Juan Cruz

When a great thinker of the Spanish Golden Age, such as Vitoria, Molina or Suárez, inquires about the fundamental cause which justifies a licit declaration of war, “injury” is included as one of these causes. Here, “injury” is understood as an infringement of a right, an injustice committed and for which restitution has not been made. Among the injuries which may licitly be considered a justification for war, there is the “insult to honor”, especially to the honor of the Nation and the honor of the Sovereign. The difficulty in accepting this justification for war lies in making a demarcation between the interest of the Sovereign and the interest of the People, i.e. the men who make up the community, who are the immediate depositaries of power. For these thinkers, honor is always owed to the People. This is because a State, a Nation, a People, has the right to enjoy respect for its institutions, laws and customs, as an integral part of its own life

This starting point of the deontological argument as formulated by Millán-Puelles is the absolute imperative of duty on conscience, and its terminus or culmination is God as an Absolute Person. The proof departs from the commanded conscience to the Conscience that commands. An imperative is not only a demand directed toward a free will, but likewise the demand that one will be directed by another. Each imperative is a dialogue betwen wills. Thence the need that the imperative be imposed ultimately by a person.

A partir del aforismo de Nietzsche, según el cual “el signo de la libertad lograda es no avergonzarse ya ante uno mismo”, se propone enfocar la vergüenza no sólo desde el plano psicológico, sino también del moral; pero antes el autor exige un análisis fenomenológico y ontológico de la vergüenza. Valorando en sus justos términos algunas exposiciones modernas, como las de Straus, Scheler y Bollnow, expone lo que él llama “vergüenza trascendental”, fundamento de todo ulterior examen psicológico o moral de la vergüenza.

The Aquinate consigns that including in the divine interior, emanation is an order of origin between coincidents or concurrents; in the divine exterior, emanation is an order of origin between incoincidents, be it in the entitative plane (according to the order from essence to existence, and from the faculties to the substance), or be it in the operative plane (according to the order from faculties to act). In this work, only the topics concerned with the entitative level are dealt with, which express two orders of emanation: that of creatures as such and that of the faculties