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60Must Signals Handicap?The Monist 85 (1): 86-104. 2002.The extravagant crests, tails, colors, and songs of many animals, particularly males, have long puzzled evolutionary biologists. The peacock’s colorful tail is a classic example. This tail, which can reach more than five feet in length, requires a great deal of energy to grow, and it is a burden to lug around for most of the year. Why, then, should the tail have evolved? Natural selection is supposed to favor traits that make organisms more fit, not less fit.
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25Natural-Kind Term Reference and the Discovery of EssenceDissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst. 1998.According to a doctrine that has been popularized by Kripke and Putnam, a natural kind term like 'bird' rigidly designates the kind with the microstructure of sample birds. This microstructure is the essence of birdhood, so our learning what the relevant microstructure is our discovery of the kind's essence. We have discovered that some statement like 'The bird is the taxon with such and such DNA structure' is true. Further, it is commonly added, the discovered microstructure is essential to eac…Read more
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25Joseph LaPorte, Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, USD 84.00, ISBN 0521825997 (cloth), x + 221 pp (review)Erkenntnis 69 (3): 415-419. 2008.
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1Theoretical identity statements, their truth, and their discoveryIn Helen Beebee & Nigel Sabbarton-Leary (eds.), The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds, Routledge. 2010.
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64Does a type specimen necessarily or contingently belong to its species?Biology and Philosophy 18 (4): 583-588. 2003.In a recent article, Alex Levine raises a paradox. It appears that, given some relatively uncontroversial premises about how a species term comes to refer to its species, a type specimen belongs necessarily and contingently to its species. According to Levine, this problem arises if species are individuals rather than natural kinds. I argue that the problem can be generalized: the problem also arises if species are kinds and type specimens are paradigmatic members used to baptize names for speci…Read more
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51Rigid designation and theoretical identitiesOxford University Press. 2013.Rigid designators for concrete objects and for properties -- On the coherence of the distinction -- On whether the distinction assigns to rigidity the right role -- A uniform treatment of property designators as singular terms -- Rigid appliers -- Rigidity - associated arguments in support of theoretical identity statements: on their significance and the cost of its philosophical resources -- The skeptical argument impugning psychophysical identity statements: on its significance and the cost of…Read more
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65Is There a Single Objective, Evolutionary Tree of Life?Journal of Philosophy 102 (7): 357-374. 2005.It is often said that there is just one “objective” tree of life: a single accurate branching hierarchy of species reflecting order of descent. For any two species, there is a single correct answer as to whether one is a “daughter” of the other, whether the two are “sister species” by virtue of their descent from a common parental species, whether they belong to a family line that excludes any given third species, and so on. The idea is intrinsically interesting. It has consequences for what we …Read more
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1Samir Okasha, Philosophy of Science: A Very Short Introduction (review)Philosophy in Review 23 268-269. 2003.
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42On two reasons for denying that bodies can outlast lifeMind 118 (471): 795-801. 2009.Hershenov (2005) gives two interesting, related arguments, which he calls ‘symmetry arguments’, to the effect that a living body or an organism cannot be identical to a corpse, superficial appearances to the contrary. I relate the two arguments briefly and then criticize them for related weaknesses.
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120Essential membershipPhilosophy of Science 64 (1): 96-112. 1997.In this paper I take issue with the doctrine that organisms belong of their very essence to the natural kinds (or biological taxa, if these are not kinds) to which they belong. This view holds that any human essentially belongs to the species Homo sapiens, any feline essentially belongs to the cat family, and so on. I survey the various competing views in biological systematics. These offer different explanations for what it is that makes a member of one species, family, etc. a member of that ta…Read more
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103Rigid Designators for PropertiesPhilosophical Studies 130 (2): 321-336. 2006.Here I defend the position that some singular terms for properties are rigid designators, responding to Stephen P. Schwartz’s interesting criticisms of that position. First, I argue that my position does not depend on ontological parsimony with respect to properties – e.g., there is no need to claim that there are only natural properties – to get around the problem of “unusual properties.” Second, I argue that my position does not confuse sameness of meaning across possible worlds with sameness …Read more
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35The Logical Structure of Kinds, by Eric FunkhouserMind 126 (502): 627-631. 2017.The Logical Structure of Kinds, by FunkhouserEric. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. 182.
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5Review of Jody Hey: Genes, Categories, and Species: The Evolutionary and Cognitive Causes of the Species Problem (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (4): 627-630. 2003.
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56Species as relations: Examining a new proposal (review)Biology and Philosophy 21 (3): 381-393. 2006.
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171Natural Kinds and Conceptual ChangeCambridge University Press. 2003.According to the received tradition, the language used to to refer to natural kinds in scientific discourse remains stable even as theories about these kinds are refined. In this illuminating book, Joseph LaPorte argues that scientists do not discover that sentences about natural kinds, like 'Whales are mammals, not fish', are true rather than false. Instead, scientists find that these sentences were vague in the language of earlier speakers and they refine the meanings of the relevant natural-k…Read more
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47In defense of speciesStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 38 (1): 255-269. 2007.In this paper, I address the charge that the category species should be abandoned in biological work. The widespread appeal to species in scientific discourse provides a presumption in favor of the category’s usefulness, but a defeasible presumption. Widely acknowledged troubles attend species: these troubles might render the concept unusable by showing that ‘species’ is equivocal or meaningless or in some similar way fatally flawed. Further, there might be better alternatives to species. I argu…Read more
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26In defense of speciesStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 38 (1): 255-269. 2005.In this paper, I address the charge that the category species should be abandoned in biological work. The widespread appeal to species in scientific discourse provides a presumption in favor of the category’s usefulness, but a defeasible presumption. Widely acknowledged troubles attend species: these troubles might render the concept unusable by showing that ‘species’ is equivocal or meaningless or in some similar way fatally flawed. Further, there might be better alternatives to species. I argu…Read more
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3Samir Okasha, Philosophy of Science: A Very Short Introduction Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 23 (4): 268-269. 2003.
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14On Systematists’ Single Objective Tree of Ancestors and DescendantsBiological Theory 4 (3): 260-266. 2009.It is often said that there is just one “objective” tree of life: a single accurate branching hierarchy of species reflecting order of descent. For any two species there is a single correct answer as to whether one is a “daughter” of the other, whether the two are “sister species” by virtue of their descent from a common parental species, whether they belong to a family line that excludes any given third species, and so on. This position is not right. We may whittle a tree of life, paring troubl…Read more