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Juha Saatsi

University of Leeds
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    60
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  •  Events
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  • University of Leeds
    School of Philosophy, Religion, and History of Science
    Associate Professor
University of Leeds
School of Philosophy, Religion, and History of Science
PhD, 2006
Homepage
Leeds, West Yorkshire, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology
Science, Logic, and Mathematics
Philosophy of Mathematics
Causation
Realism and Anti-Realism
Philosophy of Physical Science
General Philosophy of Science
2 more
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Biology
Philosophy of Mathematics
Philosophy of Physical Science
General Philosophy of Science
Metaphysics and Epistemology
Science, Logic, and Mathematics
Causation
Realism and Anti-Realism
4 more
  • All publications (60)
  •  1
    1. Preface Preface (pp. i-ii)
    with Laura Ruetsche, Chris Smeenk, Branden Fitelson, Patrick Maher, Martin Thomson‐Jones, Bas C. van Fraassen, Steven French, Stathis Psillos, and Katherine Brading
    Philosophy of Science 73 (5). 2006.
    Science, Logic, and MathematicsEpistemic Paradoxes
  • The Bloomsbury companion to the philosophy of science (edited book)
    with Steven French
    Bloomsbury Academic. 2014.
    The Bloomsbury Companion to the Philosophy of Science presents a practical and up-to-date research resource to the philosophy of science. Addressing fundamental questions asked by discipline - areas that have continued to attract interest historically, as well as recently-emerging areas of research - this volume provides a comprehensive and up-to-date overview of the philosophy of science. Specially-commissioned essays from an international team of experts reveal where important work continues t…Read more
    The Bloomsbury Companion to the Philosophy of Science presents a practical and up-to-date research resource to the philosophy of science. Addressing fundamental questions asked by discipline - areas that have continued to attract interest historically, as well as recently-emerging areas of research - this volume provides a comprehensive and up-to-date overview of the philosophy of science. Specially-commissioned essays from an international team of experts reveal where important work continues to be done in the area and the exciting new directions the field is taking. The Companion explores issues pertaining to the philosophy of specific sciences (physics, biology, neuroscience, economics, chemistry and mathematics) and general issues in the field, such as explanation, realism, representation, evidence, reduction, laws, causation and confirmation. Featuring a series of indispensable research tools, including an A to Z of key terms and concepts, a chronology, a detailed list of resources and a fully annotated bibliography, The Bloomsbury Companion to the Philosophy of Science the essential reference tool for anyone working in philosophy of science today.
  • Introduction
    with Steven French
    In Steven French & Juha Saatsi (eds.), Scientific Realism and the Quantum, Oxford University Press. 2020.
    Philosophy of Physical Science
  •  14
    (In)effective realism?
    European Journal for Philosophy of Science 12 (2): 1-16. 2022.
    Matthias Egg argues that scientific realism can be reconciled with quantum mechanics and its foundational underdetermination by focusing realist commitments on ‘effective’ ontology. I argue in general terms that Egg’s effective realism is ontologically overly promiscuous. I illustrate the issue in relation to both Newtonian mechanics and quantum mechanics.
    Science, Logic, and Mathematics
  •  53
    Scientific realism and underdetermination in quantum theory
    with Matthias Egg
    Philosophy Compass 16 (11). 2021.
    Philosophy Compass, EarlyView.
    Quantum TheoriesVarieties of Scientific Realism, MiscUnderdetermination of Theory by Data, Misc
  • Truth vs. Progress Realism about Spin
    In Steven French & Juha Saatsi (eds.), Scientific Realism and the Quantum, Oxford University Press. 2020.
    Philosophy of Physical Science
  •  5
    VLE Wiki as Philosophy Assessment
    with Istvan Danka
    Discourse: Learning and Teaching in Philosophical and Religious Studies 10 (2): 147-157. 2011.
  •  601
    Explanatory Abstractions
    with Lina Jansson
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (3). 2019.
