Jose Luis Fernández

A range of collaborative approaches to address complexity in the business environment including strategic alliances, public private partnerships, issues management alliances, innovation and enterprise zones, supply chain certification and partnerships, industry self‐regulatory systems, and technology incubators are evidence of collaboration across sectors. This paper suggests that these may be part of a bigger adaptation. Such new models may be critical in addressing challenging issues of immigration and workforce development, disruptive technologies, globalization, corruption, and sustainability. The paper builds the case that these collaborative responses are not simply new forms but represent a new logic and values. They incorporate a “both and” logic and a more ecological perspective. They recognize that going it alone may not be sufficient. Partnering with NGOs, third‐party organizations, and even government agencies may lead to better solutions. Finally, they challenge leadership to generate new conversations and ask different questions. The paper provides three detailed cases that illustrate collaborative responses to issues and new forms of adaptation including industry self‐regulation, recycling, and employment programs for persons with disabilities. It concludes with suggestions for future research.

This paper begins by summarizing the critique that Natorp directed towards Husserl’s conception of phenomenology. It can be considered that this critique has two major moments. First, it is a critique against the assumption that immediate life can be treated as an immanent “fi eld” or “region” that can be known in reflection. Second, it is a critique against the assumption that the logos that gives an accurate account of immediate life, that is, the original phenomenological logos, has to take the form of a conceptual description: since every concept seems to operates an abstraction of concrete life, it seems problematic how an eidetic categorical analysis could safeguard the original reality of immediate life; in other words, it seems problematic that such an operative logos could be considered the original accomplishment of phenomenology. Heidegger acknowledged the depth of Natorp’s critical remarks and understood that they involved a real methodological problem for an accurate understanding of the phenomenological endeavour. This paper tries to clarify how the assumption of an indicative character of meaningful distinctions can overcome Natorp’s critique. To assume the indicative character of a meaningful distinction means, here, to operate with distinctions in such a way that their original dependence on concrete factual life is acknowledged, in other words, to use distinctions assuming that they are carried out for the sake of that which does not involve the categorical form of the meaningful distinction and, therefore, to use distinctions, not for their own sake, but in order to remit or indicate that concrete reality which precedes them. This paper defends also that the consequent assumption of the indicative character of meaningful distinctions is to lead to a new and more genuine understanding of phenomenology and how the phenomenological endeavour is to be carried out. Finally, this paper tries to show that this important motive is really present in Heidegger’s first lessons in Freiburg. Nevertheless, the paper also points out that the original understanding of phenomenology that this motive had to open, was soon miscarried. In Heidegger’s thought, the indicative character of philosophical concepts is not fully assumed. That motive is entangled with other irreconcilable elements that end up ruining the original possibilities that it should have contributed to unveil. These distorting elements, which ultimately prevail in Heidegger’s philosophy, are what make up for Heidegger’s theory of formal indications and for his hermeneutical transformation of phenomenology.

This paper begins by summarizing the critique that Natorp directed towards Husserl’s conception of phenomenology. It can be considered that this critique has two major moments. First, it is a critique against the assumption that immediate life can be treated as an immanent “fi eld” or “region” that can be known in reflection. Second, it is a critique against the assumption that the logos that gives an accurate account of immediate life, that is, the original phenomenological logos, has to take the form of a conceptual description: since every concept seems to operates an abstraction of concrete life, it seems problematic how an eidetic categorical analysis could safeguard the original reality of immediate life; in other words, it seems problematic that such an operative logos could be considered the original accomplishment of phenomenology. Heidegger acknowledged the depth of Natorp’s critical remarks and understood that they involved a real methodological problem for an accurate understanding of the phenomenological endeavour. This paper tries to clarify how the assumption of an indicative character of meaningful distinctions can overcome Natorp’s critique. To assume the indicative character of a meaningful distinction means, here, to operate with distinctions in such a way that their original dependence on concrete factual life is acknowledged, in other words, to use distinctions assuming that they are carried out for the sake of that which does not involve the categorical form of the meaningful distinction and, therefore, to use distinctions, not for their own sake, but in order to remit or indicate that concrete reality which precedes them. This paper defends also that the consequent assumption of the indicative character of meaningful distinctions is to lead to a new and more genuine understanding of phenomenology and how the phenomenological endeavour is to be carried out. Finally, this paper tries to show that this important motive is really present in Heidegger’s first lessons in Freiburg. Nevertheless, the paper also points out that the original understanding of phenomenology that this motive had to open, was soon miscarried. In Heidegger’s thought, the indicative character of philosophical concepts is not fully assumed. That motive is entangled with other irreconcilable elements that end up ruining the original possibilities that it should have contributed to unveil. These distorting elements, which ultimately prevail in Heidegger’s philosophy, are what make up for Heidegger’s theory of formal indications and for his hermeneutical transformation of phenomenology.

