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The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 9: Philosophy of MindCharlottesville: Philosophy Doc Ctr. 2000.
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80Minds, Causes and Mechanisms: A Case Against PhysicalismWiley-Blackwell. 2000.This volume includes a lucid discussion of recent developments by philosophers such as Block, Davidson, Fodor, Kim, Lewis, Mellor, Putnam, Schiffer, Shoemaker, ...
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44Mental Contents, Tracking Counterfactuals, and Implementing MechanismsThe Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 9 1-11. 2000.In the ongoing debate, there are a set of mind-body theories sharing a certain physicalist assumption: whenever a genuine cause produces an effect, the causal efficacy of each of the nonphysical properties that participate in that process is determined by the instantiation of a well-defined set of physical properties. These theories would then insist that a nonphysical property could only be causally efficacious insofar as it is physically implemented. However, in what follows we will argue agai…Read more
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12Endorsement, Reasons and Intentional ActionTheoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 22 (1): 25-33. 2009.Moran's conception of self-knowledge, in his book Authority and Estrangement, is connected to an extremely rationalistic conception of intentional action. I will argue that this rationalistic commitment can be avoided without renouncing the most basic aspects in his account of self-knowledge.
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7David Francis Pears (1921-2009)Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 30 (2): 201-204. 2011.
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El realismo y el limbo de las posibilidades no realizadasTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 27 (1): 109-124. 2008.
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4Varieties of Internal Relations: Intention, Expression and NormsTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 25 (1): 137-154. 2006.
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15Escepticismo, contextualismo y principio de clausuraTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 19 (3): 141-149. 2000.
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15Filosofía de la Mente: el estado de la cuestión (Philosophy of Mind: the State of the Art)Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 21 (3): 315-332. 2010.
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Why enough should be enough: the role of expressive behaviourTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 30 (3): 67-78. 2011.
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12Filosofía de la Mente: el estado de la cuestiónTheoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 21 (3): 315-332. 2010.
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94Acting Without ReasonsDisputatio 2 (23): 229-246. 2007.In this paper, I want to challenge some common assumptions in contemporary theories of practical rationality and intentional action. If I am right, the fact that our intentions can be rationalised is widely misunderstood. Normally, it is taken for granted that the role of rationalisations is to show the reasons that the agent had to make up her mind. I will argue against this. I do not object to the idea that acting intentionally is, at least normally, acting for reasons, but I will propose a te…Read more
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14Endorsement, Reasons and Intentional ActionTheoria 22 (1): 25-33. 2009.Moran’s conception of self-knowledge, in his book Authority and Estrangement, is connected to an extremely rationalistic conception of intentional action. I will argue that this rationalistic commitment can be avoided without renouncing the most basic aspects in his account of self-knowledge.
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133Endorsement, reasons and intentional actionTheoria 22 (1): 25-33. 2007.In my opinion, Richard Moran’s account of the connections between self-knowledge and intentional ac-tion presents a certain unresolved tension. On the one hand, the epistemic privilege of the first person derives from the fact that forming an intention is a matter of the subject endorsing a course of action. An en-dorsing subject is not a mere observer of her intentions. On the other hand, the transparency of endorsement is assimilated to the putative fact that an agent forms her intentions by r…Read more
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91Filosofía de la mente: El estado de la cuestión (philosophy of mind: The state of the art)Theoria 21 (3): 315-332. 2006.