Juhana Toivanen

This chapter charts key aspects of medieval discussions on moral vices and the corruption of human nature. It is based on the premise that the transition from the medieval to the early modern period should not be seen as a revolution but a gradual shift, and that the understanding of later discussions is furthered by grasping central tenets of the earlier tradition. We elaborate on certain continuities and similarities between the periods, focusing especially on three interconnected topics that were central to medieval moral philosophy and political thought and that seem to live on and influence early modern ways of thinking. These three topics are (1) the doctrine of original sin; (2) the order of love (ordo caritatis), an idea which was abundantly used by medieval authors in both theological and philosophical contexts; and (3) psychological and ethical voluntarism, which emerged in late medieval theoretical discussions concerning moral responsibility. The chapter is a programmatic overview, but it proposes that early modern ethical and political theories of vice, sin, and sociability demonstrate interesting continuities with medieval discussions, and that contextualising the former in the longer historical tradition offers useful perspectives on them.

Vice, Sin, and Sociability in Early Modern Philosophy investigates ideas of human wickedness and its social and political implications. The book charts early modern discussions stemming from the Augustinian conception of original sin and earlier virtue theories, and shows the complex and innovative reception of traditional ideas. The twelve chapters investigate the nature of vice and sin and their origins in the soul, the body, and society, and elaborate on self-love, pride, honour, lying, and the desire for esteem.

The present essay discusses perception as action of both the object and of the soul in medieval Latin commentaries on Aristotle’s De sensu et sensato. Beginning with the Aristotelian principle that sensible qualities are defined by their ability to act on the external senses so as to engender sensations, we first explore medieval positions concerning the thorny issue of whether sensible qualities can remain active even when they are present in extremely small quantities of matter. Then we turn to the activity of the soul, which was discussed in relation to the ability to perceive several perceptual qualities simultaneously. Many medieval authors emphasised that powers of the soul have an active role in the process of perception, as they form judgements and pay attention to the objects of the senses. The final section of the essay is dedicated to a case study of Walter Burley. New evidence coming from manuscript research suggests that Burley may have been one of the medieval Latin thinkers who considered the concept of action in detail while commenting on De sensu. In particular, we discuss the hypothesis that Burley may have authored a question commentary on De sensu which is preserved in ms. London, British Library, Add. 18630, ff. 54r-67v and attributed to him in the manuscript. Although the authorship of the text remains uncertain, we show that this commentary is identical with a hitherto anonymous De sensu commentary preserved in ms. Oxford, Merton College, 276, ff. 1ra-8vb. Moreover, we claim that this commentary has strong ties with another question commentary on De sensu that has been attributed to Burley in secondary literature and we present some preliminary observations concerning the complex relation of both works with Burley’s literal commentary on De sensu. We argue that these commentaries bear witness to the main alternative positions concerning both issues discussed in this essay. Therefore, if Burley wrote all of them, his case would represent a remarkable example of the liveliness of the debate about the active aspects of perception within the medieval Latin De sensu commentary tradition.

This chapter discusses the reception of Avicenna’s well-known “flying man” thought experiment in twelfth- and thirteenth-century Latin philosophy. The central claim is that the argumentative role of the thought experiment changed radically in the latter half of the thirteenth century. The earlier authors—Dominicus Gundissalinus, William of Auvergne, Peter of Spain, and John of la Rochelle—understood it as an ontological proof for the existence and/or the nature of the soul. By contrast, Matthew of Aquasparta and Vital du Four used the flying man as an argument for the soul’s ability to be directly aware of itself. A detailed analysis of the views of these authors shows interesting philosophical differences between them and reveals how one of the crucial premises of the original thought experiment—namely that the flying man is unaware of his body—loses its importance due to the changes in the argumentative role that is assigned to it. The most radical example of a new way of understanding bodily self-awareness is Peter Olivi’s so-called ‘man before the creation.’

This chapter explores medieval Latin developments that led to the separation of the common good and the good of an individual. It starts by presenting two different explanations for why acting morally well is difficult: either morality demands aiming for the common good at the expense of one’s own good, or it requires developing a virtuous character and recognizing that one’s true good aligns with actions that promote the common good. Based on earlier research, it is suggested that the latter view (eudaemonism) was replaced by the former (ethical anti-egoism) during late medieval period. The chapter focuses on moral psychology, examining the identity between the individual good and the common good, the challenge of self-sacrifice to this identity, and the role of moral motivation in the development of the distinction between the individual and the common good.

