Jörg U. Noller

The article reconstructs Kant’s concepts of Enlightenment andimmaturity in the light of his theory of autonomy and heteronomy.Thestarting point is the thesis that Enlightenment and immaturity can onlybe adequately understood when related to the normative structure of moralself-legislation. Building on this, I argue that, according to Kant, immatu-rity and heteronomy are self-incurred conditions, the overcoming of whichlies within the responsibility of the subject. Finally, I analyze the condi-tions of transition from heteronomy to autonomy, which are defined asaprocess of education that is both epistemic and practical. This process isstructured by the three maxims of common human understanding and con-cretized in the idea of a public, media-mediated reason.

This paper presents a Kantian critique of artificial intelligence (AI) that shifts the focus from the technological capabilities of AI systems to the conditions of human-AI interaction. Drawing on Immanuel Kant’s concept of enlightenment as the “emergence from self-incurred immaturity,” the paper argues that digital technologies such as AI increasingly mediate—and potentially undermine—our rational autonomy. Through an analysis of AI as a novel form of human-technology relation, termed ‘extension relationship,’ the paper argues that uncritical use of AI risks developing what can be called digital immaturity. This critique is grounded in a Kantian account of medial reason and common sense (sensus communis), emphasizing the public use of reason as a normative ideal for digital maturity. The paper concludes by proposing a model of digital enlightenment in which responsible AI development is guided by human purposes and moral autonomy, rather than algorithmic determinism or passive consumption.

_English summary:_ The aim of this volume is to map out the specifically philosophical relationship between German Idealism and Judaism in the latter's reception and transformation. Going by Kant, is "Judaism" dealt with affirmatively, critically, or even in a defamatory way in the construction of philosophical theories? How is one's own philosophy created in distinction to Judaism? How is the image of Judaism composed philosophically, and how is it instrumentalized, modified and transformed for one's own philosophical theory? At the heart of the matter lies the concept of monotheism, the historical-philosophical significance of the Israelites' captivity in and exodus from Egypt, and the relationship between Judaism and Christianity, but also the meaning of revelation, the laws and commandments as well as the mythic tradition of the Kabbalah._ German description:_ Der vorliegende Sammelband setzt sich zum Ziel, das spezifisch Philosophische am Verhaltnis der klassischen deutschen Philosophie zum Judentum herauszuarbeiten: Wie wird "das Judentum" im Ausgang von Kant in die philosophische Theoriebildung affirmativ, kritisch oder gar diffamierend einbezogen? Wie wird die eigene Philosophie in Abgrenzung vom Judentum konstituiert? Wie wird das Bild des Judentums philosophisch konstruiert, und wie wird es fur die eigene philosophische Theorie instrumentalisiert, modifiziert und transformiert? Im Zentrum der Betrachtung stehen der Begriff des Monotheismus, die geschichtsphilosophische Bedeutung der Agyptischen Gefangenschaft und des Exodus, das Verhaltnis von Judentum und Christentum, aber auch die Bedeutung der Offenbarung, der Gesetze und Gebote sowie die mystische Tradition der Kabbala. Mit Beitragen von:Andreas Arndt, Myriam Bienenstock, Micha Brumlik, Christian Danz, Paul Franks, Walter Jaeschke, Amit Kravitz, Yitzhak Melamed, Jorg Noller, Gunter Zoller.

This paper develops a normative framework for the alignment of artificial intelligence (AI) systems with human agency. Moving beyond models that treat values as inferable data, it reconceptualizes alignment as the structural integration of AI within human normative domains. The argument unfolds in three steps. First, it introduces the concept of extended human agency, viewing AI as a teleological extension of human purposiveness rather than an autonomous moral subject. Second, it grounds this integration in practical autonomy—the human capacity to act for reasons and to assume responsibility within justificatory structures. Third, it proposes the design concept of a normative interface: a mediating architecture that connects machine behavior with human norms, ensuring teleological coherence, normative intelligibility, and accountability. Law serves as a paradigmatic case, demonstrating how institutionalized practices of justification can guide the ethical embedding of AI. According to this model, alignment is not achieved through internalized value learning but through participation in norm-governed action spaces, where human agents remain the ultimate bearers of responsibility. Finally, this paper argues that responsible alignment requires a normative and not merely technical architecture, linking artificial systems to the historical and institutional forms of human rationality.

