Whether in the form of conceptual analysis or as grounding reduction, armchair theorising has been the main method of theory construction in general jurisprudence in the English-speaking world. Given important deficiencies in this way of proceeding, empiricist jurisprudence, particularly in the form of reductive naturalism, has emerged as an alternative to armchair theorising and has gained some support within the discipline. In this article, I argue that both of these methodological positions u…
Read moreWhether in the form of conceptual analysis or as grounding reduction, armchair theorising has been the main method of theory construction in general jurisprudence in the English-speaking world. Given important deficiencies in this way of proceeding, empiricist jurisprudence, particularly in the form of reductive naturalism, has emerged as an alternative to armchair theorising and has gained some support within the discipline. In this article, I argue that both of these methodological positions ultimately provide us with partial and thus inadequate explanations of the complex social phenomenon of law. In their failure, however, each position does get something right. I then further argue that to make good of these positions’ strengths and simultaneously correct their shortcomings, we need to be able to navigate between the self-understanding of participants of the social practice of law and the viewpoints of social scientists and critical observers.
