José Médina

“Llega a ser el que eres”, lema de Píndaro, es la nota final que unifica filosofía y biografía en Ortega porque actúa como vínculo, a la vez ético y vital, entre el yo y el mundo. Dicho vínculo se llama técnicamente “vocación”, y en la filosofía tardía de Ortega es la única fuente de sentido de la propia vida. La vocación decisiva de Ortega fue la intelectual o filosófica, en el sentido socrático-platónico, no la del “intelectual” como figura que interviene en asuntos públicos, aunque asumiera ese papel con notable intensidad hasta 1932 o 1933. Desde que la Guerra Civil española estalla decidió no ma- nifestarse sobre temas políticos. Uno de los textos que más a fondo reflexiona sobre la condición del intelectual en el doble sentido indicado fue “El intelectual y el otro” (1940), que dialoga dramáticamente con la circunstancia argentina en la que y para la que fue escrito, pero que tuvo repercusiones en el mundo del exilio republi- cano en la América hispana, especialmente en México.

La aportación que este libro realiza posee un alto grado de originalidad y es de una novedad total dada la carencia de trabajos de investigación sobre el curriculum y la formación universitaria que las enfermeras reciben en España. De ese modo se constituye en el primer intento riguroso y sistemático que se lleva a cabo en nuestro país, de reflexión, análisis empírico, teorización y articulación conceptual de la formación de enfermeras, desde el campo disciplinar de la Pedagogía Universitaria. En la obra se lleva a cabo una descripción sistemática y rigurosa de los diferentes desarrollos teóricos que se están llevando a cabo en el campo de la producción discursiva sobre la formación de enfermeras. Cabe destacar también que ese marco teórico se ha construido a partir de una bibliografía extensa y actualizada basada, en su mayor parte, en el ámbito anglosajón, el cual supone una sistematización del campo curricular de la enseñanza universitaria que las enfermeras reciben, inédita en nuestro país. El objetivo de la obra es analizar las condiciones de emergencia y las características más relevantes del discurso pedagógico-didáctico en el curriculum de Enfermería. Más concretamente, se ha estudiado la lógica de la producción simbólica en el campo de la formación de enfermeras y su efecto en las prácticas de enseñanza- aprendizaje y en la subjetividad de profesoras y alumnas. Para alcanzar ese propósito, el autor ha descompuesto el discurso pedagógico en la formación de enfermeras en tres grandes dimensiones teórico-conceptuales. En primer lugar se analizan las estructuras de racionalidad científica y pedagógica y los supuestos epistemológicos que sustentan, legitiman y otorgan sentido a la práctica de la enseñanza de la Enfermería. Después, se fija la atención en el proceso de producción, selección, transmisión y asimilación de competencias mediante el cual se legitima una determinada manera de entender la práctica de la Enfermería. Por último, se analiza la relación existente entre el discurso pedagógico y las formas de subjetividad de las estudiantes y futuras enfermeras. En resumen, con esta obra se presentan una serie de ideas y argumentos que pueden contribuir a un mejor conocimiento de las prácticas educativas que se desarrollan en las Escuelas Universitarias de Enfermería de nuestro país y a la mejora de la formación inicial y permanente que las enfermeras reciben.

This chapter contributes to the philosophy of protest by developing a framework for the analysis of the communicative dynamics in protest acts and protest movements. This contribution to the philosophy of protest will be mainly in the areas of applied philosophy of language and political epistemology. The chapter develops a communicative account of protest that highlights some of the epistemic obstacles and dysfunctions that protest acts and protest movements face, especially forms of silencing and epistemic injustice. It analyzes different kinds of epistemic injustice that contribute to the silencing of protest but also to the communicative and epistemic downgrading of protest acts and protest movements (testimonial, hermeneutical, and agential epistemic injustice). Public protests articulate public criticisms, make evaluative claims, and sometimes develop evaluative arguments. Cases of group testimonial injustice, like the ones experienced by protest movements, can block or undermine group agency. Prisoners engage in epistemic activism to fight the agential epistemic injustices they suffer.

Using Iris Marion Young’s framework, this essay looks at racial violence as one of the many “faces” of racial oppression. In the light of this analysis I argue that the fight against racial violence requires much more than identifying the perpetrators of such violence and bringing them to justice; it requires, I argue, thick critical engagements with multiple publics and institutions and with society at large, engagements that are not only cognitive and argumentative but also affective, imaginal, and action-oriented. My argument about the broad range of thick critical engagements needed in anti-racist-violence activism focuses especially on what I term epistemic activism, which refers to the critical activities of denouncing, contesting, and resisting the cognitive-affective attitudes and sensibilities that facilitate complicity with racial oppression and with racial violence. My analysis pays particular attention to the role that affectivity plays in complicity with racial violence and how affective attitudes can be used in epistemic activism to disrupt complicity and to mobilize people in the fight against racial violence. My analysis and argumentation are developed through a case study of epistemic activism: the activism against racial violence in the United States and the changes in public life and institutional recognition that activist organizations such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the Equal Justice Initiative have aimed to promote.