Although possible worlds semantics is a powerful tool to represent the semantic properties of natural language sentences, it has been often argued that it is too coarse: with the tools that possible worlds semantics puts at our disposal, any relevant semantic difference has to be a truth conditional difference representable as a difference in intension. A case that raises questions about the ability of possible worlds semantics to make the appropriate discriminations is the distinction between rigidity and direct reference, an issue deeply connected to the representation of the behavior of two operators: ‘dthat’ and ‘actually’. Differences between the mode of operation of ‘dthat’ and ‘actually’ have been observed, but they have not been examined in depth. Our purpose is to explore systematically to what extent the observed differences between the two operators have truth conditional consequences that are formally representable in possible worlds semantics.

This essay works to juxtapose elements of Terrence Deacon’s theory of emergence from _Incomplete Nature_ with G. W. F. Hegel’s description of what might be understood as emergent teleodynamics in his examination of modality in the _Science of Logic_. Although Deacon’s links to Immanuel Kant’s conception of organisms in the third Critique has been profitably explored by Adrian Johnston, “Hegel’s name is entirely absent in the pages of _Incomplete Nature_.” In an attempt to fill in this lacuna, I work to sketch out what I perceive as the main point of contact between these two thinkers using a retrospective study of how Hegel presupposes specific elements of Deacon’s notion of ‘absentials’, a term of art that denotes what is essentially absent in something present. With specific focus on Hegel’s treatment of the modality of actuality, it is shown how he also puts forward an account of the power of absence in the emergence of the real insofar as his study of modality imagines not only the constitution of realized possibilities, but also their unrealized counterparts.

This study introduces a comprehensive model for the ethical analysis of digital technologies to foster a full implementation of digital humanism. Drawing on key ethical traditions, the model acts as a framework for evaluating emerging technologies to ensure that they contribute to human development and societal well-being rather than solely driven by economic objectives. The theoretical framework integrates principles from ethical theories such as virtue ethics, deontological ethics, and consequentialism and applies them to digital technology development. The analysis emphasizes the need for transparency, accountability, and the prioritization of human dignity. The model is applied to augmented reality (AR) devices to illustrate its applicability, highlighting their potential benefits—such as enhanced education and healthcare capabilities—and the risks, including privacy concerns, digital distraction, and the exacerbation of social inequalities. Through this framework, developers and policymakers can better understand the ethical implications of digital technologies before their widespread implementation to mitigate risks and enhance positive outcomes. Ultimately, this model advocates for a balanced approach to digital innovation, where technological progress is aligned with universal human values and ethical standards, ensuring that the digital world remains a servant to human flourishing.

The Shroud of Turin is an old linen fabric imprinted with the image of a tortured man who lies prone with his hands crossed before him. Since for many it is related to Jesus of Nazareth, this cloth is among the most studied, controversial and enigmatic of all archaeological and religious objects. Since its radiocarbon dating at the end of the eighties of the last century, it is considered by many to be an object made in the Middle Ages. The controversy is due to the fact that there are other scientific and artistic evidences that place this object outside the medieval sphere. An argument map is a critical thinking way of representing the relationships between evidences and arguments, and is used here to represent the sequences of argumentation that defend that the Shroud of Turin is not a medieval object.