    A number of philosophers have recently suggested that some abstract, plausibly non-causal and/or mathematical, explanations explain in a way that is radically dif- ferent from the way causal explanation explain. Namely, while causal explanations explain by providing information about causal dependence, allegedly some abstract explanations explain in a way tied to the independence of the explanandum from the microdetails, or causal laws, for example. We oppose this recent trend to regard abstract…Read more
    A number of philosophers have recently suggested that some abstract, plausibly non-causal and/or mathematical, explanations explain in a way that is radically dif- ferent from the way causal explanation explain. Namely, while causal explanations explain by providing information about causal dependence, allegedly some abstract explanations explain in a way tied to the independence of the explanandum from the microdetails, or causal laws, for example. We oppose this recent trend to regard abstractions as explanatory in some sui generis way, and argue that a prominent ac- count of causal explanation can be naturally extended to capture explanations that radically abstract away from microphysical and causal-nomological details. To this end, we distinguish di erent senses in which an explanation can be more or less abstract, and analyse the connection between explanations’ abstractness and their explanatory power. According to our analysis abstract explanations have much in common with counterfactual causal explanations.
    Causal Accounts of ExplanationMathematical ExplanationTheories of Explanation, Misc
  •  861
    Mathematics and Explanatory Generality: Nothing but Cognitive Salience
    with Robert Knowles
    Erkenntnis 86 (5): 1119-1137. 2021.
    We demonstrate how real progress can be made in the debate surrounding the enhanced indispensability argument. Drawing on a counterfactual theory of explanation, well-motivated independently of the debate, we provide a novel analysis of ‘explanatory generality’ and how mathematics is involved in its procurement. On our analysis, mathematics’ sole explanatory contribution to the procurement of explanatory generality is to make counterfactual information about physical dependencies easier to grasp…Read more
    We demonstrate how real progress can be made in the debate surrounding the enhanced indispensability argument. Drawing on a counterfactual theory of explanation, well-motivated independently of the debate, we provide a novel analysis of ‘explanatory generality’ and how mathematics is involved in its procurement. On our analysis, mathematics’ sole explanatory contribution to the procurement of explanatory generality is to make counterfactual information about physical dependencies easier to grasp and reason with for creatures like us. This gives precise content to key intuitions traded in the debate, regarding mathematics’ procurement of explanatory generality, and adjudicates unambiguously in favour of the nominalist, at least as far as explanatory generality is concerned.
    Explanation, MiscellaneousInference to the Best Explanation, MiscIndispensability Arguments in Mathe…Read more
    Explanation, MiscellaneousInference to the Best Explanation, MiscIndispensability Arguments in MathematicsSalience
  •  411
    Non-causal explanations in physics
    In Eleanor Knox & Alastair Wilson (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Physics, Routledge. 2021.
    Mathematical ExplanationVarieties of Explanation, MiscPhilosophy of Physics, General Works
  •  1
    Scientific Realism and the Quantum (edited book)
    with Steven French
    Oxford University Press. 2020.
    Quantum theory explains a hugely diverse array of phenomena in the history of science. But how can the world be the way quantum theory says it is? Fifteen expert scholars consider what the world is like according to quantum physics in this volume and offer illuminating new perspectives on fundamental debates that span physics and philosophy.
  •  4
    Mary Leng. Mathematics and reality. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, x + 278 pp (review)
    Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 17 (2): 267-268. 2011.
    Logic and Philosophy of Logic
  •  707
    Scientific Realism and the Quantum (edited book)
    with Steven French
    Oxford University Press. 2020.
    Quantum theory explains a hugely diverse array of phenomena in the history of science. But how can the world be the way quantum theory says it is? Fifteen expert scholars consider what the world is like according to quantum physics in this volume and offer illuminating new perspectives on fundamental debates that span physics and philosophy.
    Scientific Realism, MiscPhilosophy of Cosmology
  •  71
    Explanation Beyond Causation: Philosophical Perspectives on Non-Causal Explanations (edited book)
    with Alexander Reutlinger
    Oxford University Press. 2018.
