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14Welfare, Profits, & OughtsInternational Journal of Applied Philosophy 36 (2): 179-190. 2022.Suppose we morally ought to maximize social welfare. Suppose profit maximization is a means to maximize social welfare. Does this imply that we morally ought to maximize profits? Many proponents of the view that we have a moral obligation to maximize profits (tacitly) assume the validity of this argument. In this paper, we critically assess this assumption. We show that the validity of this argument is far from trivial and requires a careful argumentative defence.
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Welfare, Profits & Oughts Does an ought to maximise welfare imply an ought to maximise profits?International Journal of Applied Philosophy. forthcoming.Suppose we morally ought to maximise social welfare. Suppose profit maximisation is a means to maximise social welfare. Does this imply that we morally ought to maximise profits? Many proponents of the view that we have a moral obligation to maximise profits (tacitly) assume the validity of this argument. In this paper, we critically assess this assumption. We show that the validity of this argument is far from trivial and requires a careful argumentative defence.
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6Structural Irrationality Does Not Consist in Having Attitudes You Ought Not to Have: A New Dilemma for Reasons-Violating Structural IrrationalityAustralasian Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.This paper presents a new argument against the view that structural (or attitude-based) irrationality consists in failing to respond correctly to normative reasons. According to this view, a pattern of attitudes is structurally irrational if and only if that pattern guarantees that one has at least one attitude one ought not to have. I argue that this ought-violation view comes with three indispensable theoretical commitments. These commitments concern various relationships between normative per…Read more
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234The Essence of Structural IrrationalityJournal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 26 (2). 2023.The phenomenon of ‘structural irrationality’ covers a diverse range of combinations of attitudes, including (inter alia) contradictory beliefs, contradictory intentions, means–end incoherence, akratic incoherence, and cyclical preferences. This paper offers a novel, unified account of when a pattern of attitudes qualifies as structurally irrational. It begins by setting up the core of the view I will be defending: a set of attitudes is irrational if and only if it is impossible for those attitud…Read more
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146What (in)coherence is notGrazer Philosophische Studien 99 (2): 125-134. 2022.Two or more attitudinal states are incoherent if and only if, necessarily, under conditions of full transparency, you are disposed to give up one of them. This is roughly the account of incoherence that has recently been put forward by Alex Worsnip (2018). In this paper, I argue that Worsnip’s account of incoherence is incorrect. Not only does it fail to be fully general (i.e., it does not allow us to assess the coherence of all combinations of attitudes), but it also implies that an agent is ne…Read more
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9Are all Actions Movements of the Agent's Body?Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 1 (24): 52-64. 2011.Davidson famously contended that all actions are movements of the agent's body. It has been objected, however, that Davidson's view is incompatible with his own definition of primitive actions. This paper argues that this objection is based on an incorrect reading of Davidson's argument. I will show that by reading "movements", in "all actions are bodily movements", transitively, Davidson's definition of primitive actions ceases to conflict with his thesis that all actions are bodily movements.
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34Weakness of the will remains a perplexing issue. Though philosophers have made substantial progress in homing in on what counts as a weak will, there is little agreement on whether weakness of the will is irrational, and if so, why. In this paper, we take an empirical approach towards the rationality of weakness of the will. After introducing the philosophical debate, we present the results of an empirical study that reveals that people take a “dual sensitivity”, as we shall put it, towards asse…Read more
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251Die Rationalität eingefrorener KonflikteSpektrum 2018 (2). 2018.Der Arktikel beschreibt die Logik des "eingefrorenen" Konflikts zwischen der Republik Moldau und der selbsternannten „Pridnestrowische Moldauischen Republik“ ("Transnistrien"). Bezugnehmend auf die strategischen Optionen der beteiligten Akteure wird erklärt warum der seit 1992 bestehende Konflikt zu keiner Lösung findet.
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658The Function of Normative Process-RequirementsDialectica 66 (1): 115-136. 2012.This paper discusses whether rationality, morality or prudence impose process-requirements upon us. It has been argued that process-requirements fulfil two essential functions within a system of rational, moral or prudential requirements. These functions are considered to prove the existence of process-requirements. First, process-requirements are deemed necessary to ensure that rationality, morality or prudence can guide our deliberations and actions. Second, their existence is regarded as esse…Read more
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1002The Morality of Price/Quality and Ethical ConsumerismRes Publica 25 (3): 425-438. 2019.Hussain claims that ethical consumers are subject to democratic requirements of morality, whereas ordinary price/quality consumers are exempt from these requirements. In this paper, we demonstrate that Hussain’s position is incoherent, does not follow from the arguments he offers for it, and entails a number of counterintuitive consequences.