This article explores how racist propaganda works in visual communication and how such propaganda can be resisted. The article analyzes how photography has created new possibilities for the insidious dissemination of racist messages and discusses ways of resisting these visually transmitted propagandistic messages. The two sections of the article focus on examples of racist propaganda in visual culture: in section 1, the focus is on the propagandistic use of photography in the early twentieth century by the pro‐lynching movement; and in section 2, the focus is on racist subtexts in communication that is both visual and verbal in mass media in recent decades. In both sections, the paper discusses how to neutralize and counter propaganda in visual culture by means of what the author terms “epistemic activism,” which consists in practices of interrogation and resistance that unmask, disrupt, and uproot biases and insensitivity. The article discusses different instances of epistemic activism that make explicit and effectively criticize racist subtexts in visual communication. The instances of epistemic activism discussed include the pamphlets of the anti‐lynching movement, critiques of visual artists and scholars, and the critical responses of online activists. The article argues that epistemic activism can produce critical viewership by disrupting the passive reception of visual messages and triggering more active and critical modes of viewing images. The author concludes by emphasizing the urgent need for epistemic activism that promotes critical awareness of the subtexts embedded in visual communication and a sense of critical responsibility in the production, consumption, and recirculation of images.

This paper discusses fundamental presuppositions underlying our communicative and interpretative practices by exploring the question of whether there can be logical aliens, that is, beings whose actions and utterances are unintelligible to us. I offer a critique of the dominant view of intelligibility in analytic philosophy that denies the possibility of logical aliens on a priori grounds. My argument tries to show that this transcendental view, one that derives from Davidson’s philosophy, rests on cognitivist and objectivist biases that distort communication. Building on a non-transcendental interpretation of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, I propose an alternative view of intelligibility: a contextualist hermeneutics that is action-based and socially-oriented and that does not impose a priori limitations on what is intelligible for us.

In this essay I argue that epistemic injustices can be understood and explained as social pathologies of recognition, and that this way of conceptualizing epistemic injustices can help us develop proper diagnostic and corrective treatments for them. I distinguish between two different kinds of recognition deficiency—quantitative recognition deficits and misrecognitions—and I ague that while the rectification of the former simply requires more recognition, the rectification of the latter calls for a shift in the mode of recognition, that is, a deep transformation of the recognition dynamics so that other forms of recognition can emerge. Arguing against incremental recognitional approaches that aim only at increasing social visibility/audibility, I examine communicative dysfunctions around the phenomenon of racist violence in order to show how problems of misrecognition persist and become recalcitrant even when quantitative recognition deficits disappear.

This paper articulates a deflationary interpretation of the notions of meaning and necessity in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. This interpretation is developed through a new account of the socalled color‐exclusion problem and of why the formalism of the Tractatus fails to solve it. According to my analysis, this failure calls into question whether the limits of the sayable and the thinkable can be drawn from within language and thought by means of a purely formal logical analysis. I argue that the lesson to learn from the color‐exclusion problem concerns the limitations of a formal logical analysis of language in eliminating the philosophical mythologies formed around the notions of meaning and necessity, and more generally the limitations of formalism as a deflationary strategy in philosophy.

Background:The acquisition of experience is a major concern for nurses in intensive care units. Although the emotional component of the clinical practice of these nurses has been widely studied, greater examination is required to determine how this component influences their learning and practical experience.Objective:To discover the relationships between emotion, memory and learning and the impacts on nursing clinical practice.Research design:This is a qualitative phenomenological study. The data were collected from open, in-depth interviews. A total of 22 intensive care unit nurses participated in this research between January 2012 and December 2014.Ethical considerations:The School of Nursing Ethics Committee approved the study, which complied with ethical principles and required informed consent.Findings:We found a clear relationship between emotion, memory and the acquisition of experience. This relationship grouped three dimensions: (1) satisfaction, to relieve the patient’s pain or discomfort, give confidence and a sense of security to the patient, enable the presence of family members into the intensive care unit and provide family members with a realistic view of the patient’s situation; (2) error experience, which nurses feel when a patient dies, when they fail to accompany a patient in his or her decision to abandon the struggle to live or when they fail to lend support to the patient’s family; and (3) the feel bad–feel good paradox, which occurs when a mistake in the patient’s care or handling of his or her family is repaired.Conclusion:Emotion is a capacity that impacts on nurses’ experience and influences improvements in clinical practice. Recalling stories of satisfaction helps to reinforce good practice, while recalling stories of errors helps to identify difficulties in the profession and recognise new forms of action. The articulation of emotional competencies may support the development of nursing ethics in the intensive care unit to protect and defend their patients and improve their relationships with families in order to maximise the potential for patient care.