Juan Carlos Mendoza-Collazos

Following the levels of intentionality and semiosis distinguished by the Semiotic Hierarchy, and the distinction between original agency and enhanced agency, we propose a model of an agency hierarchy, consisting of six layers. Consistent with the phenomenological orientation of cognitive semiotics, a central claim is that agency and subjectivity are complementary aspects of intentionality. Hence, there is no agency without at least the minimal sense/feeling of agency. This perspective rules out all artefacts as genuine agents, as well as simple organisms, since it is highly unlikely that e.g. bacteria have any first-person perspective. Using this model, we review and assess recent proposals on the nature of agency from cognitive science, and neuroscience, and draw conclusions on how to incorporate aspects of them within a synthetic cognitive-semiotic framework.

Malafouris (2013) proposes that agency is an emergent product of the relational ontology of our material engagement. In contrast, I suggest a distinction between meaning and agency for a better understanding of our relational ontology with things. Meaning is the payoff of the relational ontology, meaning emerges when an agent act within the world. Agency is the capability to act, signify, produce and obtain meaning, and this capability is exclusive of living organisms. The distinction does not imply to fall in Cartesianism. Agentive semiotics (Niño 2015; Mendoza-Collazos 2016), for instance, is far from an anthropocentric or Cartesian conception of the way the agency operates. The treatment that agentive semiotics proposes for the exclusiveness of agency in living organisms could enhance the force of Malafouris' relational approach, explaining the key role of material culture without methodological fetishism.