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119A Constitutive Account of 'Rationality Requires'Erkenntnis (4): 909-941. 2014.The requirements of rationality are fundamental in practical and theoretical philosophy. Nonetheless, there exists no correct account of what constitutes rational requirements. This paper attempts to provide a correct constitutive account of ‘rationality requires’. I argue that rational requirements are grounded in ‘necessary explanations of subjective incoherence’, as I shall put it. Rationality requires of you to X if and only if your rational capacities, in conjunction with the fact that you …Read more
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76Asymmetry, Scope, and Rational ConsistencyCroatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (2): 109-130. 2010.Suppose rationality requires you to A if you believe you ought to A. Suppose you believe that you ought to A. How can you satisfy this requirement? One way seems obvious. You can satisfy this requirement by A-ing. But can you also satisfy it by stopping to believe that you ought to A? Recently, it has been argued that this second option is not a genuine way of satisfying the above requirement. Conditional requirements of rationality do not have two ‘symmetric’, but only one ‘asymmetric’ satisfac…Read more
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230New Perspectives on Nazi LawJurisprudence 3 (2): 341-346. 2012.It is beyond doubt that the legal system established by the Nazi government in Germany between 1933-1945 represented a gross departure from the rule of law: the Nazis eradicated legal security and certainty; allowed for judicial and state arbitrariness; blocked epistemic access to what the law requires; issued unpredictable legal requirements; and so on. This introduction outlines the distorted nature of the Nazi legal system and looks at the main factors that contributed to this grave divergenc…Read more
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97What is (Correct) Practical Reasoning?Acta Analytica 28 (4): 471-482. 2013.This paper argues that practical reasoning is a mental process which leads a person from a set of existent mental states to an intention. In Section 1, I defend this view against two other proposals according to which practical reasoning either concludes in an action itself or in a normative belief. Section 2 discusses the correctness of practical reasoning and explains how the correctness of instrumental reasoning can be explained by the logical relations that hold between the contents of the m…Read more
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964The Property of Rationality: A Guide to What Rationality Requires?Philosophical Studies 175 (1): 117-140. 2018.Can we employ the property of rationality in establishing what rationality requires? According to a central and formal thesis of John Broome’s work on rational requirements, the answer is ‘no’ – at least if we expect a precise answer. In particular, Broome argues that (i) the property of full rationality (i.e. whether or not you are fully rational) is independent of whether we formulate conditional requirements of rationality as having a wide or a narrow logical scope. That is, (ii) by replacing…Read more
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58Are there process-requirements of rationality?Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 18 (4): 475-488. 2011.Does a coherentist version of rationality issue requirements on states? Or does it issue requirements on processes? This paper evalu- ates the possibility of process-requirements. It argues that there are two possible definitions of state- and process-requirements: a satisfaction- based definition and a content-based definition. I demonstrate that the satisfaction-based definition is inappropriate. It does not allow us to uphold a clear-cut distinction between state- and process-requirements. We…Read more
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Are There Process-Requirements of Rationality?Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 18 (4): 475-487. 2011.Does a coherentist version of rationality issue requirements on states? Or does it issue requirements on processes? This paper evaluates the possibility of process-requirements. It argues that there are two possible definitions of state- and process-requirements: a satisfaction-based definition and a content-based definition. I demonstrate that the satisfaction-based definition is inappropriate. It does not allow us to uphold a clear-cut distinction between state- and process-requirements. We sh…Read more
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105Is the right prior to the good?South African Journal of Philosophy 26 (2): 143-149. 2007.One popular line of argument put forward in support of the principle that the right is prior to the good is to show that teleological theories, which put the good prior to the right, lead to implausible normative results. There are situa- tions, it is argued, in which putting the good prior to the right entails that we ought to do things that cannot be right for us to do. Consequently, goodness cannot (always) explain an action's rightness. This indicates that what is right must be determined in…Read more
