Josep Clusa

Este artículo analiza la primera traducción completa de la Crítica de la razón pura de Kant al catalán, realizada por Miquel Montserrat (2024). Mediante un análisis comparativo multilingüe con traducciones en latín, castellano, italiano, francés e inglés, examinamos los métodos traductológicos empleados y evaluamos el enfoque «extranjerizador moderado» de Montserrat. El estudio se centra en cuatro aspectos clave: el léxico común, la terminología filosófica, la sintaxis de los periodos hipotácticos kantianos y el tratamiento de los dobletes terminológicos. Las principales virtudes de la traducción incluyen la elegante preservación de la arquitectura sintáctica kantiana y la innovadora estrategia de marcar dobletes terminológicos con claves angulares (⸢realidad⸣), una solución sin precedentes en las lenguas románicas. Los límites se manifiestan principalmente en la elección de algunos términos del léxico común poco familiares en el catalán actual. El artículo propone enmiendas léxicas no normativas para futuras ediciones, siguiendo el espíritu del propio traductor, que se mostraba abierto a correcciones. La traducción de Montserrat representa un hito histórico que sitúa el catalán en el mapa mundial de las traducciones kantianas y constituye una herramienta imprescindible para la investigación y la docencia filosófica en esta lengua.

This article analyzes the first complete Catalan translation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Miquel Montserrat (2024). Through a multilingual comparative analysis involving translations into Latin, Spanish, Italian, French and English, we examine the translation methods employed and evaluate Montserrat’s “moderate foreignizing” approach. The study focuses on four key aspects: common vocabulary, philosophical terminology, the syntax of Kantian hypotactic periods, and the treatment of terminological doublets. The translation’s strengths include the elegant preservation of Kantian syntactic structures and the innovative strategy of marking terminological doublets with angle brackets (┌reality┐), a solution unprecedented in Romance languages. The primary limitations concern certain common vocabulary choices that are unfamiliar in contemporary Catalan. The article suggests non-normative lexical amendments for future editions, following the spirit of the translator himself, who has been open to corrections. Montserrat’s translation represents a landmark achievement that raises the profile of Catalan on the world map of Kantian translations and constitutes an indispensable tool for philosophical research and teaching in this language.

This paper examines the debate about the referential meaning of Kant’s concept of substance. In the Critique of Pure Reason and other works such as the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, the category or concept of substance appears quite uncontroversially to have both a logical meaning (by which it means roughly ‘a thing that is the ultimate subject of predication’) and an objective meaning (by which it means roughly ‘a thing that is permanent’, or, equivalently, ‘a thing existing at all times’). However, it is highly contested what kind of object, or objects, are supposed to meet, in experience, the criteria imposed by the conjunction of these two distinct meanings. I discuss two examples of the main interpretations to be found in the literature: Peter Strawson (2000), who contends that the reference of substance is only matter, and Claudia Jáuregui (2021), who also includes ordinary particular objects as substances. I scrutinize their fit with some of the textual evidence, primarily from the First Analogy of Experience, and finally reject Jáuregui’s interpretation as implying a kind of mereological essentialism about particular objects. Keywords: substance, meaning, matter, ordinary objects, First Analogy of Experience.