Juhana Toivanen

This article discusses the theories of perception of Robert Kilwardby and Peter of John Olivi. Our aim is to show how in challenging certain assumptions of medieval Aristotelian theories of perception they drew on Augustine and argued for the active nature of the soul in sense perception. For both Kilwardby and Olivi, the soul is not passive with respect to perceived objects; rather, it causes its own cognitive acts with respect to external objects and thus allows the subject to perceive them. We also show that Kilwardby and Olivi differ substantially regarding where the activity of the soul is directed to and the role of the sensible species in the process, and we demonstrate that there are similarities between their ideas of intentionality and the attention of the soul towards the corporeal world.

This chapter discusses the reception of the Aristotelian concept of ‘political animal’ in thirteenth and fourteenth century Latin philosophy. Aristotle thought that there are other political animals besides human beings, and his idea of what it means to be a political animal was partially based on biological needs and desires that lead animals to live together. By analysing what medieval philosophers thought of other political animals - such as ants, bees, and cranes - and of the biological basis of the political nature of humans, the chapter elaborates on the precise meaning of the concept of political animal. It is argued that biological aspects play a significant role in medieval views, but at the same time medieval authors tend to distance human beings from other political animals by emphasising rationality, choice, and language as central factors for the social and political life.

This chapter discusses Peter John Olivi’s (1248–1298) conception of the role of dispositions (habitus) in sensory cognition from metaphysical and psychological perspectives. It shows that Olivi makes a distinction between two general types of disposition. Some of them account for the ease, or difficulty, with which different persons use their cognitive powers, while others explain why people react differently to things that they perceive or think. This distinction is then applied to Olivi’s analysis of three different psychological operations, where the notion of disposition figures prominently; estimative perception, perceptual clarity, and the perception of pain and pleasure. The chapter argues that Olivi uses cognitive dispositions in an interesting way to explain individual differences between persons, and that they reveal the dynamic nature of his conception of human psychology.

This article traces the philosophical idea of self-perception from the times of ancient Stoicism to the thirteenth century by analyzing the views of Seneca, Augustine, and Olivi. The central argument is that they defend the same idea according to which self-preservation and the appropriate use of one’s body requires awareness thereof, despite the obvious contextual differences and the uncertainty of direct historical connections between the authors. They think that this kind of self-awareness does not belong only to human beings, because irrational animals need to perceive their bodies, the functions of their bodily parts, and to perceive themselves as living beings in order to act appropriately and survive. The attribution of self-perception to animals is based on a distinction between the experiential awareness of the soul and the intellectual understanding of its essence, a distinction postulated by all three authors. The philosophical affinities between their views show that ideas that originate in Stoic thought were transmitted, directly or indirectly, to medieval philosophical psychology.

This chapter focuses on thirteenth-century Latin discussions concerning the psychological processes that explain some of the most sophisticated features of perceptual experience. Sense perception primarily conveys information about the sensible qualities of external objects; we see colours, hear sounds, taste flavours, and so forth. Yet, our experience of the external world contains several elements that cannot be reduced to these qualities. To name a few, external objects are perceived as three-dimensional bundles of properties, as useful or harmful for the perceiving subject, and as objects of desires, fears, and other emotions, and they are conceptualised in various ways—in short, they are perceived as something. It is well known that medieval philosophers recognised these and other similar phenomena. They analysed various elements of perceptual experience, which are not (or cannot be) directly apprehended by the external senses. In order to account for these elements, they argued that in addition to the five external senses, several so-called internal senses contribute to perception. The leading idea in their approach was to divide complex psychological processes into sub-processes or functions that can then be attributed to various internal senses, and analysed separately. An analysis of medieval views from the perspective of the interplay between external and internal senses allows us to understand the complexity of perceptual experience. This chapter will (1) specify different types of ‘perceiving as’ that medieval authors recognised, (2) explain what kind of additions these processes make to perception, (3) suggest two heuristic models that can be used to analyse medieval theories, and (4) ask where the limit between conceptual and non-conceptual perception lies.

This chapter discusses Peter John Olivi’s conception of the role of dispositions in sensory cognition from metaphysical and psychological perspectives. It shows that Olivi makes a distinction between two general types of disposition. Some of them account for the ease, or difficulty, with which different persons use their cognitive powers, while others explain why people react differently to things that they perceive or think. This distinction is then applied to Olivi’s analysis of three different psychological operations, where the notion of disposition figures prominently; estimative perception, perceptual clarity, and the perception of pain and pleasure. The chapter argues that Olivi uses cognitive dispositions in an interesting way to explain individual differences between persons, and that they reveal the dynamic nature of his conception of human psychology.

