What grounds the existence of beings? This paper argues that if reality is intelligible and grounding is irreflexive, the ground of beings cannot itself be a being. The argument proceeds by elimination. If we ask what accounts for there being anything at all, four options present themselves: the ground is among the beings it grounds (self-grounding), the totality of beings is a brute fact, there is an infinite regress of grounds, or the ground is trans-categorial. Self-grounding generates incohe…
Read moreWhat grounds the existence of beings? This paper argues that if reality is intelligible and grounding is irreflexive, the ground of beings cannot itself be a being. The argument proceeds by elimination. If we ask what accounts for there being anything at all, four options present themselves: the ground is among the beings it grounds (self-grounding), the totality of beings is a brute fact, there is an infinite regress of grounds, or the ground is trans-categorial. Self-grounding generates incoherence: it violates grounding's irreflexivity, collapses into explanatory vacuity, and produces priority inversion. Brute fact refuses rather than provides explanation. Infinite regress defers explanation without terminus. What remains is a ground outside the domain it grounds: not an entity among entities, but the condition for there being entities at all. This conclusion aligns with classical theism's doctrine that God is ipsum esse subsistens: not a being that exists, but subsistent existence itself. The theological identification is stipulative; the argument establishes a structural place that classical theism names "God."