Jorge Mittelmann

Alexander’s comments on Aristotle’s Metaphysics often uncover fruitful doctrinal tensions that help deepen our understanding of some Peripatetic tenets, by disclosing implications that would otherwise lay hidden. Nowhere else does this become clearer than in Alexander’s exposition of the several meanings of δύναμις laid down by Aristotle in his philosophical lexicon. The point discussed therein is of the utmost importance: it concerns the well-known divide between active and passive capacities, whose joint activation brings about change, that most basic feature of the physical world. The cleavage between these two kinds of power seems clear-cut. There are, however, some borderline cases that call into question their subsumption under any of those major headings. The problem that troubles Alexander concerns the way soul and nature fit into this global picture of capacities and the right way in which to think of them as causal powers. After presenting the general account of Aristotelian δυνάμεις, the paper outlines two mutually related questions Alexander raises about them, both of which call for careful consideration, since they seem to give a wrong picture of φύσις. The paper concludes by dispelling doubts and by highlighting some presuppositions that may explain the difficulties Alexander finds in Aristotle’s account.

In commenting on Aristotle’s κοινότατος λόγος of the soul – which portrays it as ‘the first actuality of a natural body having life in potentiality’– Philoponus suggests that seeds and embryos are not potentially alive bodies, despite ‘having become ready to receive life from the soul’ (209.17). To the extent that something’s suitability to be ensouled turns it eo ipso into a potentially alive thing, Philoponus’ remark may betray a contradiction, that can be handled by tinkering with the scope of a closely attached adverb. This paper argues that no such intervention is required, however, and that apparent inconsistencies vanish as soon as Neoplatonic embryology and Philoponus’ lexical background are given their due.

Este ensayo sostiene que uno de los desafíos más apremiantes que debe enfrentar una psicología de inspiración peripatética es el de conservar la relevancia causal del alma en los tres órdenes del cambio físico (traslación, alteración y crecimiento), sin hacer de ella un “motor” interno que desplace al organismo por hallarse en continuidad con él. En caso de no sortear con éxito este escollo, tal psicología no podrá afirmar que el alma sea un ítem inextenso e impasible, sino (a lo sumo) un cuerpo sutil que desplaza a otro más grosero. Mittelmann propone una lectura conjunta de los tratados de Alejandro y Aristóteles acerca del alma, con el fin de presentar la estrategia de Alejandro como un modo exitoso de hacer frente a esa dificultad patente. Según Mittelmann, Alejandro hallaría en los “estados disposicionales” de Aristóteles el paradigma apropiado para concebir la eficacia causal de las formas. Aquellos podrían oficiar de motores inmóviles en la medida en que reúnen una doble condición, que ni las formas platónicas ni los cuerpos sutiles pueden satisfacer: por una parte, su carácter incorpóreo no los convierte en substancias (separadas); por otra, su carácter inseparable no los convierte en cuerpos que desplacen a otros cuerpos por hallarse en contacto con ellos.

John Ackrill argued that Aristotelian bodies are conceptually promiscuous, since they fail to exemplify the modal relations that are expected to hold between their matter and their form. Although “potentially alive”, organic bodies are bound to be ensouled, on pain of lacking the required potential; but to the extent that they are ensouled, they are already actually alive. It seems odd to claim that a body may lack what it cannot help having. This paper claims that the standard solution falls short of the strong unity living beings display, given that nothing in them can be accidentally alive. An alternative proposal is advanced, based on two distinctions Aristotle draws in his philosophical lexicon: both matter and form have a claim to being called “nature”; formal nature may be found in its subject either in actuality or in potentiality. It is argued that the characterization of organic bodies as “potentially alive” conforms to, a pattern that helps explain the specific way in which bodies share in the organisms’ life. Two possible instances of are finally considered by way of illustration.

El presente artículo expone los principales rasgos de la estrategia que Aristóteles diseña en los Tópicos para hacer frente a quien intenta invalidar una definición aduciendo que ésta dice dos lo mismo. Por una parte, se sostiene que ella se funda menos en rasgos específicos de la definición que en propiedades de la predicación en general. Por otra, se sugiere que en su resolución de la dificultad Aristóteles recurre a una habilidad dialéctica que podría resultar relevante para el diagnóstico de otros problemas, y en particular de las inferencias erróneas expuestas en De Interpretatione 11. Se argumenta que tanto las definiciones prima facie redundantes como los predicados conjuntos cuya atribución resulta ilícita se esclarecen al revelar el carácter predicativo de ciertas secuencias de términos.

Este artículo intenta comparar dos interpretaciones diferentes de la relación entre una capacidad y su correspondiente actualidad en Física III. El autor se concentra en la legitimidad de una distinción entre “capacidad de ser” y “capacidades de devenir”. Esta distinción se aplica a la interpretación de la definición de movimiento de Aristóteles. Mittelmann discute la circularidad que parece resultar de un recurso a “capacidades dinámicas”; luego se propone mostrar que el modo alternativo de construir la posición de Aristóteles por referencia a la actualización incompleta de “capacidades de ser” produce algunas consecuencias contra-intuitivas. El trabajo termina por señalar que ambas estrategias llevan a una alternativa: o la definición aristotélica de movimiento debe aceptarse sin objeciones o debe ser rectificada en el sentido sugerido por W. D. Ross, pero a riesgo de hacer la definición circular.

