marginalisation of certain population groups – such as gender or ethnic quotas – have been investigated and discussed substantially in research and politics in recent years, the concept of “youth quotas” has not received any attention of this kind in the literature so far. This is why this journal will serve as a useful source of information for anyone who is interested in this topic and who sees the currently insufficient level of youth participation in parliaments, business, academia, and other public institutions, as a phenomenon that should be remedied, no matter to which generation one belongs. Since “youth” is a far-reaching term that might give rise to misunderstandings, it is important to clarify that, in this journal, it refers primarily to the 15-30 year olds among the population. The contributions analyse in depth whether youth quotas are an effective means to remedy the underrepresentation of youth in parliaments, to create more “youth-friendly” policies that focus on future trends and developments with which the next generations will have to cope, and to counteract the changes in age demographics that are already visible today. Te latter is particularly pertinent in the context of youth quotas, since evidence suggests that in many Western countries the percentage of young people among the whole population is constantly decreasing. For instance, Eurostat figures for population projections from 2011 indicate such a development: while in 1960, in all 27 EU countries as well as in the four EFTA countries the average percentage of the population aged over 65 was only around 9%, this proportion will increase to more than 19% in 2020 and to over 29% by 2060. Some other key issues addressed in this journal pertain to the following questions. Can the introduction of youth quotas be justified in a democratic system? Would they really bring about intergenerationally fairer outcomes? Will young representatives necessarily defend and respect the interests of the youth? And are there more effective and justifiable instruments to enhance youth participation in parliament or other institutions? In the opening article, Juliana Bidadanure claims that the implementation of youth quotas in parliaments would produce fairer outcomes for the current young generation as well as for future generations. She justifies this thesis with two different possible effects of youth quotas, namely substantive representation and symbolic representation. Substantive representation refers to the belief that young representatives in parliament may represent the interests of youth better and therefore implement more policies that have a long-term view, e.g. with regard to the environment. With the model of symbolic representation, Bidadanure also suggests that youth quotas might play a symbolic role when it comes to promoting a community of equals with the same political rights. Indirectly, this might improve political participation of youth as a whole. In the subsequent article, Ivo Wallimann-Helmer tries to find an answer to the question of whether youth quotas will help to avoid future disasters, for instance those related to public debt or the environment. Trying to find a possible justification for youth quotas, he draws four conclusions. First, quotas are not a normative goal in themselves, but only a means to avoid unjustified discrimination. Second, in a democracy quotas are used to guarantee that the interests of different population groups are effectively translated into policy, hence they are most important for the legislative assembly. Third, in the light of recent demographic changes, youth quotas can be justified to avoid the marginalisation of young people’s interests. In this context, Wallimann-Helmer also discusses which design of quotas would be appropriate to achieve this goal. The last and most convincing argument for the implementation of youth quotas, according to the author, is that they might ensure better legitimacy of the long-term impacts of policy decisions taken today. The third article, by Marcel Wissenburg, brings the social justice perspective into the discussion on whether or not to introduce quotas for the young. According to Wissenburg, the social justice discourse retains numerous questionable underlying assumptions, seven of which he addresses from a libertarian perspective. By adopting this perspective, he concludes that the theory of temporal justice makes clear that responsibility cannot only be borne by the young or future generations, but that is has to be shared by the population as a whole. Even though this conclusion provides him with a possible justification for youth quotas, he draws the attention to another instrument he considers more appropriate to ensure youth participation: the concept of veto rights. In our special section, entitled “Country Report: Youth Quotas in Peru”, Christian Pardo Reyes tells the story of how he successfully started a campaign in Lima, Peru, to introduce a quota system reflecting the need to involve youth at all levels of government power. His organisation became known as Internacional Juvenil. In order to achieve its goals, it established strong relationships with other youth organisations, state agencies and influential political leaders. Today, its work continues in other countries of the world, such as Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Mexico and Spain, where a “Youth Tithe” similar to the Peruvian model is being promoted. The topic of youth quotas raises political, philosophical, legal, demographic, environmental and sociological questions. Interdisciplinarity is central to this new topic, which has been neglected so far by researchers in these disciplines. We hope that this issue kicks off the intensive debate that the theme deserves. We wish you an insightful and rewarding read. Petter Haakenstad Godli, Antony Mason, Stephanie Kalla, Igor Dimitrijoski, Jörg Tremmel, Markus Rutsche