This paper analyzes human-machine interrelation concerning artificial neuronal networks (ANNs) from a teleological point of view. The paper argues that AI cannot be understood adequately in terms of subjectivity or objectivity but rather as a new kind of teleological relationship that holds between human and artificial performances of intelligence. Thereby, AI is understood as an enactivist extension of human agency, both in instrumental and moral terms. This hybrid account will be distinguished from four alternative accounts of human-machine relations: (i) the simulation account, according to which AI simulates human rationality; (ii) the instrumentalist account, according to which AI is just a tool; (iii) the anthropomorphic account, according to which AI is human-like; and (iv) the indifference account, according to which AI will merge with human rationality due to technological progress. Against these four accounts, the paper argues for a teleological account of AI as extended human agency that is part of the human lifeworld. By focusing on the teleological interrelation of socially grounded databases and algorithms, the paper finally develops an account of responsible AI that considers its specific relatedness with human actions, purposes, and intentions by means of language. Understanding human-machine relations in terms of extended agency finally allows to tackle the question of how to avoid the problems of AI bias and opacity.

This book offers translations of early critical reactions to Kant’s account of free will. Spanning the years 1784–1800, the translations make available, for the first time in English, works by little-known thinkers including Pistorius, Ulrich, Heydenreich, Creuzer and others, as well as familiar figures including Reinhold, Fichte and Schelling. Together they are a testimony to the intense debates surrounding the reception of Kant’s account of free will in the 1780s and 1790s, and throw into relief the controversies concerning the coherence of Kant’s concept of transcendental freedom, the possibility of reconciling freedom with determinism, the relation between free will and moral imputation, and other arguments central to Kant’s view. The volume also includes a helpful introduction, a glossary of key terms and biographical details of the critics, and will provide a valuable foundation for further research on free will in post-Kantian philosophy.

This paper reconstructs Diderot's Encyclopédie as a project of conceptual enlightenment and moral epistemology. It argues that the Encyclopédie is more than a mere lexical compendium, as it entails epistemological affordances that promote epistemic autonomy. The paper situates the Encyclopédie between Kant's media critique of enlightenment and its own epistemic claim, showing how its hypertextual form reconciles mediated knowledge with autonomous thinking. As such, the Encyclopédie can be understood as a dynamic model of conceptual rationality—transforming concepts into reasons, and readers into responsible epistemic agents.

This volume collects thirteen original essays that address the concept of will in Classical German Philosophy from Kant to Schopenhauer. During this short, but prolific period, the concept of will underwent various transformations. While Kant identifies the will with pure practical reason, Fichte introduces, in the wake of Reinhold, an originally biological concept of drive into his ethical theory, thereby expanding on the Kantian notion of the will. Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer take a step further and conceive the will either as a primal being, as a socio-ontological entity, or as a blindly striving, non-rational force. Thus, the history of the will is marked by a complex set of tensions between rational and non-rational aspects of practical volition. The book outlines these transformations from a historical and systematic point of view. It offers an overview of the most important theories of the will by the major figures of Classical German Philosophy, but also includes interpretations of conceptions developed by lesser-studied philosophers such as Maimon, Jacobi, Reinhold, and Bouterwek.

This paper re-evaluates the relationship between nature and technology in light of human-centeredness. It differentiates three conceptual domains: (1) the ethical evaluation of human manipulation of nature, (2) the definition and conceptual significance of the Anthropocene, and (3) the ontological distinction between natural, artificial, and hybrid entities. The concept of “third nature” is proposed as a hybrid ontological and normative category that emerges from the interaction of first (biological) and second (technological-cultural) nature. Methodologically, this concept serves to reveal forms of hidden anthropocentrism and provides a framework for a Kantian-inspired ethics adapted to the Anthropocene condition. In doing so, the paper argues that human autonomy must be preserved not by rejecting technology, but by critically understanding the mediated nature of human-nature entanglement.