Josip Guć

In this paper I try to indicate particular elements of Socrates’ philosophy by which educational practice should be guided, as well as certain harmful implications of Sophistic approach to education. In analysis of Socrates’ position, I especially rely on Vlastos’ interpretations, and particularly I refer to Socrates’ thesis that virtue cannot be taught. Among other things, it suggests a non-doctrinal approach to moral-educational practice, which cannot result from Protagoras’ opposite beliefs. Nowadays Sophistic particular- and utilitarian-oriented education occurs especially in the educational (or better: manipulative) transmission of national, business and similar so-called ethics, which are not able for recognizing and overcoming of the existing socio-economic framework, and for which Socrates’ moral-educational philosophy contains critical force, arising primarily out of the emphasis on autonomy.

The paper attempts to point out Paulo Freire’s thoughts that could be fruitful in the context of bioethical consideration of the human relationship toward nature, i.e., non-human living beings, especially with regard to the development of bioethical sensibility, in particular present in children. Given that certain childhood traits, compatible with the idea of bioethical sensibility, form the core of Freire’s philosophy of education, this is an area in which the bioethicisation of Freire’s thought can be particularly fruitful. In addition, the paper presents his views associated with moral regard toward non-human living beings, as well as those that are somewhat contradictory to due regard toward living beings, given that the latter views provide impoverished insights into the richness of the non-human living beings’ self-realisation. Prior to these considerations, the notion of bioethicisation of philosophy is further clarified, especially regarding the closely related (programmatic) notion of Europeanisation of bioethics. Both of these terms are used in the context of integrative bioethics. The last chapter explains the potential contribution of Freire’s dialogical method to the development of a pluri-perspective methodology of integrative bioethics.

In this paper I examine the role of anthropomorphic thinking today, especially in bioethics. In this context, the ban on anthropomorphism, which was until recently considered almost as an axiom, is particularly significant. The first part of the presentation considers the justification and consequences of this ban, where I especially refer to the insights of Hans Jonas. The second part of the presentation tries to offer answers to the issue of justification of anthropomorphism in bioethics, where the connection between anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism is also examined. Anthropocentrism is often considered as one of the main premises of in some way already actual ecological apocalypse. By playing with metaphors, one can set the fundamental question of this presentation as follows: does anthropomorphism originate from the “heart of darkness” that spawned the “apocalypse now”?

The responsibility for the COVID-19 pandemic was first ascribed to persons associated with the Huanan Seafood Market. However, many scientists suggest that this pandemic is actually a consequence of human intrusion into nature. This opens up a whole new perspective for an examination of direct and indirect, individual and collective responsibility concerning this particular pandemic, but also zoonotic pandemics as such. In this context, one of the key issues are the consequences of factory-farming of animals, which contributes to circumstances in which zoonotic pandemics emerge. Moreover, it is part of a larger economic system, global capitalism, whose logic implies certain coercion toward its participants to keep it essentially unchanged and therefore to make sure that livestock health remains?the weakest link in our global health chain?. However, even though the precise answer to the issue of moral responsibility for zoonotic pandemics outbreaks in general and the COVID-19 pandemic in particular cannot be given, it is possible to list certain indicators and make a framework helpful in ascribing moral responsibility to certain persons. The paper intends to do so by examining the notion of responsibility and by applying it to the issues mentioned. The results of this analysis show that it is misleading to place moral blame on people involved in actions that directly caused the animal-to-human transmission of a certain virus or on humanity as a whole.