If you had to choose one moment in history in which to be born, and you didn’t know in advance whether you were going to be male or female, which country you were going to be from, what your status was, you’d choose right now.” This answer to his one-question test was used by Barack Obama in several of his speeches to demonstrate how humanity has made progress up until the present day. Is he right? Beyond asking people what their preferred birth year would be in the context of such a thought experiment, it is possible to compare the attractiveness of actual birth years from official statistics. There are already a handful of indices which are, if recorded repeatedly, usable for measuring the changes in quality-of-life circumstances over time, and thus the “position” of succeeding generations in the course of history. Jamie McQuilkin, who is the winner of the 2016/17 Demography Prize, derives an additional index from national statistics in the opening article of this second part of the IGJR double issue on “Measuring Intergenerational Justice for Public Policy”. He combines nine indicators: forest degradation rate, share of low-carbon energy consumption, and carbon footprint in the environmental dimension; adjusted net savings, current account balance, and wealth in equality in the economic dimension; and primary pupil-teacher ratio, fertility rate, and GDP-adjusted child mortality in the social dimension. Unlike other index-builders, McQuilkin takes great pains to lay out all the premises, definitions and data sources of his account in as clear a manner as possible, which makes his article an accessible and instructive read. All-encompassing comparisons of the position of a generation in the “lottery of timing” are nonetheless notoriously difficult to draw. The two subsequent articles confine themselves to public policy. They both treat financial transfers between generations; but a deeper look reveals that their underlying rationale is quite different. Bernhard Hammer, Tanja Istenič and Lili Vargha use a framework of direct reciprocity between generations whereas Paul Kershaw builds upon a concept of indirect reciprocity. This is best explained when we look at the relationship between generations before the welfare state came into being. The directly reciprocal generational contract is the implicit expectation that parents will care for their children until they are old enough to care for themselves, and children will support their parents, in turn, when their parents can no longer support themselves. Here, the exchange happens between the same generational cohorts but while they are in different age groups. In their work, Hammer, Istenič and Vargha adapt this idea in the context of the welfare state, pinpointing the role of human capital-building and reproduction for the maintenance of generational contracts. The authors develop a new indicator to analyse whether there is a balance between transfers to children and transfers expected by the elderly population in the future. Their results indicate that, in most of the 16 EU countries analysed, the human capital investments in children are far too low to finance the necessary transfers to the elderly population in the future. In the final article, Kershaw writes within a framework of a different logic: indirect reciprocity. Imagine in pre-welfare-state times the members of three generations walking together. The daughter accompanies her mother and her grandmother as they embark on a ritual journey intended to end with the grandmother’s voluntary death. The girl takes pity on her grandmother and convinces her mother to promise to care for the old woman until her natural death in exchange for a promise from the girl to do the same for her mother when the time comes. Here, the exchange does not happen between the same generational cohorts. The creditor generation cannot be paid back by the deceased debtor generation. As the middle generation has become the debtor generation, the obligation is passed on the next generation. Kershaw discusses three different approaches in this framework for Canada: the elderly/non-elderly spending ratio; intergenerational reciprocity; and the ability to pay of different age cohorts. Next to calculating some striking results, Kershaw further develops the elderly bias in social spending as an indicator for the fairness of intergenerational welfare state contracts. For the utility of cross-country comparisons, medical care spending and education must be taken into account according