Joshua Bergamin

Improvising musicians—especially towards the “freer” or more “experimental” end of the spectrum—are often seen as having the space to do just about anything. But actual improvisations are (also) processes of what enactivist philosophers Hanne De Jaegher and Ezequiel Di Paolo call “participatory sense-making”; musicians’ active choices are both enabled and constrained by musical phenomena, or “autonomous organising principles”, that emerge between them. Here we explore one example of such phenomena: groove. We begin by theorizing groove more broadly as a “grid” and as “participatory discrepancies”, emphasizing how groove shows a form of agency in processes of sense-making. We then analyze sense-making at work in a case of emergent groove performed by the 21-piece experimental improvising ensemble Splitter Orchester. We conclude that collective sense-making is a dynamic process in which individual agents negotiate not only with each other, but also the shared norms and emergent other-than-human processes that they enact.

In this paper, I explore the question of agency in spontaneous action via a phenomenology of musical improvisation, drawing on fieldwork conducted with large con- temporary improvising ensembles. I argue that musical improvisation is a form of ‘participatory sense-making’ in which musical decisions unfold via a feedback pro- cess with the evolving musical situation itself. I describe how musicians’ technical expertise is developed alongside a responsive expertise, and how these capacities complicate the sense in which habitual action can be viewed as pre-conscious or ‘automatic.’ Nevertheless, I shall argue that the self-awareness required for expert improvisation does not amount to highly reflective deliberation, arguing instead that the practice of musical improvisation involves an exercise of practical rationality, akin to what Aristotle called phronēsis. Musical decisions – as an expressive form of sense-making – are guided by feelings of ‘rightness’ that are experienced directly and intuitively, responding to the norms and reasons that are embedded in the instruments, sounds, and practices of a particular (sub)culture.

In this chapter, I explore the ethical dimension of improvised music via an engagement with Gadamer’s conception of the artwork as event. In particular, I suggest that the practice of improvised music offers a direction back to a collective experience that previously was the domain of ritual. This experience, which I will convey via parallels between Gadamer’s work and the anthropology of Victor Turner, coloured with descriptions by practicing improvisers, suggests extensions of subjectivity and agency beyond the human individual – both with other listeners, and with the other-than-human elements of the performance. I argue that the improvised musical or artistic event is a fractal phenomenon in which we play out the ethical relationships of our broader forms-of-life on a microcosmic scale. In important ways, then, participation in improvised art can contribute to a re-interpretation of how we relate to others, and offers paths to how we might live out what Heidegger called an ‘original’ ethics, sharing in the world’s unfolding by actively letting others be. Such a re-understanding can, I conclude, help us clarify our enmeshment with the other-than-human, as well as the value of artistic practice as a form of philosophy.

Hubert Dreyfus argues that explicit thought disrupts smooth coping at both the level of everyday tasks and of highly-refined skills. However, Barbara Montero criticises Dreyfus for extending what she calls the ‘principle of automaticity’ from our everyday actions to those of trained experts. In this paper, I defend Dreyfus’ account while refining his phenomenology. I examine the phenomenology of what I call ‘esoteric’ expertise to argue that the explicit thought Montero invokes belongs rather to ‘gaps’ between or above moments of reflexive coping. However, I agree that the ‘principle of automaticity’ does not adequately capture the experience of performing such skills. Drawing on examples of expert performance in sport and improvised music and dance, I argue that esoteric action, at its best, is marked by a distinct state of non-conceptual awareness- an experience of spontaneity, flow and ‘owned-ness’- that distinguishes it from the automaticity of everyday actions.

I argue that ordinary confabulation is a side-effect of an interpretive faculty that makes sense of the world by rationalising our experience within the context of a personal and cultural narrative. However, I argue that a hyperactivity of the same process manifests as schizotypy—latent schizophrenic tendencies—that can lead to extreme dissociation of interpretation from experience. I first give a phenomenological account of the process of interpretation, arguing that it is enacted through the creation of conceptual cognitive content from an originary non-conceptual experience. I then ground this account in empirical evidence, showing how our direct perception is moulded and adapted as it is conceptualised to fit our individual and collective expectations. Finally, I argue that hyperactive over-interpretation results in schizotypic dissociation, thus suggesting that schizophrenia should be understood as a disorder of interpretation, the extreme end of a spectrum that includes ordinary confabulation.