    Explanations are very important to us in many contexts: in science, mathematics, philosophy, and also in everyday and juridical contexts. But what is an explanation? In the philosophical study of explanation, there is long-standing, influential tradition that links explanation intimately to causation: we often explain by providing accurate information about the causes of the phenomenon to be explained. Such causal accounts have been the received view of the nature of explanation, particularly in…Read more
    Explanations are very important to us in many contexts: in science, mathematics, philosophy, and also in everyday and juridical contexts. But what is an explanation? In the philosophical study of explanation, there is long-standing, influential tradition that links explanation intimately to causation: we often explain by providing accurate information about the causes of the phenomenon to be explained. Such causal accounts have been the received view of the nature of explanation, particularly in philosophy of science, since the 1980s. However, philosophers have recently begun to break with this causal tradition by shifting their focus to kinds of explanation that do not turn on causal information. The increasing recognition of the importance of such non-causal explanations in the sciences and elsewhere raises pressing questions for philosophers of explanation. What is the nature of non-causal explanations – and which theory best captures it? How do non-causal explanations relate to causal ones? How are non-causal explanations in the sciences related to those in mathematics and metaphysics? This volume of new essays explores answers to these and other questions at the heart of contemporary philosophy of explanation. The essays address these questions from a variety of perspectives, including general accounts of non-causal and causal explanations, as well as a wide range of detailed case studies of non-causal explanations from the sciences, mathematics and metaphysics.
    Varieties of Explanation, MiscCausal Accounts of ExplanationExplanation in the Sciences, MiscMathema…Read more
    Varieties of Explanation, MiscCausal Accounts of ExplanationExplanation in the Sciences, MiscMathematical ExplanationTheories of Explanation, MiscExplanation in MathematicsCausal Explanation
  •  17
    On Explanations from Geometry of Motion
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 2016.
    This paper examines explanations that turn on non-local geometrical facts about the space of possible configurations a system can occupy. I argue that it makes sense to contrast such explanations from “geometry of motion” with causal explanations. I also explore how my analysis of these explanations cuts across the distinction between kinematics and dynamics.
    Science, Logic, and Mathematics
  •  45
    The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism (edited book)
    Routledge. 2017.
    Standard Scientific Realism
  •  109
    The Structural Foundations of Quantum Gravity (edited book)
    with Dean Rickles and Steven French
    Oxford University Press. 2006.
    What is spacetime? General relativity and quantum field theory answer this question in very different ways. This collection of essays by physicists and philosophers looks at the problem of uniting these two most fundamental theories of our world, focusing on the nature of space and time within this new quantum framework, and the kind of metaphysical picture suggested by recent developments in physics and mathematics. This is a book that will inspire further philosophical reflection on recent adv…Read more
    What is spacetime? General relativity and quantum field theory answer this question in very different ways. This collection of essays by physicists and philosophers looks at the problem of uniting these two most fundamental theories of our world, focusing on the nature of space and time within this new quantum framework, and the kind of metaphysical picture suggested by recent developments in physics and mathematics. This is a book that will inspire further philosophical reflection on recent advances in modern physics.
    Metaphysics of Spacetime, Misc
  •  42
    Historical inductions, Old and New
    Synthese 196 (10): 3979-3993. 2019.
    I review prominent historical arguments against scientific realism to indicate how they display a systematic overshooting in the conclusions drawn from the historical evidence. The root of the overshooting can be located in some critical, undue presuppositions regarding realism. I will highlight these presuppositions in connection with both Laudan’s ‘Old induction’ and Stanford’s New induction, and then delineate a minimal realist view that does without the problematic presuppositions.
    Historical Arguments Against Scientific Realism
  •  58
    What is theoretical progress of science?
    Synthese 196 (2): 611-631. 2019.
    The epistemic conception of scientific progress equates progress with accumulation of scientific knowledge. I argue that the epistemic conception fails to fully capture scientific progress: theoretical progress, in particular, can transcend scientific knowledge in important ways. Sometimes theoretical progress can be a matter of new theories ‘latching better onto unobservable reality’ in a way that need not be a matter of new knowledge. Recognising this further dimension of theoretical progress …Read more
    The epistemic conception of scientific progress equates progress with accumulation of scientific knowledge. I argue that the epistemic conception fails to fully capture scientific progress: theoretical progress, in particular, can transcend scientific knowledge in important ways. Sometimes theoretical progress can be a matter of new theories ‘latching better onto unobservable reality’ in a way that need not be a matter of new knowledge. Recognising this further dimension of theoretical progress is particularly significant for understanding scientific realism, since realism is naturally construed as the claim that science makes theoretical progress. Some prominent realist positions are best understood in terms of commitment to theoretical progress that cannot be equated with accumulation of scientific knowledge.
