Juan Garcia Torres

For most of his life, Augusto Salazar Bondy (1925-1974) understood liberation negatively, as the absence of domination, and he understood domination as having power over the affairs, development, and life—i.e., the being—of the dominated. Towards the end of his life, Bondy theorized liberation in more positive terms. My proposal is that Bondy’s mature view of domination requires two ingredients: a) that the dominant has power over the being of the dominated, and b) that the dominant’s use of such power creates alienation—diminishment or estrangement from one’s own being—in the dominated. Bondy’s mature view of positive liberation, by contrast, requires two ingredients: a) that the liberator has power over the being of the liberated, and b) that the liberator’s use of such power increases the being and augments the freedom of the liberated, thus permitting the liberated to be fuller versions of who they are. A significant challenge to Bondy’s account of positive liberation is that for the liberated to be a fuller version of who they are requires the liberated’s freedom and autonomy and that the liberator’s having power over the being of liberated seems to undermine the liberated’s freedom and autonomy making positive liberation impossible. Bondy’s answer to this challenge, I argue, is that the liberated’s freedom and autonomy are preserved provided that the liberator’s power over the being of the liberated operates from within the freedom of the liberated. Finally, I argue that love can serve as a plausible illustration of how a person can have power over the being of another that operates from within the freedom of the other and promotes positive liberation, in Bondy’s sense, thus answering this significant challenge.

One of Leibniz’s fundamental philosophical commitments is the principle of sufficient reason (PSR). Yet Leibniz’s precise understanding of this principle is elusive. Leibniz provides several seemingly different formulations of its content, and Leibniz sometimes seems to require the PSR being metaphysically necessary and sometimes being metaphysically contingent. I argue that these puzzles can be solved by taking seriously Leibniz’s insistence that the PSR is a principle of reasoning. For Leibniz, I argue, to say that the PSR is a principle of reasoning is to say that it is a regulative principle of rational inquiry, a principle that settles some of the permissible and impermissible moves in the game of rationally inquiring into a fundamentally intelligible reality. According to this reading, there is a coherence between epistemology and metaphysics: for Leibniz, one is epistemologically justified in holding metaphysical doctrines precisely because they result from engaging in the type of rational inquiry structured by the PSR understood as a principle of reasoning.

Paulo Freire insists that the oppressed are the more likely agents of liberation because the oppressors self-handicap their abilities to dismantle the systems of oppression they create and sustain. I develop this basic picture relying on the thought of Mexican philosopher Jorge Portilla and the character-type he calls ‘apretado.’ Apretados are people who understand themselves in relation to their material possessions, relatively high social positions, and who construe their social positions as self-validating proof of their deserving more or being more valuable than others. Apretados create oppressive social structures that enable them to live in accordance with their self-conceptions, but these structures enslave apretados to the validating gaze of others and condemn apretados to a state of Sartrean bad faith and alienation from the selves they construct in time with their actions. Unafflicted by these self-imposed harms, the oppressed are the more likely agents of liberation, as Freire insists.

Under what conditions is it epistemologically credible to appeal to considerations originating in one’s faith tradition to curb or reject dictates of one’s reason? I call these cases of theological encroachment upon philosophical inquiry. What makes theological encroachment epistemologically credible? I propose that the intellectual virtue, or intellectual vice, manifested in theorizing is epistemologically relevant. I focus on intellectual integrity: for theists who think God is worthy of worship, intellectual integrity demands that they only accept cases of theological encroachment that are worthy objects of choice for a recognizably worship-worthy God. I rely on the thought of early 19th century Mexican Catholic Bishop Clemente de Jesús Munguía as a case study to illustrate the plausibility of this criterion.

From the thought of mid-twentieth century Mexican philosopher Jorge Portilla (1919-1964), I develop a three-prong existentialist response to the problem of evil. One prong is granting that a version of the problem of evil is successful: no theodicy is credible while beholding innocent suffering. A second prong involves an affective engagement with evil that facilitates a loving human flourishing grounded in solidarity with sufferers, compassion, loving self-sacrifice, and taking responsibility for one’s own culpability. The final prong is the capacity of this affective engagement with evil to permit a belief in God as an existential commitment to a suffering God as a transcendental ideal of self-sacrificing love that guides one’s perpetual project of self-creation.