This chapter explores medieval Latin developments that led to the separation of the common good and the good of an individual. It starts by presenting two different explanations for why acting morally well is difficult: either morality demands aiming for the common good at the expense of one’s own good, or it requires developing a virtuous character and recognizing that one’s true good aligns with actions that promote the common good. Based on earlier research, it is suggested that the latter view (eudaemonism) was replaced by the former (ethical anti-egoism) during late medieval period. The chapter focuses on moral psychology, examining the identity between the individual good and the common good, the challenge of self-sacrifice to this identity, and the role of moral motivation in the development of the distinction between the individual and the common good.

This article discusses the theories of perception of Robert Kilwardby and Peter of John Olivi. Our aim is to show how in challenging certain assumptions of medieval Aristotelian theories of perception they drew on Augustine and argued for the active nature of the soul in sense perception. For both Kilwardby and Olivi, the soul is not passive with respect to perceived objects; rather, it causes its own cognitive acts with respect to external objects and thus allows the subject to perceive them. We also show that Kilwardby and Olivi differ substantially regarding where the activity of the soul is directed to and the role of the sensible species in the process, and we demonstrate that there are similarities between their ideas of intentionality and the attention of the soul towards the corporeal world.

This chapter discusses the reception of the Aristotelian concept of ‘political animal’ in thirteenth and fourteenth century Latin philosophy. Aristotle thought that there are other political animals besides human beings, and his idea of what it means to be a political animal was partially based on biological needs and desires that lead animals to live together. By analysing what medieval philosophers thought of other political animals - such as ants, bees, and cranes - and of the biological basis of the political nature of humans, the chapter elaborates on the precise meaning of the concept of political animal. It is argued that biological aspects play a significant role in medieval views, but at the same time medieval authors tend to distance human beings from other political animals by emphasising rationality, choice, and language as central factors for the social and political life.

This chapter discusses Peter John Olivi’s (1248–1298) conception of the role of dispositions (habitus) in sensory cognition from metaphysical and psychological perspectives. It shows that Olivi makes a distinction between two general types of disposition. Some of them account for the ease, or difficulty, with which different persons use their cognitive powers, while others explain why people react differently to things that they perceive or think. This distinction is then applied to Olivi’s analysis of three different psychological operations, where the notion of disposition figures prominently; estimative perception, perceptual clarity, and the perception of pain and pleasure. The chapter argues that Olivi uses cognitive dispositions in an interesting way to explain individual differences between persons, and that they reveal the dynamic nature of his conception of human psychology.

This article traces the philosophical idea of self-perception from the times of ancient Stoicism to the thirteenth century by analyzing the views of Seneca, Augustine, and Olivi. The central argument is that they defend the same idea according to which self-preservation and the appropriate use of one’s body requires awareness thereof, despite the obvious contextual differences and the uncertainty of direct historical connections between the authors. They think that this kind of self-awareness does not belong only to human beings, because irrational animals need to perceive their bodies, the functions of their bodily parts, and to perceive themselves as living beings in order to act appropriately and survive. The attribution of self-perception to animals is based on a distinction between the experiential awareness of the soul and the intellectual understanding of its essence, a distinction postulated by all three authors. The philosophical affinities between their views show that ideas that originate in Stoic thought were transmitted, directly or indirectly, to medieval philosophical psychology.

This chapter discusses Peter John Olivi’s conception of the role of dispositions in sensory cognition from metaphysical and psychological perspectives. It shows that Olivi makes a distinction between two general types of disposition. Some of them account for the ease, or difficulty, with which different persons use their cognitive powers, while others explain why people react differently to things that they perceive or think. This distinction is then applied to Olivi’s analysis of three different psychological operations, where the notion of disposition figures prominently; estimative perception, perceptual clarity, and the perception of pain and pleasure. The chapter argues that Olivi uses cognitive dispositions in an interesting way to explain individual differences between persons, and that they reveal the dynamic nature of his conception of human psychology.

This introductory chapter delineates the purpose and content of the edited volume. It reflects on how the potential tension and compatibility between self-interest and the common good have been addressed in the history of philosophy, and it elaborates on the theoretical conditions that must be met in order for a real distinction between these two notions to emerge. The introduction also underscores the advantages of exploring this subject over the transitional period from medieval to early modern philosophy, and suggests ways in which historical views may be useful for contemporary discussions. The chapter concludes by outlining the structure of the book and summarizing the arguments presented in individual chapters.

This chapter analyses how one thirteenth century Parisian philosopher, Nicholas of Vaudémont (fl. 1370s), understood the tension between the common good in the sense of the good of the community as a whole, and individual good in his commentary of Aristotle’s Politics. The analysis proceeds in relation to two of Nicholas’ questions. The first of them concerns the classical problem of whether or not a virtuous person should sacrifice his life for the sake of his community; and the second question is related to the justification of capital punishment for the sake of the common good. It is claimed that Nicholas entertains at least a theoretical possibility that virtuous action may not necessarily entail the common good and that he further distinguishes the concern for the common good from the private sphere by arguing that responsibility of the common good rests solely with the political ruler. As a result, the tension becomes a fracture as the theoretical distance between the good of an individual and the common good widens.

