Implicit biases help maintain disparities between social groups. Arguably, in order to understand how to combat the effects of implicit biases we need to know what kind of mental states the implicit attitudes that undergird them are. Moreover, whether or not you care about combatting the effects, we need to understand what implicit attitudes are to begin understanding human cognitive architecture. Accordingly, one question that a lot of recent research in philosophy and psychology has focused on…
Read moreImplicit biases help maintain disparities between social groups. Arguably, in order to understand how to combat the effects of implicit biases we need to know what kind of mental states the implicit attitudes that undergird them are. Moreover, whether or not you care about combatting the effects, we need to understand what implicit attitudes are to begin understanding human cognitive architecture. Accordingly, one question that a lot of recent research in philosophy and psychology has focused on is: how belief-like are implicit attitudes? The dominant answer from psychologists and philosophers so far is that implicit attitudes are not beliefs. However, in this paper, I argue that implicit attitudes (probably) are beliefs by presenting a general dilemma for various criteria of belief that are supposed to distinguish implicit attitudes from beliefs. Then I argue we can explain frequently cited and prima facie puzzling empirical data that might nevertheless appear to distinguish implicit attitudes from beliefs, if we adopt an independently motivated, fragmented model of the human mind. Finally, I sketch some simple empirical predictions that fall out of the combination of a fragmented model of the mind with the view that implicit attitudes are beliefs, hopefully opening the door for empirical investigations into novel strategies for altering implicit attitudes.
