Joseph Jedwab

I argue for the RI-model of the Incarnation by showing how it solves two problems for the doctrine, and I defend the model from objections. The conciliar doctrine of the Incarnation says that, in Christ, there is one person and two natures. The Son has the divine nature and a human nature. The RI-model of the Trinity says that, in the Trinity, there are three entities. Each is a being, a person, and divine. They are all the same being but different persons. So, there is one being and three persons. Any sentence of the form ‘God is F’ is true if and only if the divine being is F. And whatever is true of anything divine is true of God. So, God is a being, a person, and divine. The RI-model of the Incarnation says that, in Christ, there are two entities. Each is a being and a person. One entity is divine, and the other entity is human. They are the same person but different beings. So, there is one person and two beings. Any sentence of the form ‘Christ is F’ is true if and only if the person who is the divine entity and the human entity is F. And whatever is true of the divine or the human entity is true of Christ. So, Christ is a being, a person, divine, human, begotten, and born.

Work on divine omnipresence in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion draws a pair of distinctions between basic and derivative accounts, and occupation and non-occupation accounts. Physical objects are paradigm examples of objects that are somewhere. And they are, in the basic sense, somewhere because they occupy regions. So, the basic account says that, in the basic sense, God is everywhere. And the occupation account says that, in the basic sense, God is everywhere because God occupies every region. Any derivative account, by contrast, says that, in a derived sense, God is everywhere. And any non-occupation account says that, in either the basic or a derived sense, God is everywhere because God bears some non-occupation relation to every region. The chapter considers various versions of the occupation account and various non-occupation accounts, and argues that, in the basic sense, God is aspatial, but, in a derived sense, God is everywhere.

Work on divine omnipresence in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion draws a pair of distinctions between basic and derivative accounts, and occupation and non-occupation accounts. Physical objects are paradigm examples of objects that are somewhere. And they are, in the basic sense, somewhere because they occupy regions. So, the basic account says that, in the basic sense, God is everywhere. And the occupation account says that, in the basic sense, God is everywhere because God occupies every region. Any derivative account, by contrast, says that, in a derived sense, God is everywhere. And any non-occupation account says that, in either the basic or a derived sense, God is everywhere because God bears some non-occupation relation to every region. I consider various versions of the occupation account and various non-occupation accounts. And I argue that, in the basic sense, God is aspatial, but, in a derived sense, God is everywhere.

The Doctrine of the Trinity says that there is one God, that there are three divine Persons, and that each divine Person is God. The Logical Problem of the Trinity is that these claims seem logically inconsistent. We argue that any coherent and orthodox solution to the Logical Problem must use the technique of paraphrase: a logically or metaphysically more perspicuous reformulation. If so, discussions of paraphrase deserve more prominence in the literature on the Doctrine of the Trinity. We also show that such explicit discussion has important implications for theorizing about the Trinity.

Relative-identity theories of the Trinity and Incarnation are worth another look. But not all such theories are the same. One important difference among them concerns restricted quantification. Peter Geach proposes two theses: the sortal relativity of identity and the irreducibility of restricted quantification. Every relative-identity theory of the Trinity and Incarnation applies Geach’s first thesis. But only what I call “the Geachian theory” applies both theses. I argue that any such Geachian theory faces significant theoretical disadvantages. Towards the end, I propose a closely related but non-Geachian relative-identity theory that doesn’t share those theoretical disadvantages.