Joshua Fernandes

Multimodality refers to cognitions that are qualified with contents arising from multiple sense faculties. This paper locates and examines two perceptual forms of multimodal cognitions, mentally mediated perceptual cognitions (jñānalakṣaṇā pratyāsatti) and simultaneous cognitions (yugapajjñānā) in Gaṅgeśa’s Tattvacintāmaṇi. A mentally mediated perceptual cognition is one in which a substance, while being perceived experientially, has contents from the rational agent’s memory trace infused into their perceptive cognition. An opponent argues that recognition (pratyabhijñā) is composed of two cognitions, an experiential cognition (anubhava) followed by a recollection (smaraṇa/smṛti), while Gaṅgeśa argues that recognition takes recourse to mentally mediated perceptual cognition and appears in a single cognition. A simultaneous cognition is the ability to simultaneously experience qualities arising from multiple sense faculties in a single cognition. An opponent argues for the possibility of simultaneity and its occurance in a single cognition, while Gaṅgeśa argues that it is impossible to veridically experience simultaneity in a single cognitive state. I argue that Gaṅgeśa can theorise on both types of cognitions while upholding the Restriction Assumption: that the sense faculties are restricted to and can only generate cognitions related to their respective content.

Annambhaṭṭa’s Tarkasaṅgraha is a primer for introducing students to Nyāya phi- losophy. More than twenty-five commentaries have been published on this text. Annambhaṭṭa defines colour as the quality that can only be grasped by the visual sense faculty. In this paper, I present an intellectual thread across these commen- taries by illustrating the evolution of perspectives on Tarkasaṅgraha’s definition of colour. Cases are shown where insertions were added to the definition, either to avoid logical inconsistencies, or to further develop philosophical thought. The commentary, Nīlakaṇṭhaprakāśikā, presents an interpretation that leads to an invalid conclusion and then provides a correction. Tarkasaṅgrahasarvasvam, Śaktisanjīvinī and Āloka expand the definition in the navyanyāya style. Ṭippaṇi shows how the definition has implications in other theories. Lastly, I analyse Nṛsiṃhaprakāśikā’s evaluation and refinement of definitions on the basis of parsimony, and its argument on why Tarkasaṅgraha’s definition is equally sufficient.

standard Nyāya understanding of the internal sense organ. He says that the internal sense organ is elemental, does not inhere in anything and indirectly rejects the standard Nyāya view that it is of atomic dimension. Gokul Madhavan (2017) raises an important question on what Raghunātha means by the internal sense organ being an element. He gives two possible readings. The first reduces the internal sense organ to any one of the primary elements. The second reading says that the internal sense organ is an irreducible element, different from the primary elements. Using Madhusūdana Sarasvatī’s understanding of the internal sense organ as presented in his Siddhāntabhindu, I present a novel view, that the internal sense organ is different from the primary elements precisely because it can grasp contents related to all primary elements, an epistemological view that Naiyāyikas also accept, but also that it must be necessarily created from and composed of those very primary elements, a mereological view that the Advaitins propose. I argue that Madhusūdhana’s view is more preferable than Madhavan’s two readings.

In the Tattvacintāmaṇi, the Nyāya stalwart Gaṅgeśa (14th century CE) engages in a debate with a Mīmāṃsaka, for whom the manas is ubiquitous while it is atomic for the Naiyāyika. Ubiquitous and atomic substances are both partless. Ubiquitous substances are actionless while atomic ones move. The Mīmāmsaka asks a question on action: if the manas is atomic, then the actions of the body would be absurdly restricted to a bodily region that is also atomic. Or, if it pervades the entire body, parts that have no intention to be acted upon would also act. They ask how we are able to move all our fingers and toes at the same time. Gaṅgeśa offers two related responses, one to introduce desire (cikīrṣa) as the regulator for movement within the body. Second, he says that effort is limited by where the effect of bodily action is seen. Phillips and Tatacharya (2009) have argued that Gaṅgeśa’s responce is unsatisfactory for his shift from manas to desire implies ambiguity in Gaṅgeśa’s reasoning. Picking from an objection Uddyotakara (6th century CE) raises on Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana’s (4th century CE) reading to Nyāya Sūtra 3.1.8-11, on whether the visual sense faculties are one or two, it will be argued that the atomic manas still plays a role in bodily actions. While Vātsyāyana argues that the sense organs are two, Uddyotakara points out that an atomic manas cannot come into contact with two visual faculties at once and concludes that it is one. I attempt to show the relation between the two debates and how the conceptual reconstruction answers some of Mīmāmsaka's questions.