Julia Duetz

Some philosophers claim that, in ordinary language, when non-philosophers refer to ‘conspiracy theories’ such people take it that conspiracy theories are—in some sense—_mad, bad, or dangerous_. These philosophers then argue that academics interested in studying conspiracy theories should keep their operating definition close to that notion. I will challenge this by first arguing that whatever the ordinary language conception of ‘conspiracy theory’ might be, the notion that these philosophers are pointing to is _at best_ contrary and _at worst_ contradictory with their own work. Secondly—using the psychological literature as an example—I will show that academic non-philosophers do not seem interested in the folk or ordinary language notion of ‘conspiracy theory’ anyway. Thus the argument for what we might call ‘ordinary language generalism’—the position that generally it is recognised by users of ordinary language that there is something inherently _mad, bad, or dangerous_ about conspiracy theories—fails. However, we can capture some of the intuitions behind ordinary language generalism by focussing on the kinds or sub-types of conspiracy theories that interest us.

In an historic moment in Dutch politics, the entire cabinet left the House of Representatives during a debate due to extreme right politician Thierry Baudet's conspiracy-laden speech. After espousing a variety of conspiratorial claims, Baudet accused the Minister of Finance, Sigrid Kaag, of being a secret agent for a global Deep State since her studies at Oxford. The accusation prompted Kaag and the entire cabinet to exit the chamber. While some MPs defended Baudet's right to speak, others supported the chair's decision to silence him for violating the rules. These events showcase the divisive potential of conspiracy accusations in politics, causing polarised reactions. Our analysis delves into the dynamics of conspiracy accusations, their impact on polarisation, and the role of intended audiences (as opposed to general audiences) in both advancing accusations and shaping responses thereto. We argue that Baudet's tactics aimed at capitalising on the polarisation his accusations generated. We argue further that dismissing conspiracy accusations too hastily can deepen public distrust in elected officials, emphasising the need for caution in handling such claims. Ultimately, we highlight the broader pattern of conspiracy accusations being employed to fuel political polarisation, raising questions about their role in democratic deliberation.