Logical localism is a thesis within philosophy of logic according to which the correct logic is dependent on the topic, domain or subject matter of its application. There is a very straightforward problem for anyone defending a localist thesis, a problem that follows from the fact that we reason across domains. This challenge is known as the problem of mixed inferences. The problem is, very roughly, the following: suppose that there are at least two components, within the premises or conclusion of an argument, belonging to domains governed by different logics. Then, which is the criterion of validity for the mixed argument? Our aim is to offer an answer to this question and, more concretely, a way out to the dilemma that Chase Wrenn has raised in his analysis of the problem of mixed inferences. We will use Joshua Schechter’s method of combining logics, juxtaposition, as the criterion of validity for mixed inferences. After exploring its virtues and possible shortcomings, we argue that juxtaposition is a first step towards a fully-fledged solution, but already a promising way out of the dilemma posed by Wrenn.

The Liar Paradox is a classic argument that creates a contradiction by reflection on a sentence that attributes falsity to itself: ‘this sentence is false’. In our paper we will discuss the ways in which the Liar sentence (and its paradoxical argument) can be represented in first-order logic. The key to the representation is to use first-order logic to model a self-referential language. We will also discuss several related sentences, like the Liar cycles, the empirical versions of the Liar and the Truth teller sentences.

En esta discusión abordo la hermenéutica analógica de Mauricio Beuchot comparándola con la hermenéutica filosófica de Hans-Georg Gadamer. Argumento que Beuchot vuelve a la idea clásica de la hermenéutica como método de interpretación y no la juzga, como Gadamer, como una fenomenología de la comprensión. Sin embargo, Beuchot no atiende las razones de Gadamer en contra de concebir la hermenéutica como una metodología. Si se considera como metodología centrada en la analogía, la hermenéutica analógica deja de lado otros recursos interpretativos importantes. Finalmente, Beuchot adopta una teoría correspondentista de la verdad contra la que argumenta Gadamer y que es incompatible con una hermenéutica filosófica. In this paper I analyze Mauricio Beuchot's analogical hermeneutics by contrasting it with Hans-Georg Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. I argue that Beuchot goes back to the classical idea of hermeneutics as a method of interpretation, and does not see it, as Gadamer does, as a phenomenology of understanding. However, Beuchot does not address Gadamer's arguments against using hermeneutics as a methodology. Considered as a methodology centered on analogy, analogical hermeneutics overlooks other important interpretation resources. Finally, Beuchot adopts a correspondence theory of truth, which Gadamer objects and is incompatible with philosophical hermeneutics.

En sus primeras lecciones de Friburgo, Heidegger planteó que una conceptuación originariamente filosófica debía tener un carácter indicativo-formal. Esto involucraba una transformación metodológica de la fenomenología hacia una hermenéutica de la vida fáctica. En este artículo se expone cómo la asunción de un procedimiento indicativo-formal permite a Heidegger superar ciertos problemas, apuntados por Natorp, que amenazaban la comprensión de Husserl de la fenomenología. Por otra parte, se hace también una consideración crítica del planteamiento fenomenológico original de Heidegger. In his first Freiburg lessons Heidegger proposed that an original philosophical conceptualization had to have a formal-indicative character. This involved a deep methodological transformation of phenomenology towards a hermeneutics of factual life. This work expounds how the assumption of a formal-indicative procedure allows Heidegger to overcome certain problems of Husserl's understanding of phenomenology, which Natorp had pointed out. Besides, this paper makes a critical consideration of Heidegger's original phenomenological approach

Here, I first prove that certain families of k-valued clones have the Gupta-Belnap fixed-point property. This essentially means that all propositional languages that are interpreted with operators belonging to those clones are such that any net of self-referential sentences in the language can be consistently evaluated. I then focus on two four-valued generalisations of the Kleene propositional operators that generalise the strong and weak Kleene operators: Belnap’s clone and Fitting’s clone, respectively. I apply the theorems from the initial part of the paper to analyse the fixed-point property of Belnap’s and Fitting’s clones when some special operators that reflect the semantics are added. The conclusion of the paper is that Fitting’s clone is better suited than Belnap’s to provide self-referential languages with highly expressive resources.