The trilogy Forms of Representation in the Aristotelian Tradition investigates how Aristotle and his ancient and medieval successors understood the relation between the external world and the human mind. It gives an equal footing to the three most influential linguistic traditions - Greek, Latin, and Arabic - and offers insightful interpretations of historical theories of perception, dreaming, and thinking. This first volume focuses on sense perception and discusses philosophical questions concerning the external senses, their classification, and their functioning, from Aristotle to Brentano.

"The trilogy Forms of Representation in the Aristotelian Tradition investigates how Aristotle and his ancient and medieval successors understood the relation between the external world and the human mind. It gives an equal footing to the three most influential linguistic traditions - Greek, Latin, and Arabic - and offers insightful interpretations of historical theories of perception, dreaming, and thinking. This first volume focuses on sense perception and discusses philosophical questions concerning the external senses, their classification, and their functioning, from Aristotle to Brentano"--

This introductory chapter delineates the purpose and content of the edited volume. It reflects on how the potential tension and compatibility between self-interest and the common good have been addressed in the history of philosophy, and it elaborates on the theoretical conditions that must be met in order for a real distinction between these two notions to emerge. The introduction also underscores the advantages of exploring this subject over the transitional period from medieval to early modern philosophy, and suggests ways in which historical views may be useful for contemporary discussions. The chapter concludes by outlining the structure of the book and summarizing the arguments presented in individual chapters.

This chapter analyses how one thirteenth century Parisian philosopher, Nicholas of Vaudémont (fl. 1370s), understood the tension between the common good in the sense of the good of the community as a whole, and individual good in his commentary of Aristotle’s Politics. The analysis proceeds in relation to two of Nicholas’ questions. The first of them concerns the classical problem of whether or not a virtuous person should sacrifice his life for the sake of his community; and the second question is related to the justification of capital punishment for the sake of the common good. It is claimed that Nicholas entertains at least a theoretical possibility that virtuous action may not necessarily entail the common good and that he further distinguishes the concern for the common good from the private sphere by arguing that responsibility of the common good rests solely with the political ruler. As a result, the tension becomes a fracture as the theoretical distance between the good of an individual and the common good widens.

This open access volume provides an in-depth analysis of philosophical discussions concerning the common good and its relation to self-interest in the history of Western philosophy. The thirteen chapters explore both renowned and lesser-known thinkers from the Middle Ages to the eighteenth century, covering also the relevant ancient background. By bridging the gap between the medieval and early modern periods, they provide fresh insights into how moral and political philosophers understood the concepts of the common good and self-interest, along with their ethical and political implications. The concept of the common good occupies a central role in philosophical reflections on the public and private dimensions of moral and social life in contemporary debates. By exploring the rich and diverse ways in which the relationship between the common good and self-interest has been understood, this volume has the potential to contribute to our ongoing efforts to critically discern the possibilities and limitations of these concepts in the present. Thus, the volume will be useful for scholars interested in the multi-layered role of the notion of the common good both in the history of philosophy and in contemporary moral and political philosophy.

This essay contributes to contemporary discussions concerning so‐called animal politics by drawing from the history of the notion of political animal. Two different historical meanings of the notion are identified: (1) normative political animality that is intrinsically linked with rationality, language, and justice; (2) biological political animality that focuses on collaboration for the sake of a common aim. The former is applicable only to human beings, while the latter can also be used in relation to other animals. After briefly discussing the Aristotelian background of the notion, the essay argues that in medieval Aristotelian tradition, the normative meaning prevailed and the biological one was set aside. However, it is precisely the biological notion that appears useful today. The essay suggests several ways in which it might benefit contemporary theoretical discussions concerning animals, thus laying ground for further developments in animal politics.

