•  32
    Are We Essentially Animals?
    Philosophical Forum 50 (3): 383-409. 2019.
    Animalism is the view that we human individuals are animals. And standard animalists claim that if we are animals, we are animals essentially. This is because they believe that if we are animals, we are essentially members of the human kind (e.g., human animal, Homo sapiens), and as a result, we have the criterion of identity by virtue of that kind. The goal of this paper is to reject the claim that our being animals implies our essentially being animals. I begin by reformulating the standar…Read more
  •  32
    In Defense of Physicalist Christology
    Sophia 60 (1): 193-208. 2021.
    Physicalist Christology is the view that God the Son, in the Incarnation, became identical with the body of Jesus. The goal of this paper is to defend PC from two recent objections. One is that if GS is a physical object, then he cannot have properties had by God. Then, by Leibniz’s law, the incarnate GS cannot be identical with the second Person of the Trinity. The other objection is that PC implies that the incarnate GS did not exist in the interim period between his death and resurrection. PC…Read more
  •  39
    The goal of this paper is to raise a novel objection to Lewis’s modal realist epistemology. After reformulating his modal epistemology, I shall argue that his view that we have necessary knowledge of the existence of counterparts ends up with an absurdity. Specifically, his analogy between mathematical knowledge and modal knowledge leads to an unpleasant conclusion that one’s counterpart exists in all possible worlds. My argument shows that if Lewis’s modal realism is true, we cannot know wha…Read more
  •  51
    Strategy for Animalism
    Axiomathes 28 (4): 419-433. 2018.
    The central argument for animalism is the thinking animal problem : if you are not an animal, there are two thinkers within the region you occupy, i.e., you and your animal body. This is absurd. So you are an animal. The main objection to this argument is the thinking brain problem : animalism faces a problem that is structurally analogous to TAP. Specifically, if animalism is true, you and your brain both think. This is absurd. So animalism is false. The purpose of this paper is to propose stra…Read more
  •  30
    The Incompatibility of Animalism and Eliminativism
    Philosophical Forum 48 (4): 395-407. 2017.
    The central case for animalism is the ‘thinking animal problem’: if I am not an animal, this leads to an absurd multiplication of thinkers. One objection to this argument is that animalism faces a structurally analogous problem called the ‘thinking parts problem’: animalism ends up with an absurdity that any part of an animal that includes a brain can be a candidate for being a thinker. Some leading animalists try to avoid the thinking parts problem by eliminating the brain (and other alleged …Read more
  •  51
    The central objection to the constitution view is the too many thinkers problem - if the animal that constitutes you thinks and you are not it, then there are two thinkers within the region you occupy. Lynne Rudder Baker claims that the animal thinks only derivatively, in virtue of constituting the person that thinks nonderivatively, and this leads to a solution to the too many thinkers problem. This paper offers two objections to Baker’s solution. First, the idea of derivative/ nonderivative…Read more
  •  66
    Naturalistic Epistemology, Normativity, and Self
    Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 53 171-182. 2008.
    In this paper, I criticize naturalized epistemology. To this end, I critically examine several versions of naturalistic epistemology (Quine, Kornblith, and Plantinga). While Quine’s epistemology eschews any kind of normativity not invoked in science, Kornblith’s and Plantinga’s views attempt to explain normativity in the light of descriptivity. I provide an argument against them. The upshot of my argument is that since we are self-conscious beings, we have reflective ability to see what we ought…Read more
  •  34
    Physicalism and neo-Lockeanism about persons
    Philosophical Psychology 29 (8): 1229-1240. 2016.
    The central objection to neo-Lockeanism about persons is the too many thinkers problem: NLP ends up with an absurd multiplication of thinkers. Sydney Shoemaker attempts to solve this problem by arguing that the person and the animal do not share all of the same physical properties. This, according to him, leads to the idea that mental properties are realized in the person’s physical properties only. The project of this paper is to reject Shoemaker’s physicalist solution to the too many thinkers …Read more
  •  48
    Dualism, Physicalism, and the Passion of the Christ
    Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 45 185-197. 2010.
    My project in this paper is to provide a plausible idea of Christ’s suffering and death in terms of two theories of the human person. One is dualism. Dualism is the view that a human person is composed of two substances, that is, a soul and a body, and he (strictly speaking) is identical with the soul. On the other hand, physicalism is the view that a human person is numerically identical with his body. I will argue that dualism is not successful in explaining Christ’s passion for some reasons. …Read more