Joshua Wilburn

This chapter argues that although the _Republic_’s tripartite theory of the soul is not explicitly endorsed in Plato’s late work the _Laws_, it continues to inform the _Laws_ from beneath the surface of the text. In particular, the spirited part of the soul continues to play a major role in moral education and development in the _Laws_ (as it did in earlier texts, where it is characterized as reason’s psychic ‘ally’). The chapter examines the programs of musical and gymnastic education in the _Laws_ and highlights parallels to the accounts of the spirited part of the soul and its role in moral education and virtue that are offered in _Republic_ and _Timaeus_. It also examines the educational role given to the laws themselves in Magnesia, and suggests that the education provided through them is largely directed at the spirited part of the soul as well.

This paper challenges the commonly held view that Plato acknowledges and accepts the possibility of _akrasia_ in the _Laws_. It offers a new interpretation of the image of the divine puppet in Book 1 - the passage often read as an account of akratic action -- and shows that it is not intended as an illustration of _akrasia_ at all. Rather, it provides the moral psychological background for the text by illustrating a broader notion of self-rule as a virtuous condition of the soul (and lack of self-rule as a vicious condition). The paper examines key discussions in the _Laws_ in order to show how Plato makes use of this broader notion of self-rule throughout the dialogue, and argues that nothing Plato says in the _Laws_ commits him to the possibility of _akrasia_. One significant consequence of this interpretation of the puppet passage is that it avoids the need to posit developmentalism in Plato's late views about the embodied human soul, as some recent commentators have done: the moral psychology of the _Laws_, on this reading, is not incompatible with the _Republic_'s tripartite theory of the soul.

This chapter undertakes a detailed examination of the philosophical method described in _Eudemian Ethics_ 1.6. Contrary to what many scholars suppose, the chapter argues that this method differs substantively from the famous endoxic method described in _Nicomachean Ethics_ 7.1. Briefly, whereas the Eudemian method aims to discover explanatory definitions of ethical topics by constructing complex deductive arguments which draw on the _phainomena_ for support and illustration, the endoxic method seeks truth about ethical matters by purging _endoxa_ of their epistemic shortcomings via aporetic investigation. D.J. Allan famously compared the Eudemian method to the ‘mathematical pattern of deduction’ exhibited by Euclid’s _Elements_. However, the chapter argues against this proposal and instead suggests that the Eudemian method is more accurately viewed as an application of the ‘rational’ (_kata ton logon_) mode of argumentation found throughout the Aristotelian corpus.

Many of Socrates’ admirers and successors in the fourth century and beyond felt the need to explain Socrates’ reputed relationship with Alcibiades and to defend Socrates against the charge that he was a corrupting influence on the young man. This chapter examines Plato’s response to this problem and defend two main aims. First, it argues that Plato’s explanation of why Socrates failed to convert Alcibiades to the life of philosophy consists in two central points: that motivations associated with the spirited part of the soul play a decisive role in moral education, particularly in the case of exceptionally ambitious and talented individuals; and that the democratic Many _themselves_, not Socrates, are primarily responsible for the corruption of promising young men like Alcibiades. These points are connected, moreover: the Many exert a moral influence on the young by shaping and exploiting their spirited motivations. It shows that Plato develops and dramatizes this diagnosis of the problem of Alcibiades in three earlier dialogues—_Protagoras_, _Gorgias_, and _Symposium_—as well as in Book 6 of the _Republic_. The chapter’s second main claim is that the psychological and educational theories of the _Republic_ are informed by Plato’s diagnosis of the problem of Alcibiades, and that they are conceived, at least in part, as a solution to that problem.

In 2019 I designed and taught two iterations of “Plato and Black Feminist Thought”, a special topics version of a course on Plato. It combined a reading of the Republic with texts from the Black feminist tradition with thematic connections to Plato's dialogue. The course seemed to be highly successful both in promoting student engagement generally and as an approach to teaching Platonic philosophy in particular. In this paper I describe the course in detail and offer an account of my experience teaching it, as well as some student perspectives.

This paper responds to two trends in debates about Plato's view of women in the Republic. First, many scholars argue or assume that Plato seeks to minimize the influence of femininity in the ideal city, and to make guardian women themselves as “masculine” as possible. Second, scholars who address the relationship between Plato's views of women and his psychological theory tend to focus on the reasoning and appetitive parts of the tripartite soul. In response to the first point, we argue that the idea that Plato seeks to masculinize/de-feminize the city oversimplifies his treatment of Greek gender norms. Although he does want to eliminate some traditionally feminine qualities from the city, he also seeks to eliminate many masculine qualities as well. Moreover, while he tries to make guardian women more like men in some respects, he simultaneously aims to make guardian men more like Greek women in important ways. Regarding the second point, we argue that this project of reimagining gender norms is illuminated by Plato's psychology, but instead of emphasizing reason and appetite, we show how his views are connected to his account of the third, “spirited” part of the soul, thumos, and its dual hard/soft or aggressive/gentle nature.

