Joseph Agassi

The present thesis is the first half of a work in which a theory is presented according to which metaphysical theories, world-views, are of great help to science, being interpretations of scientific theories and programmes for further research. The theory is presented within this framework of Popper’s methodology which is explained and defended. The historical example which is given in the second part of the work is Faraday’s world-view, his field theory. The first part is an attempt to reconstruct the intellectual background of Faraday’s activity. Bacon’s, Boyle’s, and Newton’s influence on the early nineteenth century thought are discussed, Bacon’s radicalism and utopianism are discussed together with their theoretical justification – his doctrine of prejudice – and his influence is thus explained. Boyle is presented as the creator of a scientific movement of amateurs. Inductivism and mechanism are presented as the creed of the amateur inductivist movement, Mechanism, of Boyle and Newton, is presented as a successful programme of research. All these points are discussed with a special reference to the theory of interpretations and to the influence on Faraday.

An inaugural lecture may include pomp and piety, and has to include an overview and a programme. Here we get all these and more: a history of (Oxford) anthropology. It all began-as an established subject proper-in the late nineteenth century. The lineage is, Tylor, Marrett, Andrew Lang and his friends; then the chair of social anthropology proper, inaugurated by A. R. RadcliffeBrown and passed on to the care of E. E. Evans-Pritchard, who was the most potent and seminal, and now to the author. Other names are dropped when items from reading lists are mentioned. Conspicuous in their absence are Sir James Frazer, a Cambridge figure not even alluded to; Maurice Freedman, the author’s predecessor, whose very existence, even as a place holder between EvansPritchard and the author, might not be suspected by readers; and Claude GviStrauss, whose works once engaged the author as translator.’ Odd, as they say in Oxford; distinctly odd. Radcliffe-Brown viewed anthropology as a natural science of society; Evans-Pritchard agreed first, but then viewed it as a humane art. The author’s view is a synthesis: anthropology as the comparative study of social form can emulate the exact sciences, just as deep structure linguistics does, yet stay a humane art. The study should remain eclectic and retain its elastic unityrequiring both breadth and depth true to the traditional Oxford demand for high standards. The humaneness ofthe subject is retained by its comparisons, making other cultures akin to ours. Similarly with kinship structure; yet these, like chemical structures, are open to exact analyses in theories that can be proved or disproved. The author only touches on examples of perplexities. He names a few. Symbolic elements; there may be up to hundreds or even thousands of those. Relations between them. Forms, orformal constraints that are put on them, such as rules of marriage. Then there are classifications, hierarchical and analogical; 1 For‘all these see the inaugural lecture of Maurice Freedman at the London School of Economics, ‘Rites and Duties, or Chinese Marriage’, London: G. Bell & Sons, 1%7. The Clarendon Press, 1978. Pp. 30. f0.95. Book Reviews 117 psychology, or the comparative study of emotions; and, finally, reason, that of reason, that is, that is proper and common to all men. All this is surveyed in one paragraph. The factorsjust mentioned permit an effective comparison that will reduce the enOnYiOuS complexity of known structures by abstraction to ones much simpler than ever dreamt of. But we have to find out first what are the primary factors. The author interprets the primary factors of experience as properties of the cerebral cortex, yet without being a blunt materialist. Except for the omission of asides and of local colour, this is a faithful abstract of the lecture, retaining both its substance and its expression. The idea of Oxford being a closed society is not new; but- the idea of its anthropology department conforming to the patterns of pre-literate cultures is more piquant than that. Is it also true? Take this inaugural address as the ritual act of accession, its content as legitimation. Legitimation by descent, by contracting lineages, and by multiple descent, so stressed in Leach’s ‘Legitimation of King Solomon’-both Radcliffe-Brown and Evans-Pritchard! Take mechanism, scientific status: distinctly human, yet also distinctly scientific, social anthropology as the ritual myth-the magic?--of the society is question. Consider the ritual, not the belief. How are objectionable traditions killed? By being laughed out of court, perhaps; or by questioning Professor Needham’s legitimation. Perhaps if he too discards legitimations, he may then break from the worn mould of his inaugural lecture and offer us some surprises. We are ready.

This chapter takes the form of a discussion between the editors of this volume and Joseph Agassi, regarding the relationship between methodological individualism and institutional individualism. The focus is on Agassi’s interpretation of traditional methodological individualism in terms of psychologism; the role of institutions and structural factors in social explanation; Popper’s theory of World 3; the application of Weber’s interpretative approach—Verstehen—to typical ways of thinking and acting; and the Austrian School of economics.

