José L. Falguera

Some of the keys to understanding how Carnap positions himself with respect to theoretical entities after the mid-1950s are contained in his considerations related to abstract entities in “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology” (Rev Int Philos 4:20–40, 1950[1956]). In this contribution, we defend that Carnap adopted an agnostic position in relation to the real existence (in a metaphysical sense) of both abstract entities and theoretical entities. We also aim to show that the ultimate reason for this agnosticism, in both cases, is Carnap’s rejection of external ontological questions as having no cognitive significance. In addition, we defend the idea that he would never have really succumbed to either an instrumentalist position or any sort of weak realism, such as structural realism, in opposition to some interpretations of Carnap’s work on the reference of theoretical terms. To demonstrate the validity of this latter stance of ours, we argue that: (i) the appeal to mathematical entities as referents of theoretical terms can only be understood in a deflationary way, and not in an instrumentalist manner (pace Lavers and Psillos); and (ii) Carnap’s use of the Ramsey sentence does not involve structural realism and the Newman objection does not apply to it (pace Psillos, Demopoulos and, perhaps, Friedman). In any case, even adopting a deflationist approach to theoretical entities, it sounds odd to consider them to be mathematical entities, as Carnap posited. As an alternative, we propose considering them as abstract artifacts.

The question of the existence of putative abstract objects has prompted a range of deflationist responses both ontological and metaontological in nature. Many of these draw inspiration from Carnap’s influential essay “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology”, as seen in the work of Putnam, Schiffer, Hirsch, Price, and Thomasson, among others. However, there are also notable deflationist approaches that diverge from Carnap’s framework—for instance, Jody Azzouni’s “pure deflationary metaphysics,” Otá vio Bueno’s “agnostic nominalism” and his more recent argument for the contingent nature of mathematical objects, as well as forms of metaontological minimalism advanced by figures like Øystein Linnebo and Agustı́n Rayo. This chapter introduces the central issues explored in the volume and offers a concise overview of the individual contributions that follow.

In this paper, we aim to achieve a double goal. First, we intend to relate Thomasson’s artifactualism to her deflationary approach to ontology. Then, we seek to explore the artifactualist option in detail as a serious way to understand scientific theories and models, and specifically the intentional direct referents of their terms: mathematical, theoretical and observational. Our proposal involves understanding the ontological commitment of science in a very peculiar way that is inspired in Carnap’s distinction between external and internal questions (Carnap, 1950b), as well as in both Thomasson’s easy approach to ontology (Thomasson, 2015) and her notion of an abstract artifact (Thomasson, 1999).

RESEÑA de : Rodríguez Alcázar, E. Ciencia, valores y relativismo : una defensa de la filosofía de la ciencia. Granada : Comares, 2000. RESEÑA de : López Sáenz, Mari Carmen. El arte como racionalidad liberadora. Madrid : UNED, 2000. RESEÑA de : Meloni González, Carolina. Marginales : leyendo a Derrida. Madrid : UNED, 2000. RESEÑA de : Klemperer, Víctor. La lengua del Tercer Reich. Barcelona : Minúscula, 2001. RESEÑA de : García Santesmases, Antonio García. Ética, política y utopia. Madrid : Biblioteca Nueva, 2001.

En este trabajo se asume: que una teoría factual es un sistema conceptual para representar parcelas deI mundo; que la principal manera de expresar tales sistemas es mediante el lenguaje; y que, consecuentemente, en la comparación de teorías rivales tienen importancia los factores de índole ontosemántica. Desde esa perspectiva se analizan dos problemas que surgen de la aceptación de la tesis de la inconmensurabilidad, a saber: a) el de establecer las condiciones ontosemánticas que dan sentido a la comparabilidad de teorías inconmensurables; y b) el de la consideración de un enfoque ontosemántico compatible con el hecho de que algunas modificaciones en una teoría no conlleven variación de significado y referencia, mientras otras sí.In this work it is assumed: that a factual theory is a conceptual system for representing patches of the world; that the principal way of expressing a system of that sort is by means of language; and that, consequently, factors of ontosemantic kind are important for the comparison between rival theories. Given this perspective, two problems, whieh come up from the acceptance of the incommensurability thesis are analyzed: a) to establish the ontosemantic conditions that give sense to the comparability of incommensurable theories; and b) to consider an ontosemantic picture compatible with the fact that some modifications in a theory are not followd by variance of meaning and reference, while other modifications are.

