Joseph Sartorelli

While affirmative action programs exist for a number of groups, little serious consideration has been given to the establishment of such programs for gay men and lesbians. This essay argues that many of the conditions that justify current affirmative action programs would also justify their extension to gay people, both in terms of compensation for injuries suffered and in terms of benefit to both individuals and society generally. It is argued that anti-discrimination policies are hard to enforce and, in any case, would be inadequate to redress many of the wrongs suffered by gays and lesbians. It is concluded that programs favoring gay visibility are morally justified.

In Wittgenstein on Meaning, Colin McGinn argues that the skeptical argument that Kripke distills from Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations generates at most what might be called meaning skepticism (the non-factuality view of meaning), and not concept skepticism (the non-factuality view of concepts). If correct, this would mean the skeptical reasoning is far less significant than Kripke thinks. Others have seemed to agree with McGinn. I argue that McGinn is wrong here--that, in fact, Kripke's skeptical reasoning has a straightforward extension to concepts. Whether the reasoning succeeds, however, is another matter, which I do not address here.

According to the fairness argument, same-sex marriage must be permitted because without it there would not be equal treatment for homosexuals and heterosexuals. In, Piers Benn holds that the argument does eventually deliver this conclusion, but not as readily as intuitively appears. He concludes that some conservative points against same-sex marriage achieve at least a stand-off from the point of view of the argument. I argue that he accords the conservative points much more significance than they actually deserve and misconstrues the metaphysical dimension that is an important part of how the fairness argument operates

In his book Homosexuality, Michael Ruse argues that the state does not have any obligation to provide affirmative action benefits for gay people (beyond the obligation to have anti-discrimination laws). I believe that Ruse's stated reasons do not justify this conclusion. I also believe that the conception of affirmative action he deals with is far too narrow to guarantee that if there is no obligation to provide affirmative action benefits (on that narrow conception) then there is no obligation to provide positive benefits not provided to all (the wider conception of affirmative action). Moreover, I think the attempt to use the narrower, rather than the wider, conception in this case indicates a considerably less than complete sensitivity to the plight of gay people in the context of present day Western societies. In this article I attempt to justify these beliefs.

In his famous essentialist account of identity, Kripke holds that it is necessary to the identity of individual people that they have the parents they do in fact have. Some have disputed this requirement, treating it either as a reason to reject essentialism or as something that should be eliminated in order to make essentialism stronger. I examine the reasoning behind some of these claims and argue that it fails to acknowledge the complex and multi-faceted importance of biological process in determining identity and distinguishing significant differences between biological and non-biological cases. In fact, this failure derives from an inherent tendency to treat the biological case in just the same way as the non-biological case at least at one important point in its history—the point of formation. This analysis offers a way of salvaging Kripke’s original claims. I focus in particular on the views of Graeme Forbes and Teresa Robertson, but also discuss the views of Nathan Salmon, M. S. Price and E. J. Lowe