Summary In a nutshell, the present essay claims this: First, the classical problem of knowledge has recently shifted from, How do I know? to, How do we know?–from psychology to sociology. As a phenomenological matter this is a great improvement, as a solution to the problem of rationality it is erroneous and immoral. The problem, (Why) should I act, believe, etc., this or that? is answered: You should do so on the authority of your reason. But change the problem of rationality in accord with the change in the problem of knowledge, and ask, (Why) should we–rather than I–act or believe as we do? and the answer is clear: We should act and believe as we do, because our society is as it is, and should be as it is. This is clearly the same as, we should because we should. Not very enlightening. Sociologism appears as the authoritarian solution to the problem of rationality in works of Polanyi and Kuhn; a variant of it appears as a liberal theory in the studies of Popper and his former students who, however, do not offer any positive theory of what to believe or do; rather, they offer a negative theory of what to reject. They view this as a better solution to the problem of rationality, if not even a better formulation of it (not what and why should I/we etc., but what and why should I/we not etc.).

ABSTRACT Concern with global responsibility for survival as such invites the creation of a specific international organization. The new body should adjudicate as to which disputes are open (such as, for example, concerning the advisability of building nuclear plants) and which are not (for example, white supremacy); most significantly, the new body should carefully guard its credibility by sticking to veracity, by avoiding deceit even in extreme situations. In particular it behoves us all to confess that we have no solution to our most urgent problems.

ABSTRACT The period of government‐sponsored research and development, involving military and industrial intervention in academic life, especially in the USA, was brief and yet its characteristics were declared universal by two historians of science there, Derek J. de Solla Price and Thomas S. Kuhn, who justified coercion and boredom in research work organized hierarchically. The reform of work movement is now attempting to introduce ideas in the opposite direction. Clearly, the institutions of big science should be interested in the improvement of the quality of research done on their premises and in the changes in world situation which might greatly change the agenda of research. To that end research into the general character of big science is very advisable and may be instigated either by large research institutions or by some of their umbrella organizations which may create incentives and alter the character of big science radically to everybody's advantage.

In this paper, Agassi reflects on his own interaction with Feyerabend, as it evolved over the years, and especially on Feyerabend’s intellectual legacy as a philosopher of science and a teacher. Whereas he appreciates Feyerabend’s early work and endorses some of his criticism of Popper, he regards Feyerabend’s later change of view, and his turn from rationalism to relativism, as unserious. Also, he ascribes the enduring success Feyerabend’s works still enjoy among his peers, more to his provocative style than to their actual content.

Karl Popper’s “IndeterminismIndeterminismin Quantum PhysicsQuantum Physics and in Classical PhysicsPhysics” suffers unjust neglect. He judged determinism false: the future is open. In principlePrinciple, replacing in Laplace’s variantVariant of predictable predetermination renders “scientific” determinismScientific determinism scientific and so refutable. Popper claimed that he had refuted it. Now a metaphysical systemSystem may have an extension—in the mathematical sense—that may render it explanatory and testable. If it exists, then it is not unique but may have many alternative extensions. Popper’s proofProof is then inconclusive.

There are no classics in the natural sciences akin to those in the humanities; Koyré paved the way to getting some connoisseurs to read some old science texts the way they read old classics in the humanities. Historians of science can help that project by debunking the myth that to be a good historian of science one has to be professional. Indeed, it is hard to say whether as a professional Koyré was a historian of science or of religious thought, or simply of culture. The historiographical innovation of Koyré is the idea that (contrary to the traditional view that science is infallible) historians of science should better not ignore their heroes’ errors. Hence, viewing him as a Platonist is highly misleading: whereas Plato deemed science perfect, Koyré used the analysis of scientific mistakes as a tool for understanding the research process in its diverse manifestations. Unfortunately, Koyré did not place sufficient emphasis on scientific controversies, even though, differing from other historians, and opposing Duhem’s views, he did not suppress them and he emphasized the role of metaphysics and of theology as their background, thus recognizing the proper place of metaphysics and of theology in research that Duhem had barred from science so as to exclude controversy from science. Thus, Koyré was an internalist not in the positivist sense but in the sense that he studied the problem situations of researchers, for his greatest charm was that he was consistently problem oriented.