This open access volume provides an in-depth analysis of philosophical discussions concerning the common good and its relation to self-interest in the history of Western philosophy. The thirteen chapters explore both renowned and lesser-known thinkers from the Middle Ages to the eighteenth century, covering also the relevant ancient background. By bridging the gap between the medieval and early modern periods, they provide fresh insights into how moral and political philosophers understood the concepts of the common good and self-interest, along with their ethical and political implications. The concept of the common good occupies a central role in philosophical reflections on the public and private dimensions of moral and social life in contemporary debates. By exploring the rich and diverse ways in which the relationship between the common good and self-interest has been understood, this volume has the potential to contribute to our ongoing efforts to critically discern the possibilities and limitations of these concepts in the present. Thus, the volume will be useful for scholars interested in the multi-layered role of the notion of the common good both in the history of philosophy and in contemporary moral and political philosophy.

This essay contributes to contemporary discussions concerning so‐called animal politics by drawing from the history of the notion of political animal. Two different historical meanings of the notion are identified: (1) normative political animality that is intrinsically linked with rationality, language, and justice; (2) biological political animality that focuses on collaboration for the sake of a common aim. The former is applicable only to human beings, while the latter can also be used in relation to other animals. After briefly discussing the Aristotelian background of the notion, the essay argues that in medieval Aristotelian tradition, the normative meaning prevailed and the biological one was set aside. However, it is precisely the biological notion that appears useful today. The essay suggests several ways in which it might benefit contemporary theoretical discussions concerning animals, thus laying ground for further developments in animal politics.

This chapter concentrates on Peter Olivi’s (ca. 1248–98) theory of the ontological foundations of political power—and, by extension, property and other social institutions. After briefly presenting his view of political power as a relation between a ruler and his subjects (which he presents in his famous Quid ponat ius), the chapter focuses more generally on Olivi’s theory of relations. Drawing from previous works by Alain Boureau, Sylvain Piron, Christian Rode, Robert Pasnau and others, it explores the ontology of relations and endeavors to shed new light on this notoriously difficult aspect of Olivi’s philosophy. A special focus is placed on the non-Aristotelian notion of rationes reales, which Olivi uses to make room between realism and nominalism, as he argues that power relations are real (i.e. they are not mind-dependent) although they are not based on any real properties in the relata. After showing that political power and other institutional facts must be understood in light of this peculiar ontological notion, the final section of the essay argues that the freedom of the human will entails an ability to change social reality. It is also suggested that despite this rather modern aspect of Olivi’s his social ontology, he remains firmly within medieval worldview by grounding the normative aspect of social institutions in the will of God.

Si l’on prend la rationalité au sens strict et médiéval du terme, les bêtes ne sont pas « rationnelles ». Mais si l’on adopte un sens plus large et actuel de cette notion, alors les auteurs médiévaux s’accordent à attribuer aux animaux des capacités cognitives particulièrement sophistiquées que l’on peut qualifier de rationnelles. Pierre de Jean Olivi relève ainsi que le sens commun des bêtes constitue une puissance de jugement capable de rassembler, de composer et même de comparer des informations afin de répondre adéquatement à une situation ou de résoudre un problème. Il n’en considère pas moins que l’homme seul est un animal rationnel et libre, donc non réductible à une « bête intellectuelle », cette fameuse expression ne désignant rien d’autre que la fiction d’un être humain qui serait intelligent mais privé de libre arbitre.

This chapter discusses the reception of the Aristotelian concept of ‘political animal’ in thirteenth and fourteenth century Latin philosophy. Aristotle thought that there are other political animals besides human beings, and his idea of what it means to be a political animal was partially based on biological needs and desires that lead animals to live together. By analysing what medieval philosophers thought of other political animals - such as ants, bees, and cranes - and of the biological basis of the political nature of humans, the chapter elaborates on the precise meaning of the concept of political animal. It is argued that biological aspects play a significant role in medieval views, but at the same time medieval authors tend to distance human beings from other political animals by emphasising rationality, choice, and language as central factors for the social and political life.

Peter Olivi was an original and controversial thinker whose philosophical ideas have aroused increasing interest within the scholarly community during the last decades. Stève Bobillier's L'éthique de la personne is the first monograph-length study that focuses explicitly on his ethics. Bobillier's central claim is that Olivi approaches ethics from the point of view of an individual person who chooses her actions freely and with full awareness that the choices are up to her. When someone makes a morally wrong choice, the choice can ultimately be traced back to the agent's free will. To chart the details of this theory, Bobillier analyzes Olivi's conception of the freedom of the...