•  31
    You Just Can’t Count on (Un)Reliability
    Analysis 80 (4): 737-751. 2021.
    Edouard Machery argues that many traditional philosophical questions are beyond our capacity to answer. Answering them seems to require using the method of cases, a method that involves testing answers to philosophical questions against what we think about real or imagined cases. The problem, according to Machery, is that this method has proved unreliable ; what we think about these kinds of cases is both problematically heterogeneous and volatile. His bold solution: abandon the method of cases …Read more
  •  32
    Salient Alternatives in Perspective
    with Mikkel Gerken, Chad Gonnerman, and John P. Waterman
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4): 792-810. 2020.
    This paper empirically investigates how perspective bears on putative salient alternative effects on knowledge ascriptions. Some theoretical accounts predict salient alternative effects in both fir...
  •  40
    This is an appendix containing the stimulus materials for the experiments reported in the paper ‘Salient Alternatives in Perspective.’
  •  72
    Framing how we think about disagreement
    with Diana Betz, Chad Gonnerman, and John Philip Waterman
    Philosophical Studies 175 (10): 2539-2566. 2018.
    Disagreement is a hot topic right now in epistemology, where there is spirited debate between epistemologists who argue that we should be moved by the fact that we disagree and those who argue that we need not. Both sides to this debate often use what is commonly called “the method of cases,” designing hypothetical cases involving peer disagreement and using what we think about those cases as evidence that specific normative theories are true or false, and as reasons for believing as such. With …Read more
  •  2
    Knowledge, certainty, and skepticism: A cross-cultural study
    In Stephen Stich, Masaharu Mizumoto & Eric McCready (eds.), Epistemology for the rest of the world, Oxford University Press. pp. 187-214. 2018.
    We present several new studies focusing on “salience effects”—the decreased tendency to attribute knowledge to someone when an unrealized possibility of error has been made salient in a given conversational context. These studies suggest a complicated picture of epistemic universalism: there may be structural universals, universal epistemic parameters that influence epistemic intuitions, but that these parameters vary in such a way that epistemic intuitions, in either their strength or propositi…Read more
  •  8
    The Challenges Involved with Going Negative
    Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 34 (3): 465-479. 2017.
    One rather common way of doing philosophy involves what is called “the method of cases,” where philosophers design hypothetical cases and use what we think about those cases—our “philosophical intuitions”—as evidence that certain philosophical theories are true or false, and as reasons for believing that those theories are true or false. This way of doing philosophy has been challenged in recent years on the basis of both general epistemological considerations and more specific methodological co…Read more
  •  10
    Author Q & A (review)
    The Philosophers' Magazine 58 125-126. 2012.
  •  49
    Marc Lange: Natural Laws in Scientific Practice (review)
    Philosophy of Science 71 (2): 222-224. 2004.
    What is a law of nature? Traditionally, philosophical discussion of this question has been dominated by two prominent alternatives; David Lewis’s best-systems analysis, according to which a law is a regularity that serves as a theorem in our best axiomatization of the facts about the world, and the Dretske-Armstrong-Tooley analysis, which incorporates universals to distinguish laws from mere accidental generalizations. Marc Lange’s first book presents a provocative alternative to this tradition, …Read more
  • Claude, A. 73
    with P. Abir-Am, S. Altaian, W. Arnold, D. Amon, S. Arrhenius, W. T. Astbury, H. J. Bagg, O. Bail, and D. Baltimore
    In Sahotra Sarkar (ed.), The Philosophy and History of Molecular Biology: New Perspectives, Kluwer Academic. pp. 249. 1996.
  •  539
    It has been standard philosophical practice in analytic philosophy to employ intuitions generated in response to thought-experiments as evidence in the evaluation of philosophical claims. In part as a response to this practice, an exciting new movement—experimental philosophy—has recently emerged. This movement is unified behind both a common methodology and a common aim: the application of methods of experimental psychology to the study of the nature of intuitions. In this paper, we will introd…Read more
  •  124
    Competence: What's in? What's out? Who knows?
    with Ronald Mallon and Jonathan M. Weinberg
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4): 329-330. 2010.
    Knobe's argument rests on a way of distinguishing performance errors from the competencies that delimit our cognitive architecture. We argue that other sorts of evidence than those that he appeals to are needed to illuminate the boundaries of our folk capacities in ways that would support his conclusions.
  •  395
    Accentuate the Negative
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2): 297-314. 2010.
    Our interest in this paper is to drive a wedge of contention between two different programs that fall under the umbrella of “experimental philosophy”. In particular, we argue that experimental philosophy’s “negative program” presents almost as significant a challenge to its “positive program” as it does to more traditional analytic philosophy.
  •  67
    Experimental philosophy uses experimental research methods from psychology and cognitive science in order to investigate both philosophical and metaphilosophical questions. It explores philosophical questions about the nature of the psychological world - the very structure or meaning of our concepts of things, and about the nature of the non-psychological world - the things themselves. It also explores metaphilosophical questions about the nature of philosophical inquiry and its proper methodolo…Read more
  •  265
    Is experimental philosophy philosophically significant?
    Philosophical Psychology 23 (3): 377-389. 2010.
    Experimental philosophy has emerged as a very specific kind of response to an equally specific way of thinking about philosophy, one typically associated with philosophical analysis and according to which philosophical claims are measured, at least in part, by our intuitions. Since experimental philosophy has emerged as a response to this way of thinking about philosophy, its philosophical significance depends, in no small part, on how significant the practice of appealing to intuitions is to ph…Read more