Jose Barreto

This article studies the legislation of Ukraine in force and scientific papers reflecting the issue of causing harm to athletes, fans and other participants of sport events, as well as liability in case of death or injury of the participants of such events. Sport is an important component of social life, but at the same time it is not without risks. Sports competitions are often accompanied by injuries that can have serious consequences, including the death of athletes. In this connection, the question arises about the criminal liability of athletes in case of sports injuries or deaths during competitions. This becomes a matter of concern for legislators, the judiciary and the public, as it is important to ensure a balance between the development of the sport and the protection of the rights and safety of the participants. Legislation regarding the criminal liability of athletes for sports injuries or death during competition may vary from country to country. In some jurisdictions there are specific articles that regulate such situations, in others it may be subject to interpretations of general criminal norms. At the same time, it is important to take into account the specifics of sports activities, the participants’ ability to manage risks, and the general practice of resolving similar conflict situations. In the case of sports injuries or deaths during competition, the judicial system must carefully analyze all the circumstances of the event, including the observance of safety rules, the availability of medical care and the possible need to take criminal measures. Solving the issue of the athlete’s criminal responsibility for such events requires an objective and careful approach that takes into account all aspects of sports activity and legal norms.

En este artículo quiero argumentar a favor de la idea de que la filosofía mecánica desarrolladapor Robert Boyle desempeñó un papel importante, pero limitado, en la explicaciónde los fenómenos que sus experimentos generaban, es decir, la defensa de su mecanicismocomo la “mejor hipótesis” disponible solo logra explicar adecuadamente una parte específicade sus trabajos, mientras que el resto de su obra, en especial sus historias naturales,no requerían el apoyo total de la filosofía mecánica para generar nuevo conocimiento. Eneste sentido, uno de los elementos clave para comprender la dinámica y complejidad desu propuesta en la filosofía natural del siglo XVII es el desarrollo de la filosofía experimental,más que el apego al mecanicismo.

En este artículo quiero explorar la idea de que la filosofía experimentaldesarrollada en la década de 1660, en Inglaterra, fue una propuesta quetenía dos objetivos principales: i) consolidar una nueva forma de investigarla naturaleza que permitiera comprender su diversidad y complejidad, dondeel empleo del experimento y el rechazo de hipótesis especulativas eran lasprincipales estrategias a desarrollar, implementar y defender; ii) Exigía unanueva actitud por parte de los filósofos naturales de la época sustentadaen la experticia y en la prudencia en elaborar sistemas explicativos, lacual, en muchos casos, entraba en conflicto con los propios intereses de losinvestigadores. Esta tensión permite identificar unas diferencias interesantesentre la filosofía natural de carácter especulativo del siglo XVII y la nacientefilosofía experimental, diferencias que no siempre son señaladas por losestudiosos interesados en la filosofía moderna temprana.

This article considers in a different light the relationship between legal theory and ethics by means of an interpretation of the thought of Adorno and Horkheimer, and of the writings of Richard Rorty, as two moments of a marginal stream of ethics of passions that runs beneath the history of rationalist Western philosophy. It departs from the critique of Modernity as a dialectic of barbarism and civilisation, and from a genealogy of Auschwitz that finds its antecedents in Kantian morality. It also characterises modern culture as one of apathy and bourgeois stoicism, and establishes a link between the cold modern ethos and the dynamics of Nazi hardness. The article turns then to a consideration of some of the responses to the comprehensive crisis of Modernity: the imperative ‘Auschwitz never again’, Adorno’s ‘general enlightenment’ and Horkheimer’s ethics of sympathy. Finally it reflects upon Rorty’s proposal of sentimental education as an effective strategy to foster a human rights culture in Postmodernity, with the aim of bridging the tradition of moral sentiments and contemporary struggles for human rights.