The disagreement between generalists, who claim that conspiracy theories can be evaluated as a class, and particularists, who claim that each conspiracy theory must be evaluated on its own merits, has been one of the main dividing lines in the literature on conspiracy theories, although it has recently been suggested that consensus has settled in favour of particularism. In this paper we first argue that as it stands this disagreement is merely verbal: both sides are correct, given what they mea…
Read moreThe disagreement between generalists, who claim that conspiracy theories can be evaluated as a class, and particularists, who claim that each conspiracy theory must be evaluated on its own merits, has been one of the main dividing lines in the literature on conspiracy theories, although it has recently been suggested that consensus has settled in favour of particularism. In this paper we first argue that as it stands this disagreement is merely verbal: both sides are correct, given what they mean by ‘conspiracy theory’. We then revive a substantial version of the debate by adopting the project of analysing the ordinary concept of a conspiracy theory, which offers clear criteria on a correct definition. Our proposal is that the definition that best fits these criteria is one on which conspiracy theories are undermined by the testimony of epistemic superiors. Importantly, our definition implies the truth of generalism. While the paper is centrally concerned with advancing a novel view on the nature of conspiracy theories, its broader interest lies in the important connections it draws between this topic and recent discussions of epistemic authority, testimony, and defeat.
