Juan C Rivera Castro

Although Arthur Schopenhauer is not widely recognized as a contributor to the philosophy of mysticism, his metaphysical system anticipates several key concerns in contemporary debates about mystical experience–particularly the epistemic status of mystical reports and whether mystics share a common experience across time and cultures. Schopenhauer draws from a diverse range of mystical sources across Western and Eastern traditions, yet he does so not as a disciple of mysticism, but as a philosopher seeking external validation for his metaphysical doctrine of the blind, arbitrary Will. This raises a critical question: how does Schopenhauer respond when a mystic–such as Plotinus–offers an interpretation of ultimate reality that is neither arbitrary nor blind? This article examines Schopenhauer’s demarcation between philosophy and mysticism, wherein mystical insights are deemed incommunicable and epistemically private, while philosophical claims are presented as objective and universally debatable. By engaging closely with Plotinus’ Enneads, this paper challenges the coherence of Schopenhauer’s boundary. It argues that Plotinus’ metaphysical arguments are not reducible to private mystical insight and thus resist Schopenhauer’s attempt to marginalize them. In doing so, this paper reveals that Schopenhauer’s boundary between philosophy and mysticism may not withstand scrutiny, and that Plotinus’ views deserve reconsideration as legitimate philosophical contributions rather than mystical anomalies.

In this article, the author highlights the distinction between the volitional and henological language surrounding Schopenhauer's doctrine of the thing in itself and proposes the ramifications of this distinction. The most immediate association that comes when one thinks about Schopenhauer's thing in itself is Schopenhauer's identifying it with the will (Wille). From this follows Schopenhauer's characterization of the thing in itself as a blind striving, an aimless force that seems in constant movement, never satisfied—what the author calls the volitional account. But when one reads attentively, one encounters another set of words associated with the thing in itself, words that link Schopenhauer to the tradition of Neoplatonism inaugurated by Plotinus. Schopenhauer also describes the thing in itself as simple, one, and unchanged. This the author calls the henological account. Accordingly, the thing in itself is not merely will but much more, namely, it is the ultimate reality. Grounded on the fact that Schopenhauer was an active reader of Plotinus, the author argues that the Enneads played a role in going from the thing in itself is will to the recognition that the thing in itself is the ultimate reality. The use of henological language to describe the thing in itself changes our conceptions about the thing in itself and challenges the role that Schopenhauer assigns it in his metaphysics.

In this article, I debate Tocqueville’s faith that democratic institutions can save democracy from becoming democratic despotism. For the rising populist movements, Tocqueville’s tyrannical administrative state models everything that is wrong with democracy today. However, to some extent, they share Tocqueville’s faith that democratic institutions can save democracy. For them, one only needs to liberate the democratic institutions from those who have corrupted them. Instead of democratic institutions, I argue that only a non-democratic institution, namely, religion can accomplish that task. Tocqueville hints at this in Democracy in America when he speaks about Christianity/Catholicism. But in this book, Tocqueville focuses on the moralizing elements of religion while not discussing the elements of Christianity/Catholicism that are at odds with democracy, those unique elements that can stop the perversion of democracy. The impression is that nothing in Christianity opposes the democratic worldview. However, one important element offered by religion – specially Christianity – is the proper understanding of aristocracy/hierarchy in nature. Focusing on this element allows us to see religion as more than a school of morality. By bringing to the forefront this element we recognize religion as more than a mere school of morality. Therefore, I argue that the combined forces of religion and the aristocratic/hierarchical principle are the only permanent solution to the problem of democratic despotism as described by Tocqueville.