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110Epistemic LuckPhilosophy Compass 6 (1): 11-21. 2011.Epistemologists often remark that knowledge precludes luck. A true belief based on a guess or hunch is not knowledge because it seems merely fortuitous, too much of an accident, and, well, lucky that one happened to get things right. Of course, true beliefs based on guesses and hunches are not justified. However, Gettier cases have persuasively shown that even justified true beliefs can admit knowledge‐precluding kinds of luck. So in what sense are justified true beliefs that don’t amount knowle…Read more
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26Review of Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (6). 2010.
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106I can trust you now … but not later: An explanation of testimonial knowledge in childrenActa Analytica 25 (2): 195-214. 2010.Children learn and come to know things about the world at a very young age through the testimony of their caregivers. The challenge comes in explaining how children acquire such knowledge. Since children indiscriminately receive testimony, their testimony-based beliefs seem unreliable, and, consequently, should fail to qualify as knowledge. In this paper I discuss some attempted explanations by Sandy Goldberg and John Greco and argue that they fail. I go on to suggest that what generates the pro…Read more
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13Conscientious Self-reflection to the Rescue?European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (4): 155--167. 2014.
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28This dissertation argues that knowledge is best understood as a true belief acquired through the manifestation of intellectually virtuous performance. I argue that intellectually virtuous performance requires intellectual responsibility but not a characteristic motivation. I distinguish my view from other conceptions of intellectual virtues; particularly the virtue reliabilism of Ernest Sosa and John Greco and the virtue responsibilism of Linda Zagzebski. I argue that intellectual virtues are be…Read more
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259Conscientious Self-reflection to the Rescue?European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (4): 155-167. 2014.
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45On the Limits of Virtue EpistemologyAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2): 103-120. 2013.Since Ernest Sosa's (1980) seminal paper, a variety of views on the nature of intellectual virtues and their role in one's epistemic theory have emerged. These views, including Sosa's original, largely draw from moral counterparts for their motivation, articulation, and defense. Consider two broad accounts of intellectual virtues: Consequentialist Conception (CC): An intellectual virtue is a stable disposition, ability, or power to reliably acquire epistemic goods (e.g., true belief and know…Read more
Spokane, Washington, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Religion |
Normative Ethics |