Joshua Smith

In a recent article, Lars Bo Gundersen has suggested a new semantics for counterfactuals (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85: 1-20, 2004). The new semantics gives up on the idea that the actual world must be at the center of world orderings. Instead, statistically normal worlds are at the center. Part of the motivation for this idea is that a very influential account of knowledge, so-called ‘tracking’ accounts, seem right, but suffer serious problems with more traditional semantics for counterfactuals. Gundersen's semantics, if correct, helps tracking accounts with certain problems, but leads to new problems that seem intractable. So while Gundersen's semantics might be correct, those who endorse tracking accounts of knowledge should be loath to endorse it.

The “therapeutic obligation” is a physician’s duty to provide his patients with what he believes is the best available treatment. We begin by discussing some prominent formulations of the obligation before raising two related considerations against those formulations. First, they do not make sense of cases where doctors are permitted to provide suboptimal care. Second, they give incorrect results in cases where doctors are choosing treatments in challenging epistemic environments. We then propose and defend an account of the therapeutic obligation that solves the problems that undermined previous efforts at formulating the TO. We conclude by considering how apparent problems with our proposal actually rest on difficulties with informed consent

There are a number of relevant alternatives accounts of knowledge in the literature, including those by contextualists (like Lewis and Cohen), and invariantists (like Dretske). Despite widespread discussion of such views, an explication of the notion of relevance is conspicuously absent from the literature. Without a careful explication of that notion, relevant alternatives accounts resist evaluation. This paper attempts to aid in the evaluation of those accounts, by providing an account of relevance. The account rejects two common presuppositions about the notion of relevance. The account holds that worlds, rather than alternatives, are relevant, and that distant worlds can be relevant. Relevant worlds turn out to be those worlds at which an alternative to one’s belief obtains, and is such that one’s epistemic position (with respect to what one believes at the actual world) is worse than it is at the actual world.

Recent work by Peijnenburg, Atkinson, and Herzberg suggests that infinitists who accept a probabilistic construal of justification can overcome significant challenges to their position by attending to mathematical treatments of infinite probabilistic regresses. In this essay, it is argued that care must be taken when assessing the significance of these formal results. Though valuable lessons can be drawn from these mathematical exercises (many of which are not disputed here), the essay argues that it is entirely unclear that the form of infinitism that results meets a basic requirement: namely, providing an account of infinite chains of propositions qua reasons made available to agents.