Leibniz’s account of moral necessity does double heavy-duty: it aims a) to provide explanations of divine choices without rendering these divine choices metaphysically necessary, thus permitting for divine freedom; and b) to ground the conviction that God did the best God could have done in creating the world, or Leibnizian Optimism. I present a novel interpretation of what Leibniz calls ‘the principle of the best’ as a second-order will to do what is best (read de dicto) that grounds a set of subjunctive conditionals of divine freedom. These conditionals encode what God would do (namely the best) if God were to deliberate about creating one of a set of mutually exclusive options which are metaphysically possible for God to create. I argue that this reading of the principle of the best enables Leibnizian moral necessity to do the mentioned double heavy-duty.

From the thought of mid-twentieth century Mexican philosopher Jorge Portilla (1919–1963), I develop an account of what I call an ‘ethics of ethnic identity,’ which include: (a) a set of norms of agency grounded in ethnic identity, or ethnic norms of agency—reasons for action and obligations that spring from a given ethnic identity, and (b) a type of normativity governing these ethnic norms of agency. I argue that one of the theoretical advantages of this account is that it fares well with respect to human flourishing, morals obligations, and freedom and autonomy. I also develop an account of ethics of ethnic identity from Christine Korsgaard’s account of the sources of normativity and use it as a sophisticated foil against which my elaborations of Portilla’s views can be fruitfully contrasted.

I argue for a substantive interpretation of Carlos Vaz Ferreira’s account of intellectual flourishing as intellectual liberation. For Vaz Ferreira, I argue, there is an inescapable master-slave dynamic between language and language users, so that flourishing intellectually essentially involves a type of mastery of language that frees up thinking from enslaving linguistic/conceptual confusions and thus facilitates the acquisition of truth. Central to this project are Vaz Ferreira’s most interesting, and radical, views on the nature of language signification and thus on human’s ability to accurately describe and know reality, for failing to keep these linguistic limitations in mind, Vaz Ferreira argues, is a central way for language to enslave humans to confused thinking and thus prevent their intellectual flourishing.

Leibniz claims that for every possible substance S there is an individual concept that includes predicates describing everything that will ever happen to S, if S existed. Many commentators have thought that this leads Leibniz to think that all properties are had essentially, and thus that it is not metaphysically possible for substances to be otherwise than the way their individual concept has them as being. I argue against this common way of reading Leibniz’s views on the metaphysics of modality. I develop a model in which individual concepts are innocent; that is, individual concepts are divine ideas that permit God to know everything that will ever happen to all possible substances, if created, but these individual concepts neither require that all properties are had essentially nor require that it is metaphysically necessary for substances to be the way their individual concepts have them as being.

Can a person from Latin America be a Catholic, or a feminist, or a democratic socialist in an authentic way? These identities come from Europe, and given the colonial history of Latin America, it seems reasonable to think that decolonizing the Latin American mind is a condition for its authenticity. Further, it seems reasonable to think that decolonization itself requires extirpating ideas and identities originating from the colonizers, especially those used to establish the colonial order. Thus, it seems that Latin Americans cannot adopt such identities; authentic decolonization demands otherwise. In this paper I argue that the thought of twentieth century Mexican philosopher Jorge Portilla provides a persuasive account of the nature of authentic self-creation that allows for a kind of decolonization that makes it conceptually possible for Latin Americans to be Catholics, feminists, or democratic socialists in an authentic fashion. That is, authentic decolonization of the mind, I argue, need not involve a blanket rejection of identities originating from the colonizers; instead, it can be understood as a particular kind of authentic self-creation: one that is appropriately sensitive to the colonial history of the identities freely chosen by the agent.

In the following paper, I wish to examine a problem for the theist libertarian. On the one hand, libertarians insist that freedom requires possible alternatives open to the agent. On the other hand, God’s perfectly formed moral character implies that He always does the morally best. Give His moral character, then, it appears that there are no possible alternatives open to God. We thus get a dilemma for the theist libertarian: either a) God is not libertarian free – because His moral character rules out possible alternatives; or b) God’s character is not perfectly formed – because libertarian freedom requires that it is possible for God to act out of character. In the present paper, I argue that Thomas Reid, a paradigmatic libertarian, has the theoretical tools to retain a robust account of libertarian freedom without compromising a robust account of perfectly formed characters. In sum, it is necessary that agents with fully formed characters always act in character (read de dicto), but it is possible that agents with fully formed characters act out of character (read de re). The former claim captures the robustness of perfectly formed moral characters and the latter claim captures the robustness of libertarian freedom.

Carlos Vaz Ferreira argues that the problem of freedom is conceptually distinct from the problem of causal determinism. The problem of freedom is ultimately a problem regarding the ontologically independent agency of a being, and the problem of determinism is a problem regarding explanations of events or acts in terms of the totality of their antecedent causal conditions. As Vaz Ferreira sees it, failing to keep these problems apart gives rise to merely apparent but unreal puzzles pertaining to the nature of freedom and its relation to determinism. In this article, I present my interpretation of Vaz Ferreira’s distinctive ideas regarding the nature of freedom and its relation to casual determinism.