    Scientific Progress
  •  59
    On Explanations from Geometry of Motion
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (1). 2018.
    This paper examines explanations that turn on non-local geometrical facts about the space of possible configurations a system can occupy. I argue that it makes sense to contrast such explanations from ‘geometry of motion’ with causal explanations. I also explore how my analysis of these explanations cuts across the distinction between kinematics and dynamics
    Causation, MiscellaneousVarieties of Explanation, MiscExplanation in the Sciences, MiscMathematical …Read more
    Causation, MiscellaneousVarieties of Explanation, MiscExplanation in the Sciences, MiscMathematical ExplanationTheories of Explanation, Misc
  •  208
    Realism and Explanatory Perspectivism
    In Michela Massimi & C. D. McCoy (eds.), Understanding Perspectivism: Scientific Challenges and Methodological Prospects, Routledge. forthcoming.
    This chapter defends a (minimal) realist conception of progress in scientific understanding in the face of the ubiquitous plurality of perspectives in science. The argument turns on the counterfactual-dependence framework of explanation and understanding, which is illustrated and evidenced with reference to different explanations of the rainbow.
    Conceptual Change in ScienceScientific Change, MiscExplanation and Understanding
  •  594
    Scientific Realism meets Metaphysics of Quantum Mechanics
    In Philosophers Think About Quantum Theory, . 2017.
    I examine the epistemological debate on scientific realism in the context of quantum physics, focusing on the empirical underdetermin- ation of different formulations and interpretations of QM. I will argue that much of the interpretational, metaphysical work on QM tran- scends the kinds of realist commitments that are well-motivated in the light of the history of science. I sketch a way of demarcating empirically well-confirmed aspects of QM from speculative quantum metaphysics in a way that co…Read more
    I examine the epistemological debate on scientific realism in the context of quantum physics, focusing on the empirical underdetermin- ation of different formulations and interpretations of QM. I will argue that much of the interpretational, metaphysical work on QM tran- scends the kinds of realist commitments that are well-motivated in the light of the history of science. I sketch a way of demarcating empirically well-confirmed aspects of QM from speculative quantum metaphysics in a way that coheres with anti-realist evidence from the history of science. The minimal realist attitude sketched withholds realist com- mitment to what quantum state |Ψ⟩ represents. I argue that such commitment is not required for fulfilling the ultimate realist motiva- tion: accounting for the empirical success of quantum mechanics in a way that is in tune with a broader understanding of how theoretical science progresses and latches onto reality.
    Quantum Mechanics, MiscellaneousUnderdetermination of Theory by Data, MiscEmpirically Equivalent The…Read more
    Quantum Mechanics, MiscellaneousUnderdetermination of Theory by Data, MiscEmpirically Equivalent Theories
  •  2
    Symmetries and Explanatory Dependencies in Physics
    with Steven French
    In Alexander Reutlinger & Juha Saatsi (eds.), Explanation Beyond Causation: Philosophical Perspectives on Non-Causal Explanations, Oxford University Press. pp. 185-205. 2018.
    Many important explanations in physics are based on ideas and assumptions about symmetries, but little has been said about the nature of such explanations. This chapter aims to fill this lacuna, arguing that various symmetry explanations can be naturally captured in the spirit of the counterfactual-dependence account of Woodward, liberalized from its causal trappings. From the perspective of this account symmetries explain by providing modal information about an explanatory dependence, by showin…Read more
    Many important explanations in physics are based on ideas and assumptions about symmetries, but little has been said about the nature of such explanations. This chapter aims to fill this lacuna, arguing that various symmetry explanations can be naturally captured in the spirit of the counterfactual-dependence account of Woodward, liberalized from its causal trappings. From the perspective of this account symmetries explain by providing modal information about an explanatory dependence, by showing how the explanandum would have been different, had the facts about an explanatory symmetry been different. Furthermore, the authors argue that such explanatory dependencies need not be causal.
