Judith W. DeCew

Judith Wagner DeCew provides a solid philosophical foundation for legal discussions of privacy by articulating and unifying diverse arguments on the right to privacy and on how it should be guaranteed in various contemporary contexts. Philosophers and legal theorists tend either to define privacy narrowly or to abandon privacy as conceptually incoherent, she claims. In order to assess how far privacy should extend, and determine how the wide range of specific cases can be reconciled, DeCew surveys the history of the notion of privacy as it first evolved in American tort law and constitutional law and then analyzes current characterizations. In different contexts, privacy has been defined on the basis of information, autonomy, property, and intimacy. DeCew's broader claim is that privacy has fundamental value because it allows us to create ourselves as individuals, offering us freedom from judgment, scrutiny, and the pressure to conform. Feminist theorists often view privacy as a tool for shielding abuses. DeCew responds to this feminist critique of privacy, as well as addressing the issues of abortion and of gay and lesbian sexuality in the context of specific landmark legal cases. In discussions of Roe v. Wade, Bowers v. Hardwick, and the Hart/Devlin debates on decriminalization of homosexuality and prostitution, DeCew applies her broad theory to sexual and reproductive privacy, anti-sodomy laws, and the legislation and enforcement of morals. She finally discusses the intersection of privacy with public safety concerns, such as drug testing, and in light of new communication technologies, such as caller ID.

ABSTRACT I present and assess arguments both for and against censorship of pornography, explaining why the case on each side is inconclusive. In an effort to move beyond issues of censorship and to address the growing problem of violence in pornography, I propose a distinction between erotica and violent pornography. I then utilise this distinction to evaluate the moral status of, and certain social responses to, violent pornography. I show why most arguments that violent pornography is morally wrong rest on assumptions that either may not be true or do not apply to all instances of violent pornography. I also indicate why the only unconditional moral argument against violent pornography—an argument I find reasonable—will not be universally acceptable. Finally, I discuss two alternatives to censoring violent pornography. I argue that the first, which adapts Joel Feinberg's right of reasonable avoidability, is too weak, while the second, which advocates refusing all subsidy and support for violent pornography, is ultimately too strong as a social response in a society committed to freedom.

Contributors discuss the work of thinkers such as Cass Sunstein and Jeremy Waldron in their exploration of the relations between philosophical theories and everyday life. They elucidate major attempts to reconcile theory with practice in the Western tradition, from Herodotus to Heidegger, and discuss topics such as the role of theory in judicial decision-making and the political implication of theory. Of interest to philosophers, lawyers, and social scientists. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

I argue that there are historical, conceptual, and philosophical connections between the three interests in privacy developed in law in order to emphasize the coherence between the three types of privacy claims. This also demonstrates the broad scope of ways that our privacy may be invaded. Some may believe that technological advances have erased privacy and that we no longer have any reasonable expectation of privacy. I urge to the contrary that the connections between diverse privacy claims show there is more force to the alternative claim that it is more important than ever to protect privacy and to view it as the default for setting ethical, technological, and public policy guidelines, whenever possible.