This chapter concentrates on Peter Olivi’s (ca. 1248–98) theory of the ontological foundations of political power—and, by extension, property and other social institutions. After briefly presenting his view of political power as a relation between a ruler and his subjects (which he presents in his famous Quid ponat ius), the chapter focuses more generally on Olivi’s theory of relations. Drawing from previous works by Alain Boureau, Sylvain Piron, Christian Rode, Robert Pasnau and others, it explores the ontology of relations and endeavors to shed new light on this notoriously difficult aspect of Olivi’s philosophy. A special focus is placed on the non-Aristotelian notion of rationes reales, which Olivi uses to make room between realism and nominalism, as he argues that power relations are real (i.e. they are not mind-dependent) although they are not based on any real properties in the relata. After showing that political power and other institutional facts must be understood in light of this peculiar ontological notion, the final section of the essay argues that the freedom of the human will entails an ability to change social reality. It is also suggested that despite this rather modern aspect of Olivi’s his social ontology, he remains firmly within medieval worldview by grounding the normative aspect of social institutions in the will of God.

Si l’on prend la rationalité au sens strict et médiéval du terme, les bêtes ne sont pas « rationnelles ». Mais si l’on adopte un sens plus large et actuel de cette notion, alors les auteurs médiévaux s’accordent à attribuer aux animaux des capacités cognitives particulièrement sophistiquées que l’on peut qualifier de rationnelles. Pierre de Jean Olivi relève ainsi que le sens commun des bêtes constitue une puissance de jugement capable de rassembler, de composer et même de comparer des informations afin de répondre adéquatement à une situation ou de résoudre un problème. Il n’en considère pas moins que l’homme seul est un animal rationnel et libre, donc non réductible à une « bête intellectuelle », cette fameuse expression ne désignant rien d’autre que la fiction d’un être humain qui serait intelligent mais privé de libre arbitre.

Peter Olivi was an original and controversial thinker whose philosophical ideas have aroused increasing interest within the scholarly community during the last decades. Stève Bobillier's L'éthique de la personne is the first monograph-length study that focuses explicitly on his ethics. Bobillier's central claim is that Olivi approaches ethics from the point of view of an individual person who chooses her actions freely and with full awareness that the choices are up to her. When someone makes a morally wrong choice, the choice can ultimately be traced back to the agent's free will. To chart the details of this theory, Bobillier analyzes Olivi's conception of the freedom of the...

Zombeja käsittelevät televisiosarjat ja sarjakuvat ovat viime vuosina saavuttaneet suurta suosiota. Esimerkiksi The Walking Dead -sarjan ensimmäinen jakso näytettiin samanaikaisesti 120 maassa, ja sarjaa on sittemmin katsonut tuotantokaudesta riippuen 5–15 miljoonaa katsojaa. Post-apokalyptinen maailma kiehtoo suurta yleisöä, koska dystooppiset tarinat peilaavat erilaisia käsityksiä ihmisten perusolemuksesta ja yhteiskunnan perustasta; sarjaa voi pitää filosofisena ajatuskokeena, jolla testataan, miten erilaiset näkemykset toimisivat luonnontilaan paluun jälkeen. Artikkelimme lähtökohta on, että zombikuvasto tarjoaa hedelmällisen tilaisuuden filosofiselle analyysille. Tarkastelemme yhteiskunnan romahtamisen jälkeistä tilaa yhteiskuntafilosofian klassikoiden, Aristoteleen ja Thomas Hobbesin avulla. Pyrimme osoittamaan, että Hobbesin luonnontilan käsitteen rinnalla Aristoteleen eettiset ja yhteiskuntafilosofiset näkemykset tarjoavat hyödyllisen näkökulman sivilisaation romahduksen jälkeisen kuvitteellisen tilanteen ymmärtämiseen. Täydennämme analyysia sosiaalipsykologi Erich Frommin yhteiskuntaluonteen käsitteellä ja osoitamme, että dystopiaan sisältyy lupaus utopiasta, paremmasta maailmasta. Yleisesti ottaen esitämme, että populaarikulttuurin ja filosofian yhdistäminen tarjoaa oivaltavan näkökulman nykyisen länsimaisen ihmiskuvan peruselementtien ymmärtämiseen.

The present article delves into the history of political philosophy by discussing human sociability in Antonio Montecatini's (1537–99) commentary on Aristotle's Politics. The focus is on a philosophical analysis of three interrelated ideas that Montecatini discusses: (1) Aristotle's dictum that human beings are political animals by nature; (2) naturalness of the household; and (3) the nature and origin of political communities. Montecatini's views are briefly related to those of John Case (ca. 1546–1600), and they are also contextualized within the late medieval commentary tradition on the Politics, but the main aim is to clarify Montecatini's philosophical position and examine the ways in which he deviates from Aristotelian naturalism in political philosophy. This paves the way to a deeper understanding of the developments that led to early modern innovations.