Joshua Saunders

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Book Reviews Plato's Later Epistemology. By W. G. Runciman. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1962. Pp. 138. $3.75.) Although this work may be regarded as the sequel to an earlier article by the author ("Plato's Parmenides," in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, LXIV [1959], 89-120), his argument in this volume does not hinge upon the earlier analysis of the Parmenides. What Runciman proposes to do (and not do) is made clear enough both in the Introduction and in his concluding remarks. His purpose is "to consider the logic and epistemology of Plato's Theaetetus and Sophist" (p. 1), to "give a coherent interpretation of [these dialogues] as a whole" (p. 127), and to show something of Plato's later attitude to the general problem of knowledge and truth. But this is done within the context of a reading of Plato and of Plato's concern with knowledge, truth, and error, marked by the raising of two particular questions--of interest to Runciman and to a great many others belong-' 9 ing to the Anglo-American tradition in philosophy. Accordingly, the interpretation of these two dialogues is presented as an attempt to throw light on just "how far did Plato arri~,e at a distinction between knowledge that, knowledge how, and knowledge by acquaintance?" And secondly, "how closely did he approach a conscious formulation of the notion of truth-value?" (p. 1). The vantage point for Runciman's interpretation of these dialogues is the not unfamiliar view of Plato's "later" works as being marked by an increasing selfcriticism of his earlier theories, that it is by the method of Division (rather than the method of Hypothesis) that Plato now undertakes his exposition of the Forms. And the Forms are now seen, no longer "as the isolated objects of hypothesis and deduction... [but rather as] members of a complicated structure of mutual interrelations" (p. 128). Here then, for Runciman, Plato appears as the philosopher of later years, as more the dialectician, less concerned with contemplation of the Forms than with correlation and the knowledge of the relational properties which the Forms possess. Plato is thus seen by Runciman as coming of philosophical age in these, the "later" dialogues. And if Plato is not the forerunner of the contemporary philosophy-of-language school or a sainted forefather of those who are convinced that progress has been made in philosophy in the name of "logical analysis," at least these "later" Platonic dialogues show the brilliance of a philosopher, Plato, who could have said such new and interesting things for philosophers today, and yet "within the framework of his misguided... Theory of Forms" (p. 133). The important assumption, for Runciman, is to recognize the gradual development and modification of earlier views by a Plato grown more "sophisticated" by the maturity of his later years. And Runciman enters upon an interpretation of the Theaetetus and the Sophist with this clearly in mind, and with the comment that these dialogues may best be understood in this way: that--however crippled philosophically by his adherence to the Forms--Plato is latterly struggling with philosophical problems of logic and language. Runciman's argument, within such a context, emphasizes the role of the Sophist: had Plato but understood clearly his subject-matter, this dialogue pre-eminently suggests how he might have broken through to the full vigor of a [contemporary] concern with the nature and structure of language. "If a philosopher can be said to be doing logic without knowing it, then we may say that Plato in the Sophist is doing logic" (p. 126). Runciman's little book, thus primarily concerned, contains chapters on the logic and epistemology of the Theaetetus and the Sophist, and he raises some interesting questions. E255] 256 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY The book is both stimulating and provocative, and rather worth the reading, particularly by those who find Plato less philosophically "sophisticated" than Aristotle, less alert and relevant for some contemporary philosophical tastes. And it may be, of course, that some such readers will be led on to a larger sampling of the Platonic dialogues, with the result-doubtless pernicious---that their reading of Plato may corrupt their "understanding" of...

This is a fascinating and important study of ideas of justice and punishment held by the ancient Greeks. The author traces the development of these ideas from Homer to Plato, analysing in particular the completely radical new system of punishment put forward by Plato in his dialogue the Laws. From traditional Greek ideas of cursing and pollution through to Plato's views on homicide and poisoning by doctors, this enlivening book has a wealth of insights to interest both ancient historians and classicists, and all those interested in the history of philosophy and ethics. `Quite simply, essential reading.' (Greece and Rome)