to Kershaw. Kershaw’s first two stages of analysis are complemented by a discussion about the fairness of the different treatment of generations in welfare states. Since some cohorts are born into favourable eras, and others are not, it is important to examine intergenerational public finances by reference to the standard of living inherited by different age groups, and the socio-economic circumstances they currently face. In response to this, Kershaw in the third stage of his research considers how the standard of living for contemporary seniors compares with that of elderly Canadians four decades earlier; and how the standard of living four decades earlier – when contemporary seniors were young adults – compares with that of young people today. In short, Kershaw suggests that the Canadian government needs to introduce policy changes to readjust the intergenerational imbalances that are negatively affecting younger generations. In the book review section, the first review assesses Birnbaum, Ferrarini, Nelson and Palme’s The Generational Welfare Contract: Justice, Institutions and Outcomes. Again, the focus is on the redistribution of a welfare state’s resources in time. Partly qualifying the “mainstream” thesis that public programmes, such as health care and pensions, are not affordable at their current extent in ageing welfare states, the authors put forward the hypothesis that intergenerational welfare state contracts can lead to positive-sum solutions. In the second book review, Michael Rose’s The Representation of Future Generations in Today’s Democracy, is brought to the attention of the scientific community. The book is written in German but of importance for the debate on specialised agencies for the future. Jörg Tremmel Maria Lenk Antony Mason Markus Rutsche

Constitutions enshrine the fundamental values of a people and build a framework for a state’s public policy. With regard to intergenerational justice; their endurance gives rise to two concerns: the welfare concern and the sovereignty concern. In this paper; I outline a procedure for constitution- amending that is intergenerationally just. In its line of reasoning; the paper debates ideas such as perpetual constitutions; sunset constitutions; constitutional reform commissions and constitutional conventions both historically and analytically. It arrives at the conclusion that recurrent constitutional reform commissions in fixed time intervals strike the best balance between the necessary rigidity and the necessary flexibility of constitutions.

Constitutions enshrine the fundamental values of a people and they build a framework for a state’s public policy. With regard to generational change, their endurance gives rise to two interlinked concerns: the sovereignty concern and the forgone welfare concern. If constitutions are intergenerational contracts, how (in)flexible should they be? This article discusses perpetual constitutions, sunset constitutions, constitutional reform commissions and constitutional conventions, both historically and analytically. It arrives at the conclusion that very rigid constitutions are incompatible with the principle of intergenerational justice. Recurring constitutional reform commissions in fixed time intervals would give each generation of citizens a say without leaning too much to the side of flexibility.

If you had to choose one moment in history in which to be born, and you didn’t know in advance whether you were going to be male or female, which country you were going to be from, what your status was, you’d choose right now.” This answer to his one-question test was used by Barack Obama in several of his speeches to demonstrate how humanity has made progress up until the present day. Is he right? Beyond asking people what their preferred birth year would be in the context of such a thought experiment, it is possible to compare the attractiveness of actual birth years from official statistics. There are already a handful of indices which are, if recorded repeatedly, usable for measuring the changes in quality-of-life circumstances over time, and thus the “position” of succeeding generations in the course of history. Jamie McQuilkin, who is the winner of the 2016/17 Demography Prize, derives an additional index from national statistics in the opening article of this second part of the IGJR double issue on “Measuring Intergenerational Justice for Public Policy”. He combines nine indicators: forest degradation rate, share of low-carbon energy consumption, and carbon footprint in the environmental dimension; adjusted net savings, current account balance, and wealth in equality in the economic dimension; and primary pupil-teacher ratio, fertility rate, and GDP-adjusted child mortality in the social dimension. Unlike other index-builders, McQuilkin takes great pains to lay out all the premises, definitions and data sources of his account in as clear a manner as possible, which makes his article an accessible and instructive read. All-encompassing comparisons of the position of a generation in the “lottery of timing” are nonetheless notoriously difficult to draw. The two subsequent articles confine themselves to public policy. They both treat financial transfers between