Belief in PsyontologyPhilosophers' Imprint 20 (11). 2020.
Higher-order defeat and intellectual responsibilitySynthese 197 (12): 5435-5455. 2020.It’s widely accepted that higher-order defeaters, i.e., evidence that one’s belief is formed in an epistemically defective way, can defeat doxastic justification. However, it’s yet unclear how exactly such kind of defeat happens. Given that many theories of doxastic justification can be understood as fitting the schema of proper basing on propositional justifiers, we might attempt to explain the defeat either by arguing that a higher-order defeater defeats propositional justification or by argui…Read more
A Critical Survey of Some Recent Philosophical Research in ChinaPhilosophia 44 (4): 971-998. 2016.In this paper, I survey some recent literature produced by the established Chinese philosophers who regularly publish in Chinese philosophy journals and work in Mainland China. Specifically, I review the recent research of these philosophers in two areas: Chinese Philosophy and epistemology. In each area, I focus on two topics that have caught the attention of a lot of Chinese philosophers. I argue that the Chinese philosophers’ research on these topics has two prevalent problems: (i) a lot of a…Read more
Basing for the BayesianSynthese 196 (9): 3815-3840. 2019.There is a distinction between merely having the right belief, and further basing that belief on the right reasons. Any adequate epistemology needs to be able to accommodate the basing relation that marks this distinction. However, trouble arises for Bayesianism. I argue that when we combine Bayesianism with the standard approaches to the basing relation, we get the result that no agent forms their credences in the right way; indeed, no agent even gets close. This is a serious problem, for it pr…Read more
University of Colorado, BoulderDepartment of PhilosophyAssociate Professor
University of Southern California
School of Philosophy
Boulder, Colorado, United States of America