Vidal-Rosset Joseph

This book is the English revised and augmented version of the book entitled "Précis de philosophie des sciences" (Barberousse et al., 2011. Its purpose is to present the main questions and answers addressed in today's philosophy of science. Its target audience should be both students and researchers in this field. All contributors are recognized academics and any reader would probably learn a lot by reading this book. The preface points out that `the two parts of The philosophy of science mirror the traditional distinction between general philosophy of science and philosophy of the special sciences'. Let us give a quick overview of each contribution in these two parts. The first three articles, entitled Scientific explanation, Confirmation and induction, and Causality, written, respectively, by D. Bonnay, M. Cozic and M. Kistler, deal with much the same subject from different angles, that is the opposition between deductive–nomological explanations and inductive–statistical explanations. To see the wealth and complexity of epistemological questions related to understanding the nature of scientific theories, the reading of these papers is recommended. The five articles that follow these first three do not seem to have the same thematic unity. The fourth, Metaphysics of science as naturalized metaphysics (by M. Esfeld) `investigates how metaphysics of science qua naturalized metaphysics can work when taking fundamental physics and more precisely, quantum mechanics as a guideline'. Chapter 5, entitled Theory and models and written by M. Vorms, provides insights into contemporary philosophical perspectives on the nature and structure of scientific theories. In chapter 6 (Scientific change), A. Barberousse and M. Vorms stress the dynamic nature of science and develop different philosophical options to explain it. This first part of this companion ends on two contemporary topics. In chapter 7, Barberousse describes the new opposition between Philosophy of science and science studies, the latter focusing on sociological factors of scientific development. Last, it seems at first sight difficult to understand why P. Ludwig's paper on Reduction and emergence, which mainly concerns the conceptual difficulties of physicalist reductionism to solve the famous mind–body problem, is the eighth and concluding paper of this first part. But probably Ludwig answers this question in pointing out at the end of his paper that there are explanatory limits of scientific theories at any given moment of history. Indeed, the mind–body problem is the example par excellence of these limits. The second part is dedicated to the philosophy of special sciences and it could be itself divided into two parts. First, the expected topics: Philosophy of logic (by P. de Rouilhan), Philosophy of mathematics (by D. Bonnay and J. Dubucs), Philosophy of physics (by A. Barberousse) and Philosophy of biology (by T. Pradeu). Second, matters more rarely discussed in philosophy of science: Philosophy of medicine (by É. Giroux and M. Lemoine), Philosophy of social sciences (by J. Elster and H. Landermore), Philosophy of economics (by M. Cozic), Philosophy of cognitive science (by D. Andler) and Philosophy of linguistics (by P. Égré).

Vuillemin wrote a short article on Rawls’s Theory of Justice focusing on justice as a compact that underpins a fair society. After analysing the nature of what he calls “explicit” and “implicit” contracts in this theory, Vuillemin criticises Rawls’s definition of justice and concludes that Rawls did not understand his own intellectual ancestry. Rawls says that his political philosophy is rooted in Kantian morality. However Vuillemin contends that it derives from Carneades’ sceptical tradition. The main claim of this paper is that Vuillemin’s interpretation of Rawls’s theory is both blinkered and biased.

Ce livre developpe une theorie de la negation qui rend compte de maniere complete des trois significations naturelles et fondamentales de la negation: rejet, absence et denegation. L'auteur adopte une theorie intuitionniste de la negation, parce qu'il considere que celle-ci offre une comprehension a la fois plus riche et plus fine de la negation que celle qui est donnee par la logique classique. La premiere partie de l'ouvrage commence avec des remarques qui relevent de la psychologie, la seconde traite de la negation d'un point de vue logique, et la troisieme donne un apercu critique sur quelques metaphysiques de la negation, c'est-a-dire sur certains systemes philosophiques (ceux de Platon, de Spinoza et de Hegel) qui ont tire des consequences ontologiques a partir d'une definition specifique de la negation. Cette troisieme partie trouve une suite naturelle dans le commentaire des reflexions sur la question de la negation developpees par Spinoza (proposition 49 de la seconde partie de l'Ethique) et par Kant (Essai pour introduire en philosophie le concept de grandeur negative). Ces deux commentaires sont respectivement prolonges par une critique de l'analyse spinoziste de la negation et par l'explication de l'interet que presente la logique intuitionniste a la fois pour la comprehension de l'analyse kantienne et pour les lecons que l'on peut tirer du celebre carre des oppositions logiques, ou la negation joue un role crucial.