generations; but a deeper look reveals that their underlying rationale is quite different. Bernhard Hammer, Tanja Istenič and Lili Vargha use a framework of direct reciprocity between generations whereas Paul Kershaw builds upon a concept of indirect reciprocity. This is best explained when we look at the relationship between generations before the welfare state came into being. The directly reciprocal generational contract is the implicit expectation that parents will care for their children until they are old enough to care for themselves, and children will support their parents, in turn, when their parents can no longer support themselves. Here, the exchange happens between the same generational cohorts but while they are in different age groups. In their work, Hammer, Istenič and Vargha adapt this idea in the context of the welfare state, pinpointing the role of human capital-building and reproduction for the maintenance of generational contracts. The authors develop a new indicator to analyse whether there is a balance between transfers to children and transfers expected by the elderly population in the future. Their results indicate that, in most of the 16 EU countries analysed, the human capital investments in children are far too low to finance the necessary transfers to the elderly population in the future. In the final article, Kershaw writes within a framework of a different logic: indirect reciprocity. Imagine in pre-welfare-state times the members of three generations walking together. The daughter accompanies her mother and her grandmother as they embark on a ritual journey intended to end with the grandmother’s voluntary death. The girl takes pity on her grandmother and convinces her mother to promise to care for the old woman until her natural death in exchange for a promise from the girl to do the same for her mother when the time comes. Here, the exchange does not happen between the same generational cohorts. The creditor generation cannot be paid back by the deceased debtor generation. As the middle generation has become the debtor generation, the obligation is passed on the next generation. Kershaw discusses three different approaches in this framework for Canada: the elderly/non-elderly spending ratio; intergenerational reciprocity; and the ability to pay of different age cohorts. Next to calculating some striking results, Kershaw further develops the elderly bias in social spending as an indicator for the fairness of intergenerational welfare state contracts. For the utility of cross-country comparisons, medical care spending and education must be taken into account according to Kershaw. Kershaw’s first two stages of analysis are complemented by a discussion about the fairness of the different treatment of generations in welfare states. Since some cohorts are born into favourable eras, and others are not, it is important to examine intergenerational public finances by reference to the standard of living inherited by different age groups, and the socio-economic circumstances they currently face. In response to this, Kershaw in the third stage of his research considers how the standard of living for contemporary seniors compares with that of elderly Canadians four decades earlier; and how the standard of living four decades earlier – when contemporary seniors were young adults – compares with that of young people today. In short, Kershaw suggests that the Canadian government needs to introduce policy changes to readjust the intergenerational imbalances that are negatively affecting younger generations. In the book review section, the first review assesses Birnbaum, Ferrarini, Nelson and Palme’s The Generational Welfare Contract: Justice, Institutions and Outcomes. Again, the focus is on the redistribution of a welfare state’s resources in time. Partly qualifying the “mainstream” thesis that public programmes, such as health care and pensions, are not affordable at their current extent in ageing welfare states, the authors put forward the hypothesis that intergenerational welfare state contracts can lead to positive-sum solutions. In the second book review, Michael Rose’s The Representation of Future Generations in Today’s Democracy, is brought to the attention of the scientific community. The book is written in German but of importance for the debate on specialised agencies for the future. Jörg Tremmel Maria Lenk Antony Mason Markus Rutsche

In April 2019, Greta Thunberg made TIME Magazine’s 100 Most Influential People of 2019 list. The 16 year-old climate activist, who has also been nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize, started a movement that saw a multitude of student protests and school strikes around the world centred on action against climate change. TIME Magazine quoted her saying, “We can’t save the world by playing by the rules, because the rules have to be changed.” With her engagement, Thunberg inspired thousands of youth activists to join her in her efforts and has thus put not only climate change on the political agenda but also the political participation and representation of the young. And this even though Thunberg and many of her fellow protesters do not yet enjoy voting rights in their respective