Jorren Dykstra

To say that someone is justified is to say that they are justified in respect of something they are doing or have done. To say that something they are doing or have done is justified is to say that they are justified in respect of their doing it, or having done it. More formally: “justified” requires two arguments: an agent and an act/state. For this reason, situations in which an act/state is justified are always situations in which a person is justified. I show that this undermines the only alternative to the much- discussed excuse response to the New Evil Demon thought experiment.

Consider the claim that false beliefs can be justified (JFB). According to Williamson (forthcoming), the most promising argument for JFB is something like this: (1) if p is what one disposed to know or to believe truly would believe, then believing p is justified; (2) sometimes, one disposed to know or to believe truly would believe p even though p is false; so, JFB. But there are counterexamples to (1). I argue that this isn't the most promising argument for JFB. Instead, the thought is that beliefs which manifest a disposition to know or to believe truly are justified. (1) should be replaced by: (1*) if believing p manifests a disposition to know or to believe truly then believing p is justified. (1*) is immune to the counterexamples.