Juan Cortés

Linnaean taxonomy, which imposes hierarchical classifications based on morphological characteristics, has become deeply embedded in modern data architecture, from databases to metadata schemas to AI training datasets. With its hierarchical structure and rigid categorization, Linnaean taxonomy privileges one type of knowledge while marginalizing alternative taxonomies that offer more fluid, contextual, and relational understandings of the natural world. This paper examines how the legacy of Linnaean taxonomy continues to shape contemporary classification systems and artificial intelligence (AI). Indigenous knowledge systems, which include spiritual, cultural, and ecological dimensions, view entities not as isolated objects but as nodes in dynamic, interconnected networks. We draw from the French naturalist, Comte de Buffon, who, in line with Indigenous knowledge systems, viewed nature as continuous and contextual rather than discretely compartmentalized. The dominance of Linnaean-style classification in AI and data systems perpetuates colonial power dynamics and contributes to knowledge homogenization while losing Indigenous languages and classification systems crucial for addressing contemporary environmental challenges, particularly in agriculture and biodiversity conservation. In this Age of AI, we call for a holistic and ecological approach to archives. Therefore, we propose applying ‘rhizomatic hylomorphism,’ an ethnobiological, alternative classification that transcends hierarchical taxonomies to embrace multiplicity, relationality, and contextual meaning.

Linnaean taxonomy, which imposes hierarchical classifications based on morphological characteristics, has become deeply embedded in modern data architecture, from databases to metadata schemas to AI training datasets. With its hierarchical structure and rigid categorization, Linnaean taxonomy privileges one type of knowledge while marginalizing alternative taxonomies that offer more fluid, contextual, and relational understandings of the natural world. This paper examines how the legacy of Linnaean taxonomy continues to shape contemporary classification systems and artificial intelligence (AI). Indigenous knowledge systems, which include spiritual, cultural, and ecological dimensions, view entities not as isolated objects but as nodes in dynamic, interconnected networks. We draw from the French naturalist, Comte de Buffon, who, in line with Indigenous knowledge systems, viewed nature as continuous and contextual rather than discretely compartmentalized. The dominance of Linnaean-style classification in AI and data systems perpetuates colonial power dynamics and contributes to knowledge homogenization while losing Indigenous languages and classification systems crucial for addressing contemporary environmental challenges, particularly in agriculture and biodiversity conservation. In this Age of AI, we call for a holistic and ecological approach to archives. Therefore, we propose applying ‘rhizomatic hylomorphism,’ an ethnobiological, alternative classification that transcends hierarchical taxonomies to embrace multiplicity, relationality, and contextual meaning.

In the first “Lecture on Political Right,” which was delivered in Ateneo of Madrid in November 22, 1836, Juan Donoso Cortés formulates “general theory of government” and “special mission of representative government.” Defining government as “social action,” Donoso inextricably binds “the idea of society” and “the idea of government.” Considering society as a collection of individuals linked by certain relationships, Donoso formulates two opposite in its effect laws: “the law of the individual,” which determines the independence and freedom of the person, and “the law of association,” associated with subordination and aimed at achieving social harmony. Person’s ability to associate with other people makes him intellectual and free. An intellect as the harmonious principle creates a society; a freedom as the anti-social principle breaks down the society; hence, the government arises by the need to resist the freedom. And the most important idea of the lecture: “For the government to act means to resist”; to resist “the invasion of the human personality,” but, following ethics and “the rule of justice,” in any case not to suppress it completely. Demonstrating the liberal-conservative character of his political ideas, views and values, Donoso encourages young Spanish constitutional monarchy, which just begins to create the foundations of representative democracy, to conserve society and human freedom, to provide their “fruitful unity.”

In the second of ten Lectures on Political Right, delivered in Madrid’s Ateneo in November 29, 1836, Juan Donoso Cortés considers the notion of “popular sovereignty.” Distinguishing mind and will as two parts of human essence, Donoso deduces from the former the “law of the association” that unites all human beings, and from the latter, the “law of the individual,” that separates them. Hence, the main problem for Donoso as a liberal conservative is how to combine these two laws. Donoso states that while traditionalists propose to focus on the “law of the association” and ends with tyranny that destroys free will, revolutionaries, by contrast, focus on the “law of the individual,” which leads to anarchy as a variant of the same tyranny. In making a historical digression to the periods of the Roman Empire and the Middle Ages, Donoso shows how the revolutionary idea of “popular sovereignty”, linked directly to the “law of the individual”, gradually overcomes the idea of “divine right of kings”, based on the “law of the association.” Donoso criticizes the English and French philosophers of the 17–18th centuries the most, as these philosophers laid the foundation for historical drama of the Great French Revolution. Offering his own liberal-conservative alternative for the two named extremes, Donoso calls to abandon the “atheist”, “immoral”, “absurd”, and “impossible” “popular sovereignty”, and combine the “law of the individual” and the “law of the association” on entirely different basis of the “sovereignty of reason, sovereignty of justice”