This paper aims to show that the distinction between two types of body, which is sometimes appealed to in order to clear up the Aristotelian definition of soul, sheds some light on the ontological status of prostheses and on the issue of the “multiple realizability” of life-functions. After discussing the strain that the definition of soul imposes upon the basic hylomorphic categories, the paper turns to the idea of a “functionally defined body”, whose organs are defined by the power to perform their proper functions. This way of talking about the body suggests that Aristotle is committed to a principle of Functional Definition, which allows him to decide dubious cases of kind-membership solely on the basis of the presence or absence of the relevant powers – i.e., without drawing on any further considerations. The paper argues that even if that criterion seems unable to avoid the inclusion of artificial items under the same kinds as their biological counterparts, Aristotle’s philosophy of nature provides independent reasons for rejecting that unwelcome result of Functional Definition. Given the Aristotelian recognition of strong natural unities, which are “one” not because of their material continuity but because of partaking in the same principle of change, artificial limbs cannot be equated with their models. Accordingly, they perfom the same task, but in a sui generis way.

The Opening Chapter of De Anima II, in which Aristotle outlines an extremely general and universally applicable characterization of the soul (κοινότατος λόγος), closes with a perplexing comparison, which seems to contradict the general drift of that definiens1. After carefully arguing that the body-soul relation is a token of the hylomorphic model, which accounts for the substantial unity of every natural compound, Aristotle writes, “[F]urther, it remains unclear [ἄδηλον] whether the soul may not be the actuality of its body in the sense in which the sailor is the actuality of the ship” (413a8–9).2 Far from being found in the body as the functional organization of its matter, this remark suggests that the soul ..

This paper aims to show that the distinction between two types of body , which is sometimes appealed to in order to clear up the Aristotelian definition of soul, sheds some light on the ontological status of prostheses and on the issue of the “multiple realizability” of life-functions. After discussing the strain that the definition of soul imposes upon the basic hylomorphic categories, the paper turns to the idea of a “functionally defined body”, whose organs are defined by the power to perform their proper functions. This way of talking about the body suggests that Aristotle is committed to a principle of Functional Definition, which allows him to decide dubious cases of kind-membership solely on the basis of the presence or absence of the relevant powers – i.e., without drawing on any further considerations. The paper argues that even if that criterion seems unable to avoid the inclusion of artificial items under the same kinds as their biological counterparts, Aristotle’s philosophy of nature provides independent reasons for rejecting that unwelcome result of Functional Definition. Given the Aristotelian recognition of strong natural unities, which are “one” not because of their material continuity but because of partaking in the same principle of change , artificial limbs cannot be equated with their models. Accordingly, they perfom the same task, but in a sui generis way

Aristotle’s broad characterization of the soul has been challenged on account of its reliance on the notion of a “potentially alive body”. J. L. Ackrill famously claimed that no body can meet this description without being already actually alive. By a close inspection of both metaphysical and embryological texts, this paper argues that (1) it is embryos (and not fully-formed organic bodies) who provide the right kind of potentially alive subjects and that (2) the schematic character of the soul’s common formula accounts for its seemingly intractable features. It also holds that (3) once the homonymous nature of life is brought into the picture, the κοινότατος λόγος appears unproblematic – at least for some of its most troublesome instances.

This paper presents a reading of Metaphysics Z.10–11 according to which both chapters outline two main definienda: forms and material substances or compounds, each of which is governed by its own peculiar constraints. Forms include formal parts alone; furthermore, they are the main definable items and enjoy the strictest possible unity. However, this does not preclude Aristotle from upgrading material compounds to the status of definable items in their own right. Z.10 explains this contention by making the compound’s sensible functional matter dependent on its form. This dependence affords the resulting compound an unusually tight form-matter relationship, strong enough to ensure its definability, despite falling short of the highest kind of unity that only forms display.

Aristotle’s soul is a first principle (an ‘efficient cause’) of every vital change in an animal, in the way that a craft is a cause of its product’s coming-to-be. We argue that the soul’s causal efficacy cannot therefore be reduced to the formal constitution of vital phenomena, or to discrete interventions into independently constituted processes, but involves the exercise of vital powers. This reading does better justice to Aristotle’s conception of craft as a rational productive disposition; and it captures the soul’s continuous causal role as that which brings about all forms of vital change and underwrites their unity.

This book offers new insights into the workings of the human soul and the philosophical conception of the mind in Ancient Greece. It collects essays that deal with different but interconnected aspects of that unified picture of our mental life shared by all Ancient philosophers who thought of the soul as an immaterial substance. The papers present theoretical discussions on moral and psychological issues ranging from Socrates to Aristotle, and beyond, in connection with modern psychology. Coverage includes moral learning and the fruitfulness of punishment, human motivation, emotions as psychic phenomena, and more. Some of these topics directly stemmed from the Socratic dialectical experience and its tragic outcome, whereas others found their way through a complex history of refinements, disputes, and internal critique. The contributors present the gradual unfolding of these central themes through a close inspection of the relevant Ancient texts. They deliver a wide-ranging survey of some central and mutually related topics. In the process, readers will learn new approaches to Platonic and Aristotelian psychology and action theory. This book will appeal to graduate students and researchers in Ancient philosophy. Any scholar with a general interest in the history of ideas will also find it a valuable resource.