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46Manuscript Referees for The Journal of Ethics Volume 9: September 2004–June 2005The Journal of Ethics 9 (3): 581. 2005.
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Love, morality, and alienationIn Christopher Grau & Aaron Smuts (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Love, Oxford University Press. 2017.
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61Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory (review)Utilitas 9 (3): 366-367. 1997.This volume of essays in honour of Philippa Foot constitutes a high quality Festschrift. There is no doubt that Philippa Foot's career is worthy of such a volume. She is one of the most influential philosophers of the past few decades and her work has given rise to, and seeded, much debate in contemporary moral philosophy. She has written on a wide variety of topics — virtue ethics, the doctrine of double effect, naturalism, and practical reasoning. The essays in this volume touch on all of thes…Read more
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68Review: On Virtue EthicsPhilosophical Review 111 (1): 122. 2002.Rosalind Hursthouse has written an excellent book, in which she develops a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics that she sees as avoiding some of the major criticisms leveled against virtue ethics in general, and against Aristotle's brand of virtue ethics in particular.
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42Understanding blamePhilosophical Studies 181 (4): 921-927. 2024.Elinor Mason has provided an account of blame and blameworthiness that is pluralistic. There are, broadly speaking, three ways in which we aptly blame -- and ordinary sense, directed at those with poor quality of the will, and then a detached sense and an extended sense, in which blame is aptly directed towards those without poor quality of the will as it is normally understood. In this essay I explore and critically discuss Mason's account. While I argue that she has identified interesting aspe…Read more
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18Joel J. Kupperman, Value … and What Follows:Value … and What FollowsEthics 111 (2): 424-427. 2001.
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17The Reconciliation Project in EthicsInternational Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 (2): 271-276. 2005.
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9The Reconciliation Project in EthicsInternational Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 (2): 271-276. 2005.
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232Roger Crisp, Reasons and the Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 178Utilitas 23 (2): 235-237. 2011.
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38Review of Nomy Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (11). 2003.
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33Review of Brad Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (6). 2002.
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24
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Meta-cognition, mind-reading, and Humean moral agencyIn Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson (eds.), Moral Psychology and Human Agency: Philosophical Essays on the Science of Ethics, Oxford University Press. 2014.
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148On virtue ethicsPhilosophical Review 111 (1): 122-127. 2002.Rosalind Hursthouse has written an excellent book, in which she develops a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics that she sees as avoiding some of the major criticisms leveled against virtue ethics in general, and against Aristotle's brand of virtue ethics in particular.
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24Paul Hurley, Beyond Consequentialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), viii + 275 pp. ISBN: 978-0-19-955930-5. $60 (hbk.) (review)Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (4): 570-572. 2013.
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1Moral Bookkeeping, Consequentialism, and Carbon OffsetsIn Avram Hiller, Ramona Ilea & Leonard Kahn (eds.), Consequentialism and environmental ethics, Routledge. pp. 164-173. 2014.
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29How are We to Live? Ethics in an Age of Self-InterestPhilosophical Review 106 (1): 125. 1997.Peter Singer is well known as an ethicist who has contributed much to current debates in ethics and public policy. He has published on topics ranging from vegetarianism to famine relief to bioethics, always with something interesting to say, and often with something provocative as well. How Are We to Live? adds to Singer’s work in the area of applied, or practical, ethics. This book is not as deeply challenging as some of Singer’s earlier work. However, it is not intended for an audience compose…Read more
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140Love and Unselfing in Iris MurdochRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 87 169-180. 2020.Iris Murdoch believes that unselfing is required for virtue, as it takes us out of our egoistic preoccupations, and connects us to the Good in the world. Love is a form of unselfing, illustrating how close attention to another, and the way they really are, again, takes us out of a narrow focus on the self. Though this view of love runs counter to a view that those in love often overlook flaws in their loved ones, or at least down-play them, I argue that it is compatible with Murdoch's view that …Read more
Areas of Specialization
Value Theory |
Areas of Interest
Value Theory |