In this paper I examine the account of courage offered in Books 3 and 4 of the Republic and consider its relation to the account of courage and cowardice found in the final argument of the Protagoras. I defend two main lines of thought. The first is that in the Republic Plato does not abandon the Protagoras’ view that all cases of cowardice involve mistaken judgment or ignorance about what is fearful. Rather, he continues to treat cowardly behavior as an indication that, at least at the time of action, the agent lacked correct belief about what is best and least fearful. The evidence for this view will include an argument that what it means for the thumoeides to ‘preserve what is announced by rational accounts’ in the Republic is for it to prevent the fluctuation or corruption of reasoning under the deceptive influence of appetite. Second, I will argue that the Protagoras anticipates this account of courage in important ways. In particular, it draws attention to the problematic instability of belief and adumbrates the need for something like the spirited element of our psychology. According to my interpretation, the Republic’s account of courage is an elaboration or supplementation of the Protagoras’ account, rather than a rejection of it

In this paper I argue that, despite what many commentators have concluded, Plato’s division of three psychological “causes” of criminal behavior at Laws 863b1-e3 (anger, pleasure, and ignorance) is not intended to invoke the tripartite theory of the soul. I suggest that the focus of the division is on an alternative moral psychological picture, one which is better suited to the criminal penology of Book 9. However, I argue, this alternative picture is nonetheless consistent with tripartite theory.

In this paper I challenge the commonly held view that Plato acknowledges and accepts the possibility of akrasia in the Laws. I offer a new interpretation of the image of the divine puppet in Book 1 - the passage often read as an account of akratic action -- and I show that it is not intended as an illustration of akrasia at all. Rather, it provides the moral psychological background for the text by illustrating a broader notion of self-rule as a virtuous condition of the soul (and lack of self-rule as a vicious condition). I examine key discussions in the Laws in order to show how Plato makes use of this broader notion of self-rule throughout the dialogue, and I argue that nothing Plato says in the Laws commits him to the possibility of akrasia. One significant consequence of my interpretation of the puppet passage is that it avoids the need to posit developmentalism in Plato's late views about the embodied human soul, as some recent commentators have done: the moral psychology of the Laws, on my reading, is not incompatible with the Republic's tripartite theory of the soul.

Socrates’ admirers and successors in the fourth century and beyond often felt the need to explain Socrates’ reputed relationship with Alcibiades, and to defend Socrates against the charge that he was a corrupting influence on Alcibiades. In this paper I examine Plato’s response to this problem and have two main aims. First, I will argue in Section 2 that <span class Plato’s diagnosis of the problem—his explanation of why Socrates failed to convert Alcibiades to the life of philosophy—consists in two central points: that motivations associated with the spirited part of the soul play a decisive role in moral education, particularly in the case of exceptionally ambitious and talented individuals; and that the democratic Many themselves, not Socrates, are primarily responsible for the corruption of promising young men like Alcibiades. These points are connected, moreover: the Many exert a moral influence on the young by shaping and exploiting their spirited motivations. I aim to show that Plato develops and dramatizes this diagnosis of the problem of Alcibiades in three earlier dialogues—Protagoras, Gorgias, and Symposium—as well as in Book 6 of the Republic. My second main claim will be that the psychological and educational theories of the Republic are informed by Plato’s diagnosis of the problem of Alcibiades, and that they are conceived, at least in part, as a solution to that problem.

In the tripartite psychology of the Republic, Plato characterizes the “spirited” part of the soul as the “ally of reason”: like the auxiliaries of the just city, whose distinctive job is to support the policies and judgments passed down by the rulers, spirit’s distinctive “job” in the soul is to support and defend the practical decisions and commands of the reasoning part. This is to include not only defense against external enemies who might interfere with those commands, but also, and most importantly, defense against unruly appetites within the individual’s own soul.1 Spirit, according to this picture, is by nature reason’s faithful auxiliary in the soul, while appetite is always a potential enemy to be watched ..

In this paper I argue that although the Republic’s tripartite theory of the soul is not explicitly endorsed in Plato’s late work the Laws, it continues to inform the Laws from beneath the surface of the text. In particular, I argue that the spirited part of the soul continues to play a major role in moral education and development in the Laws (as it did in earlier texts, where it is characterized as reason’s psychic ‘ally’). I examine the programs of musical and gymnastic education in the Laws and highlight parallels to the accounts of the spirited part of the soul and its role in moral education and virtue that are offered in Republic and Timaeus. I also examine the educational role given to the laws themselves in Magnesia, and I suggest that the education provided through them is largely directed at the spirited part of the soul as well.

I advocate an ad hominem reading of the hedonism that appears in the final argument of the Protagoras. I that attribute hedonism both to the Many and to Protagoras, but my focus is on the latter. I argue that the Protagoras in various ways reflects Plato’s view that the sophist is an inevitable advocate for, and himself implicitly inclined toward, hedonism, and I show that the text aims through that characterization to undermine Protagoras’ status as an educator. One of my objectives in the course of my arguments is to explore connections between the final argument of the Protagoras and the Man-Measure Doctrine as it is developed in the Theaetetus.