    Theories of Explanation, MiscSymmetry in PhysicsVarieties of Explanation, MiscMathematical Explanati…Read more
    Theories of Explanation, MiscSymmetry in PhysicsVarieties of Explanation, MiscMathematical ExplanationExplanation in the Sciences, Misc
  •  663
    Realism and the limits of explanatory reasoning
    In The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism, Routledge. pp. 200-211. 2018.
    This chapter examines issues surrounding inference to the best explanation, its justification, and its role in different arguments for scientific realism, as well as more general issues concerning explanations’ ontological commitments. Defending the reliability of inference to the best explanation has been a central plank in various realist arguments, and realists have drawn various ontological conclusions from the premise that a given scientific explanation best explains some phenomenon. This c…Read more
    This chapter examines issues surrounding inference to the best explanation, its justification, and its role in different arguments for scientific realism, as well as more general issues concerning explanations’ ontological commitments. Defending the reliability of inference to the best explanation has been a central plank in various realist arguments, and realists have drawn various ontological conclusions from the premise that a given scientific explanation best explains some phenomenon. This chapter stresses the importance of thinking carefully about the nature of explanation in connection with evaluating realists’ appeals to explanatory reasoning and inference to the best explanation.
    Arguments For and Against Scientific Realism, MiscThe Miracle Argument for Scientific RealismAbducti…Read more
    Arguments For and Against Scientific Realism, MiscThe Miracle Argument for Scientific RealismAbduction and Scientific Realism
  •  80
    A pluralist account of non-causal explanation in science and mathematics: Marc Lange: Because without cause: Non-causal explanation in science and mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, xxii+489pp, $74.00 HB
    Metascience 27 (1): 3-9. 2017.
    Contribution to a review symposium on Marc Lange's Because without cause: Non-causal explanation in science and mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017
    Theories of Explanation, MiscExplanatory Pluralism
  •  69
    Grasping at Realist Straws (review)
    with Stathis Psillos, Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther, and Kyle Stanford
    Metascience 18 (3): 355-390. 2009.
  •  499
    Taking Reductionism to the Limit: How to Rebut the Antireductionist Argument from Infinite Limits
    with Alexander Reutlinger
    Philosophy of Science (3): 455-482. 2017.
    This paper analyses the anti-reductionist argument from renormalisation group explanations of universality, and shows how it can be rebutted if one assumes that the explanation in question is captured by the counterfactual dependence account of explanation.
    Mathematical ExplanationCondensed Matter Physics
  •  436
    Realism about Structure: The Semantic View and Nonlinguistic Representations
    with Steven French
    Philosophy of Science 73 (5): 548-559. 2006.
    The central concern of this article is whether the semantic approach has the resources to appropriately capture the core tenets of structural realism. Chakravartty (2001) has argued that a realist notion of correspondence cannot be accommodated without introducing a linguistic component, which undermines the approach itself. We suggest that this worry can be addressed by an appropriate understanding of the role of language in this context. The real challenge, however, is how to incorporate the c…Read more
    The central concern of this article is whether the semantic approach has the resources to appropriately capture the core tenets of structural realism. Chakravartty (2001) has argued that a realist notion of correspondence cannot be accommodated without introducing a linguistic component, which undermines the approach itself. We suggest that this worry can be addressed by an appropriate understanding of the role of language in this context. The real challenge, however, is how to incorporate the core notion of `explanatory approximate truth' in such a way that the emphasis on structure is retained.
    Semantic View of TheoriesStructural RealismScientific RepresentationMeaning, Misc
  •  137
    Mathematics and Program Explanations
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3): 579-584. 2012.
    Aidan Lyon has recently argued that some mathematical explanations of empirical facts can be understood as program explanations. I present three objections to his argument
    Explanation in MathematicsMathematical PlatonismIndispensability Arguments in Mathematics
  •  139
    Scientific realism and historical evidence: Shortcomings of the current state of debate
    In Henk W. de Regt (ed.), EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009, Springer. pp. 329--340. 2010.
    This paper discusses three shortcomings of the current state of the debate regarding historical evidence against scientific realism. Attending to these issues will direct the debate away from over-generalising wholesale arguments.
    Historical Arguments Against Scientific RealismHistory of Science, Misc
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