countries. Just like the previous issue of the Intergenerational Justice Review, this one is also dedicated to the topic of the underrepresentation of younger people in political decision-making. The first two contributions in this issue pay particular attention to the existence – or lack thereof – of networks and contacts in politics that seem to be important for political representation. Daniel Stockemer and Aksel Sundström’s article titled “Youth’s underrepresentation in the European Parliament: Insights from interviews with young Members of the European Parliament ” reports results from qualitative interviews with 23 MEPs on the factors contributing to the success and failure of young people to enter the European Parliament. They find that, in general, three common themes or complaints amongst the successful young MEPs, irrespective of their party affiliation: “ a general reluctance within parties to nominate young candidates, young candidates lacking the necessary contacts in parties to get elected, and young candidates having too little experience to gain nomination for an electable seat.” Despite these heavy criticisms of established politicians and structures, the authors also summarise some more hopeful suggestions by respondents centring around the role of party youth organisations. The second contribution, by Emilien Paulis, also highlights the important role of networks and contacts, yet already at an earlier stage: when joining a political party. Drawing on social network and political participation theory and novel survey data from Belgium, Paulis explores what network patterns contribute to young people’s enrolment in a political party. He discovers strong social ties between young party members and suggests that this indicates “a certain exclusivity in recruitment patterns of political parties”. In addition, his analysis also points out that a highly homogenous network composition is a statistically significant predictor of joining a political party. Overall, Paulis, similar to Stockemer and Sundström, suggests a review of institutional processes and structures within established political organisations such as parties in order to promote a more diverse and above all younger profile of politically active citizens. The final contribution in this issue offers insights from an online survey conducted among young adults in Germany suggesting that these respondents were indeed politically interested and felt willing to assume responsibility through participation. As a consequence, Philipp Köbe concludes from his analysis that the supply-side of political organisations is the main problem in the underrepresentation and not so much young people’s lack of engagement. His four specific recommendations to political organisations follow very much from this conclusion: providing transparent and suitable information to meet young people’s interests and demands; lowering the electoral threshold for parties’ parliamentary representation to improve the representation of minority opinions; expanding youth-friendly opportunities for political participation such as video conferences and social media usages in order to reach out to the appropriate groups; improving the efficiency and impact of political decision-making to reward political engagement amongst young people. Köbe finally suggests a steering instrument for political organisations to help them achieve these goals. In the book review section, we continue the theme of political participation and representation of the young. Simon Pistor reviews the book Youthquake 2017: The Rise of Young Cosmopolitans in Britain by James Sloam and Matt Henn. The book investigates youth political participation in Britain around and after the Brexit referendum in 2016 and is built around the new notion a “youthquake” – a term initially introduced by British media to describe the surprising success of the movement behind the Labour Party but later on also becoming Oxford Dictionaries’ 2017 word of the year. Pistor writes that Sloam and Henn expand the concept of a youthquake in their book to “youthquake elections” – “ones in which dramatic changes in how many young people vote, who they vote for and how active they are in the campaign have, quite literally, shaken up the status quo”. Using this concept, the book’s central claim is that it was a youth movement based on a broader appeal to the needs of young people which spiked the higher voter turnout among young people. Pistor’s review of the book is unequivocal: using methods from comparative politics, the authors provide a “very interesting argument” and “a clear empirical case for the youthquake during the 2017 General Election in the UK”. Pistor also welcomes especially two implications of the book: many young British people are not as politically disenfranchised as general wisdom holds ; many of them are not only cosmopolitans but also British cosmopolitans interested and engaged in national politics. Overall, Simon Pistor concludes that Sloam and Henn’s book is “an empirically rich and informed study”, which might suggest that the key to future democratic successes does indeed lie with the young. Ann-Kristin Kölln Antony Mason Jörg Tremmel Markus Rutsche Maria Lenk