Juan Jaña

This article examines the relationship between the anthropological critique developed by Michel Foucault and the philosophical foundations of posthumanist thought. Beginning with the diagnosis of the “death of man”, it reconstructs the genealogy of the human figure as the subject of knowledge, showing that its emergence does not reflect a fixed essence, but rather a specific epistemic configuration of modernity. Far from being a simple rejection of humanism, the anthropological critique dismantles its transcendental premises, thereby opening the possibility of thinking beyond the anthropological paradigm. The analysis is organized around three key moments in Foucault’s early work: La Question Anthropologique, where philosophy appears exhausted in its conversión towards anthropology; the Introduction to the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, which reveals the ambivalence between empiricity and transcendentality in the figure of man; and The Order of Things, where the “analytic of finitude” is formulated as the structure of modern knowledge. From there, the notion of the “anthropological slumber” emerges, reflecting the illusion of a subject capable of grounding knowledge in itself. This critique reaches a turning point with the displacement toward a non-anthropocentric mode of reflection supported by a tragic and aesthetic inversion of thought. Posthumanism thus appears not as a technological overcoming of man, but as a philosophical opening toward a mode of thinking without a central figure or essential foundation.

This article addresses the philosophical tensions between Enlightenment ideals, particularly Kantian concepts of dignity and autonomy, and the evolving field of transhumanism. Kant’s belief that human dignity originates from rational autonomy and the capacity for self-governance sets a foundation for Enlightenment humanism, which posits that humans hold an exceptional place among beings. Contrasting this, Michel Foucault’s critique of Enlightenment humanism challenges the notion of a stable human essence, viewing “man” as a historically contingent construct subject to reinterpretation, particularly in the context of transhumanist enhancement. The discussion then extends to transhumanist ambitions, which aim to augment human capacities through technology but face significant questions about whether such enhancements uphold or redefine traditional values of dignity and autonomy. A central focus is Stefan L. Sorgner’s posthumanist critique, where he proposes “fictive autonomy” as a useful social construct rather than an inherent human quality, questioning whether autonomy can remain unchanged in a technologically enhanced future. Drawing on a Foucauldian perspective, this article examines both classic transhumanism and Sorgner’s adaptation, asking if either approach can genuinely reconcile with Enlightenment principles or if they risk destabilizing them. Through this lens, the article proposes that Foucauldian critique may offer a productive alternative for examining human enhancement without succumbing to contradictions inherent in the transhumanist project. Ultimately, I suggest that transhumanism, while promising to expand human potential, might need a redefined ethical framework that embraces contingency, finitude, and a revised understanding of autonomy beyond its Enlightenment origins.