It is Frege, not Boole, who is the father of modern logic. What exactly is modern about modern logic? Why did Frege develop it? The answers given here are these. Modern logic is both comprehensive and fully formal. The comprehensiveness in question is the sufficiency for the purposes of mathematics. (Other kinds of comprehensiveness are possible.) Fully formal systems are such that computers can use them. The idea of a fully formal language is Frege’s; he offered fully formal inferences. Russell was the first to offer a formal language proper. These days, when computers are parts of everyday life, developing a formal system is hardly a challenge. At the time, Russell noted, only two formal systems were available, his and that of Wittgenstein. Most significantly, it was Frege who rendered logic unmistakably the logic of statements; analysis of concepts thus turned into (post-Wittgenstein) analysis of statements. (Regrettably, on this too many analytic philosophers are not au courant.)

Kinds of analysis proliferate. The paradigm of analysis is mathematics; Newton spoke of scientific analysis; chemical analysis is a paradigm for that; psychologists speak of analyses; social scientists follow suit; linguists offer discourse analyses; critical analyses of Shakespeare’s sonnets are also familiar. The analysis nearest to, or identical with, Wittgenstein-style philosophy, is the most famous case in the field of foundations of mathematics: Russell’s 1905 view on definite descriptions. It has never left the agenda of analytic philosophy (Pelletier FJ, Linsky B: Russell vs. Frege on definite descriptions as singular terms. Griffin and Jacquette (eds), pp 40–64, 2009, conclusion). That explains his having found the discovery that language includes non-descriptive items downright silly.

Russell inaugurated analytic philosophy new-style. His initial concern was with rationality. He took its display in science to be best and the clearest. He therefore had two initial aims: to render philosophy scientific and to prove that science is certain (since tradition equates reason with provability). This led him to efforts to improve logic. He argued that whereas every class is a subclass of itself, no class is a member of itself. He wanted to prove this. So he defined “normal” a class is normal if it is not a member of itself: x ε N ↔ ~(x ε x) and tried to prove that all classes are normal: N = V. This made him wonder: is the normal class itself normal? As we saw, the answer is, yes-and-no; which is absurd. Now absurdities were never problematic as everybody always pronounced them false. Russell’s paradox, like any paradox (or antinomy or puzzle), is demonstrably true and false. A language that contains a paradox has all its statements proven. Russell managed to block paradoxes but he allowed contradictions as well-formed. This was the birth of the first fully formal language.

Karl Popper’s “Indeterminism in Quantum Physics and in Classical Physics” suffers unjust neglect. He judged determinism false: the future is open. In principle, replacing Laplace's variant of predetermination with predictable predetermination renders “scientific” determinism scientific and so refutable. Popper claimed that he had refuted it. Now a metaphysical system may have an extension—in the mathematical sense—that may render it explanatory and testable. If it exists, then it is not unique but has many alternative extensions. Popper’s proof is then inconclusive.

L’article de Karl Popper « Indeterminism in Quantum Physics and in Classical Physics » est tombé injustement dans l’oubli. Popper jugeait le déterminisme faux : l’avenir est ouvert. En principe, remplacer la variante de Laplace de la pré-détermination par une prédétermination prévisible permet de rendre scienti-fique, donc réfutable, le déterminisme « scientifique ». Popper a affirmé qu’il l’avait réfuté. Maintenant, un système métaphysique peut avoir une extension – au sens mathématique – qui le rend explicatif et testable. Si une extension existe, alors elle n’est pas unique, et de nombreuses autres extensions alterna-tives existent. La preuve de Popper n’est alors pas concluante.

Joseph Agassi is an Israeli scholar born in Jerusalem on May 7, 1927. He has many books and articles published contributing to the fields of logic, scientific method, foundations of sciences, epistemology and, most importantly for this Journal, in the historiography of science. He studied with Karl Popper, who was definitely his biggest influence. He taught around the world in different universities. He currently lives in Herzliya, Israel. For his important contribution to the historiography of science, we chose to open the first issue of this journal with this interview recognizing his importance for the field, as well as paying our homage to him.

To commemorate the 50th anniversary of his passing, this special book features studies on Alexandre Koyré, one of the most influential historians of science of the 20th century, who re-evaluated prevalent thinking on the history and philosophy of science. In particular, it explores Koyré’s intellectual matrix and heritage within interdisciplinary fields of historical, epistemological and philosophical scientific thought. Koyré is rightly noted as both a versatile historian on the birth and development of modern science and for his interest in philosophical questions on the nature of scientific knowledge. In the 1940s and 1950s his activities in the United States established a crucial bridge between the European historical tradition of science studies and the American academic environments, and an entire generation of historians of science grew up under his direct influence. The book brings together contributions from leading experts in the field, and offers much-needed insights into the subject from historical, nature of science, and philosophical perspectives. It provides an absorbing and revealing read for historians, philosophers and scientists alike.