Nolan (this volume) describes a pair of cases in which an infinite number of clowns are apparently able to conjure up whatever they like simply by forming the right intentions. His is the latest contribution to a growing literature that uses so-called ‘New Zeno’ cases to argue for surprising philosophical conclusions about (inter alia) infinity, motion, causation, ability, the laws of physics, or the logic of counterfactuals. In this response, it is argued that New Zeno cases—Nolan’s clown cases…
Read moreNolan (this volume) describes a pair of cases in which an infinite number of clowns are apparently able to conjure up whatever they like simply by forming the right intentions. His is the latest contribution to a growing literature that uses so-called ‘New Zeno’ cases to argue for surprising philosophical conclusions about (inter alia) infinity, motion, causation, ability, the laws of physics, or the logic of counterfactuals. In this response, it is argued that New Zeno cases—Nolan’s clown cases included—are not, on reflection, all that puzzling, and the thought that there are deep philosophical lessons to be learned from them has been largely overstated. The reasons for this turn out to have interesting parallels in the literature on the consequence argument for incompatibilism about free will and the grandfather paradox for time travel.
