Joseph William

During the last fifteen years a revival of philosophical interest has gathered strength in the thesis of relativism. It is not uncommon, for example, to find accusations to the effect that Rorty, Putnam, Quine, foucault, Kuhn, Gadamer, Lyotard, Derrida and many others are guilty of propounding relativism. For many people, Derrida's deconstructionsm is a splendid example of the drift towards relativism. The problem, however, is that no one has yet explained in any detail how and why deconstruction entails relativism, and Derrida himself rejects outright the claim that a relationship obtains between deconstruction and relativism. ;The central goal of this study is to settle this problem by explicating the nature of the relationship between deconstruction and relativism. The object of my research is two-fold. Firstly and most importantly, the thesis will attempt to show that Derrida's deconstructionism does in fact entail an unconstrained version of relativism. To achieve this, I shall examine in some detail the nature of the key terms, such as "differance", "trace," "supplement," etc., that are used by Derrida in deconstructing texts. The nature of these terms, I shall argue, entail a relativistic standpoint. Secondly, the thesis will attempt to show that Derrida's brand of relativism is incoherent. In particular, I propose to examine some of the main arguments and counterarguments in the debate between the proponents and detractors of relativism, and then argue that the common ground argument is effective against Derrida's brand of relativism and, I shall urge, against relativism in general. In summary, I propose to show that by making the connection between deconstruction and relativism, we see more clearly what Derrida's deconstructionism represents, namely, an ultimately incoherent brand of relativism. This approach will go some way towards establishing the claim that the influence exerted by deconstruction on the contemporary intellectual scene is philosophically untenable