Juan F. Álvarez

The standard argument for the causal theory of memory relies on intuitions about scenarios in which subjects accurately represent events from their pasts but do so in a “causally defective” manner. Examples include representations based on suggestion and representations based on relearned information. According to causalists, these scenarios, intuitively, are not cases of remembering. This paper applies the methods of experimental philosophy to determine whether laypeople share causalist intuitions. We find that, in scenarios in which all of the causal theory’s requirements for remembering are fulfilled and in scenarios in which none of these requirements are fulfilled, laypeople’s intuitions align with the causal theory’s verdicts: they clearly ascribe remembering in the former scenarios and clearly deny remembering in the latter scenarios. In causally defective scenarios—scenarios in which some but not all of the requirements of the causal theory are fulfilled—a more complex pattern of responses is observed, with some participants ascribing remembering even in cases that do not satisfy causalist requirements. In particular, while many participants deny that remembering occurs in relearning, many do the opposite. These results suggest that folk ascriptions of remembering only partly align with the causal theory of memory.

Simulationism is a theory of memory frequently associated with continuism – the view that memory and imagination are not fundamentally different. A prominent argument advanced by simulationists in favor of continuism appeals to the hypothesis that memory and imagination are underpinned by the same episodic construction system. Drawing on empirical and philosophical work that challenges the explanatory power of this hypothesis and instead posits a specialized episodic memory system, I argue that simulationism should reject continuism in favor of discontinuism – the view that memory and imagination are fundamentally different. While some may be skeptical about the very possibility of discontinuist simulationism, I contend that this theory is worthy of serious consideration. Discontinuist simulationism offers a novel perspective on the relationship between memory and imagination and accounts for genuine remembering in terms of the reliability of an episodic memory system that prioritizes firsthand information to simulate events in the personal past, without requiring an appropriate causal connection to past events.

Though De Brigard is generally classified as a simulationist, the relationship of his view to the various theories that have emerged in the simulationist-causalist debate has so far been unclear. He himself seems to think that he has now made that relationship clear: he is a simulationist, but the form of simulationism that he defends “dissolves the conflict” between simulationism and causalism. In this paper, we argue, in response to his recent book and to a recent paper that further develops some of the ideas proposed therein, first, that the view that De Brigard defends does not in fact dissolve the conflict between simulationism and causalism and, second, that he in fact has yet to take a clear stand with respect to the claim that distinguishes simulationism from causalism. While our focus throughout is on De Brigard, our discussion sheds light on the nature of the relationship between simulationism and causalism in general, reveals that certain causalists have, like De Brigard, failed to take a clear stand with respect to the claim that distinguishes simulationism from causalism, and raises more general issues about the nature and future of the simulationist-causalist debate.

Many philosophers endorse “exclusionism”, the view that no instance of relearning qualifies as a case of genuine remembering, and vice versa. Appealing to simulationist, distributed causalist, and trace minimalist theories of remembering, I develop three conditional arguments against exclusionism. First, if simulationism is right to hold that some cases of remembering involve reliance on post-event testimonial information, then remembering does not exclude relearning. Second, if distributed causalism is right to hold that memory traces are promiscuous, then remembering does not exclude relearning. Finally, if trace minimalism is right to hold that vicarious experiences sometimes produce the minimal traces that ground remembering, then remembering does not exclude relearning. While advocates of these theories might incorporate additional conditions designed to accommodate exclusionism, the only reason they can appeal to in favor of doing so is intuition: neither the fundamental components of the theories nor the empirical results on which they are based provide a reason to endorse exclusionism. An investigation of exclusionism thus raises metaphilosophical questions, so far overlooked in philosophy of memory, about the appropriate role of intuition in theorizing about remembering.

ABSTRACT The focus of this essay is Kant's argument in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals III that regarding oneself as rational implies regarding oneself as free. After setting out an interpretation of how the argument is meant to go, I argue that Kant fails to show that regarding oneself as free is incompatible with accepting universal causal determinism. However, I suggest that the argument succeeds in showing that regarding oneself as rational is inconsistent with accepting universal causal determinism if one accepts a certain, plausible view of the explanation of events. RESUMEN El ensayo se enfoca en el argumento de Kant en la Fundamentación de la metafísica de las costumbres III según el cual considerarse racional implica verse a uno mismo como libre. Se interpreta la forma en que debe entenderse el argumento y se afirma que Kant no logra demostrar que considerarse libre es incompatible con la aceptación del determinismo casual universal. No obstante, se sugiere que el argumento sí logra demostrar que considerarse a uno mismo como racional es incompatible con la aceptación del determinismo casual universal, si se acepta una cierta versión plausible de la explicación de los eventos.