El presente trabajo se propone examinar la objeción de Leibniz a E1p2 y E1p5 y responder a ella. La objeción es conocida: es falso, según Leibniz, que dos substancias de atributos diversos no tengan nada en común (i. e., E1p2) y, por consiguiente, que en la naturaleza no puedan darse dos o más substancias de mismo atributo (i. e., E1p5). Defiendo que E1p2 y, por tanto, E1p5 resisten a la objeción de Leibniz. Para ello, abordo, primero, el sentido y la función de E1p2 a fin de determinar dos posibles contextos en que la demostración es válida: el contexto delimitado por la doctrina cartesiana del atributo principal y el contexto escolástico de la doctrina lógica de la diversidad esencial. Segundo, examino la objeción de Leibniz, con lo que determino de manera más precisa el marco epistémico tanto de E1p2d como de la objeción de Leibniz. Tercero, propongo un análisis crítico de la objeción de Leibniz a fin de mostrar que, si bien esta objeción tiene cierta apariencia de validez, si consideramos únicamente lo enunciado por Spinoza en las definiciones y axiomas anteriores a E1p2, esta entraña una contradicción. Por último, indico el punto de mayor dificultad en la demostración de E1p2 para proponer una pequeña rectificación a fin de volverla inmune a la objeción de Leibniz.

This work addresses the question of the relationships between philosophy and the history of philosophy, the latter understood as a philosophical discipline in the strict sense. Indeed, unlike what happened some fifty years ago, the debate between the history of philosophy and philosophy seems to be taking place today as an internal debate on the history of philosophy. From this point of view, it is no longer a "quarrel" (in which two opposing positions face: "history or philosophy" vs. "philosophy iff history"), but rather a reflection of those who practice this discipline about our own work, insofar as our work is at the same time historical and philosophical. In this regard, the problem raised in this work focuses on the method, and inextricably linked to the method, on the object and purpose of the historiographic work in (or for) philosophy. In the present work, I propose to defend the positions of archeological philosophy regarding these points (method, object and purpose), against the history of philosophy of analytical tendency.

"Spinoza", à quoi ça sert? Et comment s'en servir? En particulier, comment penser la mise à l'épreuve du rationalisme spécifique dont il est le nom? L'objectif de ce travail est de contribuer à une réévaluation non seulement du rôle de la pratique dans la pensée de Spinoza, mais encore du système lui-même, de sa capacité à s'adapter et à communiquer avec des domaines tels que les sciences expérimentales, l'histoire, la politique ou la médecine. A travers les concepts et problèmes, tels qu'ils sont formulés dans ses textes, mais également leur utilisation contemporaine, il s'agit ici d'analyser l'articulation de la philosophie de Spinoza au champ de l'action humaine, dans ses dimensions éthique, sociale, cognitive et affective - et d'apprécier la puissance de la rationalité qui en est le fondement. Les auteurs viennent d'horizons différents : professeurs, docteurs, doctorants, étudiants ou érudits originaires de divers pays, ils proposent dans les articles ici présentés des approches variées et originales des problèmes qu'ils traitent, offrant ainsi au lecteur un aperçu de la vitalité des réflexions que suscite aujourd'hui l'oeuvre de Spinoza.

RESUMEN Los estudios actuales sobre la mentira priman su lado epistémico y desatienden los aspectos morales. Tal distinción es clara en los intentos de diferenciar la mentira de la intención de engañar, y tienen como contrapartida una concepción de la verdad realista. Por ello, las interpretaciones que cuestionan o minimizan la existencia de la Verdad tienden a ser rechazadas, y parece que tampoco podrían abordar satisfactoriamente la mentira. En este artículo cuestionaremos dicha asunción, mostrando cómo un autor del Renacimiento, Michel de Montaigne, sostiene una perspectiva "negadora" de la verdad y critica la mentira, precisamente destacando su dimensión moral. ABSTRACT Current studies on lying emphasize its epistemic side and neglect the moral aspects. Such a distinction is clear in the attempts to distinguish lying from the intention to deceive and has as a counterpart a realistic conception of truth. Therefore, interpretations that question the existence of truth, or that minimize it, tend to be rejected, and it seems that they could not satisfactorily address the lie either. In this article we will question this assumption, showing how a Renaissance author, Michel de Montaigne, maintains a "denying" perspective of truth while criticizing the lie, precisely by highlighting its moral dimension.