According to intellectualists, the will is a rational inclination towards apprehended goodness. This conception of the will makes its acts intelligible: they are explained by (i) the nature of the will as a rational inclination, and (ii) the judgement of the intellect that moves the will. From this it follows that it is impossible for an agent to will evil as such or for its own sake. In explaining wrongdoing intellectualists cite cognitive error or the disruptive influences of the passions; these considerations, however, seem involuntary and at least partly exculpatory. The intellectualist needs an account that renders wrongful actions intelligible without undermining their status as responsible. I argue that Leibniz has the theoretical tools to provide at least part of an answer to this problem. In sum, an agent is directly responsible for her wrongdoing if the cognitive error or the disruptive influence of the passions that help explain this wrongdoing do not completely undermine her acting freely; an agent is indirectly responsible for her wrongdoing if she is directly responsible for previous actions which partly resulted in her wrongdoing, even if the presence of cognitive error or disruptive influence of the passions completely undermines her acting freely.

Jorge Portilla argues that authentic philosophical inquiry plays a liberating function. This function is that of bringing more fully to consciousness aspects of identities or ways of being‐in‐the world that have been, up until then, tacit or opaque to the agent herself to facilitate her endorsement, rejection, or modification of these identities. For Portilla, this function facilitates greater self‐mastery by increasing the range of free variations of subjectivity available to the agent, and this increase in self‐mastery itself constitutes a kind of liberation. The main goal of this article is to provide a substantive interpretation of the nature of liberation Portilla thinks is embedded in this central function of authentic philosophical inquiry. I argue that this type of liberation should be understood ultimately in terms of increases in human agency, so I label it “agential liberation.” For Portilla, agential liberation involves two central elements: (i) a type of agential flourishing central to human flourishing, and (ii) an increase in the reach of intentional action that I describe as an expansion in the arena of human agency.

I argue for a novel interpretation of Leibniz’s conception of the kind of contingency that matters for freedom, which I label ‘agential contingency.’ In brief, an agent is free to the extent that she determines herself to do what she judges to be the best of several considered options that she could have brought about had she concluded that these options were best. I use this novel interpretation to make sense of Leibniz’s doctrine that the reasons that explain free actions are merely inclining and not necessitating.

Leibniz is commonly labeled a foe of Molinism. His rejection of robust libertarian freedom coupled with some explicit passages in which he distances himself from the doctrine of middle knowledge seem to justify this classification. In this paper, I argue that this standard view is not quite correct. I identify the two substantive tenets of Molinism. First, the connection between the conditions for free actions and these free actions is a contingent one: free actions follow contingently from their sufficient conditions. Second, God knows what creatures would freely do in different possible circumstances prevolitionally—that is, prior to God willing anything. I argue that Leibniz himself endorses a version of both tenets and utilizes them for theoretical purposes similar to those of Molinists. I conclude that Leibniz is much closer to Molinism than is typically acknowledged. Leibniz is best characterized as a friend—rather than a foe—of Molinism.

Leibniz endorses several tenets regarding explanation: (1) causes provide contrastive explanations of their effects, (2) the past and the future can be read from the present, and (3) primitive force and derivative forces drive and explain changes in monadic states. I argue that, contrary to initial appearances, these tenets do not preclude an intelligible conception of contingency in Leibniz’s system. In brief, an agent is free to the extent that she determines herself to do that which she deliberately judges to be the best from several considered options that she could have brought about, had she come to the deliberative conclusion that these options were best. I develop a model which illustrates how Leibnizian agents could have come to different deliberative conclusions, and which thus illustrates how Leibnizian agents could have acted differently.

Call ‘a substance’ a person who is at home in a relatively stable and unified sense-making framework: a social structure that to some degree specifies which categories are important for interpreting reality, which goals are worth pursing, which character traits are admirable, etc. Call ‘an accident’ a person who is not at home in one such framework. It is tempting to think that being a substance is preferable, but I present some considerations for thinking otherwise. Mexican philosophers Emilio Uranga and Jorge Portilla, I argue, present notions of accidentality as decolonial tools. Uranga’s account enables Mexicans to have positive valuation of their being independently of the approving gaze of the colonizers and their standards of value. Portilla’s thought distinguishes between pernicious accidentality resulting from the disintegration of sense-making frameworks and authentic accidentality as a condition for freedom, self-creation, and ultimately for individual and communal liberation.