¿Es posible compatibilizar una suerte de relativismo epistémico con una defensa de la racionalidad científica? La profesora Pérez Ransanz, además de exponer con claridad la manera en que Thomas S. Kuhn adopta ese doble compromiso, intenta justificar la viabilidad de tal planteamiento. Este objetivo se inscribe en el marco de mostrar que en la reflexión filosófica de Kuhn sobre la ciencia, desde la aparición de La estructura de las revoluciones científica hasta las aportaciones previas a su fallecimiento en 1996, hay continuidad, coherencia y un progresivo enriquecimiento de sus puntos de vista, por encima de pequeñas diferencias que efectivamente pueden encontrarse entre sus diferentes escritos.

El término “ontoepistemosemántica” es un neologismo introducido en la literatura filosófica –hasta donde conozco– por C.U. Moulines, con el que se quiere dar cuenta de los estrechos vínculos que ontología, semántica y epistemología tienen entre sí. Al respecto Moulines señala a Frege como el primer filósofo en haberse percatado plenamente de la mutua imbricación entre las principales preguntas ontológica, epistemológica y semántica, dando preeminencia metodológica a la última. Sin embargo, la propuesta concreta de Moulines, explicitada para el ámbito de la elucidación de la ciencia, adopta una tesis de un claro carácter internista, que a mi entender está más en consonancia con Carnap, Goodman o Kuhn. El propósito de mi trabajo es considerar la peculiar propuesta de ontoepistemosemántica que defiende Moulines para analizar sus implicaciones en relación con el tratamiento que la metateoría estructuralista, de la que el propio Moulines es una figura relevante, hace de ciertos aspectos de la ciencia, como son: modelos, leyes, modelos de datos; y para establecer cómo superar las limitaciones de la propuesta de Moulines en su aplicación a los términos científicos

En este trabajo se asume: que una teoría factual es un sistema conceptual para representar parcelas deI mundo; que la principal manera de expresar tales sistemas es mediante el lenguaje; y que, consecuentemente, en la comparación de teorías rivales tienen importancia los factores de índole ontosemántica. Desde esa perspectiva se analizan dos problemas que surgen de la aceptación de la tesis de la inconmensurabilidad, a saber: a) el de establecer las condiciones ontosemánticas que dan sentido a la comparabilidad de teorías inconmensurables; y b) el de la consideración de un enfoque ontosemántico compatible con el hecho de que algunas modificaciones en una teoría no conlleven variación de significado y referencia, mientras otras sí.In this work it is assumed: that a factual theory is a conceptual system for representing patches of the world; that the principal way of expressing a system of that sort is by means of language; and that, consequently, factors of ontosemantic kind are important for the comparison between rival theories. Given this perspective, two problems, whieh come up from the acceptance of the incommensurability thesis are analyzed: a) to establish the ontosemantic conditions that give sense to the comparability of incommensurable theories; and b) to consider an ontosemantic picture compatible with the fact that some modifications in a theory are not followd by variance of meaning and reference, while other modifications are.

Facing the idea that there is an immediate normative epistemic relation between a perceptual experience and a perceptual experience belief based on that, we defend that such relation is not immediate. That is, neither it is a relation of justification, because the EPs content is not conceptual, nor it is of entitlement, since it is not immediate. We defend as an alternative that it is a relation of epistemic support. Facing the idea that EPs are fallible in a weak sense, because they can be erroneous, we defend that they are fallible in a strong sense. This is due to the fact that mainly the genuine EPs only have a representational content which is approximately accurate. We attempt to analyse it with the help of certain ideas of Zalta.

We begin by highlighting some points related to Kuhn’s later thoughts on the incommensurability thesis and then show to what extent the standard version of the thesis given by the structuralist metatheory allows us to capture Kuhn’s ideas. Our main aim is to establish what constitutes the basis of comparability between incommensurable theories, even in cases of incommensurability with respect to theoretical and non-theoretical terms. We propose that comparability between incommensurable theories requires some connection between their respective ontologies that can be captured by means of an ontological non-reductive relation. At this point, the structuralist notion of “echeloned partial substructure” may be of help. When the incommensurability is very drastic, the existence of ontological connections between the theories involved may only be evident by common terms of their non-characteristic vocabularies. So, this notion of non-characteristic vocabulary becomes relevant in our proposal.