Josh Merlo

There is a polemic against modern thought observable in the contemporary Thomistic tradition. This polemic is based on significant philosophical and theological disagreements that exist between Thomists and modern thinkers. Given these disagreements, contemporary Thomists conclude that modern thinkers can be characterized as anti-Christians, atheists, skeptics, humanists, relativists, and anti-realists. This polemic can be challenged if a plausible alternative for the generation of the Thomist-modern disagreements can be developed and supported. In this dissertation, I argue that divine power absolutism can also explain the divergence of modern thought from Thomistic orthodoxy. While (almost) all medieval Christians agree that God can do whatever is not contradictory, different traditions disagree about what is contradictory: divine power absolutists expand upon the scope of what is not contradictory. While (almost) all medieval Christians agree that God’s creative action is contingent, different schools disagree about whether God’s creative action is alterable post-creation: some divine power absolutists allow for God to alter his creative action post-creation. The consequences of expanding the scope of what is not contradictory and of allowing for God to alter his creative action post-creation are comparable to the consequences of modern thought that contemporary Thomists find so disagreeable. If some modern thinkers can be shown to endorse divine power absolutism, then we will have a plausible alternative to the contemporary Thomists’ uncharitable reading of modern thinkers. There are some modern thinkers who can be shown to endorse – to various degrees and in various cases – divine power absolutism: Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, Clarke, and Newton. Therefore, we have a plausible alternative to the Thomistic polemic: some modern thinkers are members of the divine power absolutist tradition.

In Sorgner's 2009 paper "Nietzsche, the Overhuman, and Transhumanism", he argues, contra Bostrom, that the transhumanist movement's postman is fundamentally similar to Nietzsche's overman. In this paper, Sorgner's thesis is challenged. It is argued that transhumanism, as presented both popularly and academically, is fundamentally incompatible with Nietzsche's overman, as presented in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. This argument focuses on three significant characteristics's of Zarathustra's description of the overman: the role of earthly existence, immortality, and the rejection of collective values.