Resumen El presente ensayo se interroga, a partir de una lectura de la novela 2666 de Roberto Bolaño, por la posibilidad del pensamiento filosófico: ¿Es posible el pensamiento filosófico bajo las condiciones actuales de la experiencia? El problema se plantea por el hecho de que dicha experiencia parece implicar la imposibilidad del pensamiento. Lo anterior entrañaría la siguiente paradoja: de hecho, habría un pensamiento imposible, a saber, el de la imposibilidad del pensamiento. Este problema parece ser puesto en escena en 2666, en un episodio en el que dos personajes se confrontan respecto de los asesinatos de mujeres en Santa Teresa. Quisiéramos mostrar que dichos personajes pueden ser concebidos como dos modos del pensamiento, opuestos de manera radical, en tanto que la existencia del uno torna imposible la del otro. Se concluye sobre la derrota del pensamiento filosófico.In this essay, I wonder, from a reading of Roberto Bolaño’s 2666 novel, if philosophical thinking is possible under the current conditions of experience. The problem arises from the fact that such experience seems to imply the impossibility of thinking. The foregoing would entail the following paradox: in fact, there would be an impossible thought, namely that of the impossibility of thought. This problem seems to be staged in 2666, in an episode in which two characters confront each other regarding the murders of women in Santa Teresa. We would like to show that these characters could be conceived as two modes of thought, radically opposed, while the existence of the one makes the other impossible. It concludes about the defeat of philosophical thought.

RESUMEN Una vez que el foco de la reflexión pasa de las teorías ideales a la aplicación de la justicia social, centrada en las instituciones de las sociedades democráticas, se requiere prestar especial atención a los estilos de vida. Estos tienen una alta incidencia en cómo la justicia es realizada y afectan tanto a la desigualdad económica como a la disponibilidad de los recursos naturales. En nuestras sociedades es posible establecer restricciones a los estilos de vida, especialmente en aquellos casos en que, por el efecto de algunas dinámicas sociales, aquellos se desacoplan de las concepciones del bien. Se defiende que, en tales casos, la base normativa que permite exigir el respeto a los estilos de vida se disuelve y por ello es posible justificar su restricción. ABSTRACT Now that the focus of reflection has shifted from ideal theories to the application of social justice, centered on the institutions of democratic societies, it is necessary to pay special attention to lifestyles, since they not only influence the realization of justice, but also have an effect on economic inequality and the availability of natural resources. In our societies, it is possible to place restrictions on lifestyles, especially in those cases in which, influenced by certain social dynamics, they disengage from conceptions of the good. The article argues that, in those cases, the normative base grounding the demand that lifestyles be respected is dissolved, thus justifying their restriction.

La asimilación que hace Spinoza del alma, es decir, la idea del cuerpo, al gaudium (e3p57) es problemática: si se trata del afecto definido en e1 p18s, dicha asimilación contradice lo que señala e2ax3, esto es, que la idea es anterior al afecto; si se trata de un afecto pasivo, se asimilaría el alma a un afecto pasivo, lo que contradice la idea de que la mente puede ser afectada por afectos activos. La solución tiene dos tiempos: se muestra el doble uso de gaudium como afecto y como intermedio entre la estructura y los conceptos; y se determina la unidad de la noción de goce por el uso. Se confronta finalmente este concepto con las ideas de Tomás de Aquino para mostrar su importancia en la discusión en torno a la libertad.

El presente artículo busca determinar un modelo propiamente spinociano para pensar la generación del Estado descrita en el Tratado Político. Para ello se intenta desvincular el modelo utilizado por Spinoza del modelo contractualista (estado de naturaleza/pacto social/estado de civilidad), bajo el cual ha sido habitualmente pensado (incluso cuando se sostiene que es un modelo naturalista). Comenzaremos por identificar el “campo de presencia” sobre el cual tanto Hobbes como Spinoza se sitúan. Este será caracterizado bajo el rótulo general de “aristotelismo político”, intentando mostrar su ambigüedad fundamental, constitutiva del problema que tanto Hobbes como Spinoza buscan resolver. Luego, haremos un examen detallado del modelo por el cual Spinoza responde a dicho problema.