Joshua Livingstone

Asserting that all inquiry is either superfluous or futile, Meno’s paradox threatens the very heart of philosophy. In response, philosophers have tended to refute the account of inquiry that the paradox presupposes, i.e., inquiry as a means of acquiring knowledge, and to promote an alternative view. While this strategy can be effective in refuting Meno, it can also take philosophy in some uncomfortable directions. This, I argue, is the case for both Plato and Heidegger, whose accounts of the nature of inquiry lead either into conditions of excessive constraint or excessive openness.

Hannah Arendt and Simone Weil were two of the most compelling political thinkers of the 20th century who, despite having similar life-experiences, developed radically distinct political philosophies. This unique dialogue between the writings of Arendt and Weil highlights Arendt's secular humanism, her emphasis on heroic action, and her rejection of the moral approach to politics, contrasted starkly with Weil's religious approach, her faith in the power of divine Goodness, and her other-centric ethic of suffering and affliction. The writings here respect the profound differences between Arendt and Weil whilst pulling out the shared preoccupations of power, violence, freedom, resistance, responsibility, attention, aesthetics, and vulnerability. Without shying away from exploring the more difficult concepts in these philosophers' works, Hannah Arendt and Simone Weil also aims to pull out the relevance of their writings for contemporary issues.

Asserting that all inquiry is either superfluous or futile, Meno’s paradox threatens the very heart of philosophy. In response, philosophers have tended to refute the account of inquiry that the paradox presupposes, i.e., inquiry as a means of acquiring knowledge, and to promote an alternative view. While this strategy can be effective in refuting Meno, it can also take philosophy in some uncomfortable directions. This, I argue, is the case for both Plato and Heidegger, whose accounts of the nature of inquiry lead either into conditions of excessive constraint or excessive openness.