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956Rechtfertigungen des Unrechts: Das Rechtsdenken im Nationalsozialismus in Originaltexten (edited book)Suhrkamp. 2014.Auf welchen normativen Grundlagen beruhte das NS-System? Mit welcher Rechtfertigung konnte der Führerwille dort zu einer Quelle des Rechts werden? Wie war es gemäß der NS-Strafgesetzgebung möglich, Handlungen zu bestrafen, die gegen kein geschriebenes Gesetz verstießen? Die in diesem Band versammelten und kommentierten Originaltexte geben Einblick in das Denken von Rechtstheoretikern, die mit dem Nationalsozialismus sympathisierten, und belegen deren Versuch, autoritäre und dem Rechtsstaat wider…Read more
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1Do we have reasons to do as we believe we ought to do?In M. Silar & F. S. Augier (eds.), Practical Rationality: Intentionality, Normativity and Reflexivity, Ziur Navarra. pp. 65-79. 2009.Suppose you believe you ought to A. Would a failure of yours to A imply that you are not entirely as you ought to be? Ought you to A if you believe you to ought to A? This paper argues for a qualified version of this claim. It is qualified in two ways. First, I assume that this can be so only if ‘if you believe you ought to A’ appears within the scope of ‘you ought’. That is, you ought to [if you believe you ought to A, then A.] Second, I argue that you ought to do as you believe you ought to on…Read more
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252Erratum to: The Ladder of Rationality: John Broome: Rationality Through Reasoning Oxford, Wiley Blackwell, 2013, ISBN 978-1-4051-1710-4, 308 pages, £24.99/€31.30Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (3): 793. 2016.This paper is a review and critical discussion of John Broome’s Rationality Through Reasoning. In particular, it engages critically with Broome’s view on the independence of normative reasons and rationality, his construal of the capacity, property, and requirement senses of “rationality”, and his account of reasoning as a conscious, rule-following operation on mental contents.
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109Legal oughts, Normative Transmission, and the Nazi Use of AnalogyJurisprudence 3 (2): 445-463. 2012.In 1935, the Nazi government introduced what came to be known as the abrogation of the pro- hibition of analogy. This measure, a feature of the new penal law, required judges to stray from the letter of the written law and to consider instead whether an action was worthy of pun- ishment according to the ‘sound perception of the people’ and the ‘underlying principle’ of existing criminal statutes. In discussions of Nazi law, an almost unanimous conclusion is that a system of criminal law ought no…Read more
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91Are all actions movements of the agent's body?Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 24 (1): 52-64. 2011.Davidson famously contended that all actions are movements of the agent's body. It has been objected, however, that Davidson's view is incompatible with his own definition of primitive actions. This paper argues that this objection is based on an incorrect reading of Davidson's argument. I will show that by reading 'movements', in 'all actions are bodily movements', transitively, Davidson's definition of primitive actions ceases to contradict with his thesis that all actions are bodily movements…Read more
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389VorwortIn Herlinde Pauer-Studer & Julian Fink (eds.), Rechtfertigungen des Unrechts: Das Rechtsdenken im Nationalsozialismus in Originaltexten, Suhrkamp. pp. 9-13. 2014.Wie war es möglich? Diese mit Blick auf den Nationalsozialismus und die Zeit von 1933 bis 1945 unausweichliche Frage stellt sich für jede Generation aufs Neue – und auf unterschiedlichen Ebenen. Im Gegensatz zur detaillierten historischen Aufarbeitung der NS-Zeit ist die philosophisch-theoretische Analyse der normativen Grundlagen des NS Systems ein bislang vernachlässigtes Gebietder Forschung. Die hier edierte Sammlung von Originaltextenführender Juristen, Rechtstheoretiker und Rechtsphilosophe…Read more
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226EditorialOrganon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (4): 422-424. 2013.Within the debate concerning reason and rationality, instrumental incoherence was for a long time conceived of as the paradigm of irrationality. However, with the emergence of the so-called ‘bootstrapping objection’ and the debate concerning the ‘scope’ of rational requirements, the innocuous status of the normative significance of (instrumental) coherence became subject to. This led to a paradigmatic shift in how to understand the relationship between rational requirements and normativity. Whil…Read more
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500The Ladder of Rationality: John Broome: Rationality Through Reasoning Oxford, Wiley Blackwell, 2013, ISBN 978-1-4051-1710-4, 308 pages, £24.99/€31.30Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (3): 787-791. 2016.This paper is a review and critical discussion of John Broome’s Rationality Through Reasoning. In particular, it engages critically with Broome’s view on the independence of normative reasons and rationality, his construal of the capacity, property, and requirement senses of “rationality”, and his account of reasoning as a conscious, rule-following operation on mental contents.
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12Normative Lessons for the Scope Debate of Rational RequirementsBalkan Journal of Philosophy 8 (2): 99-106. 2016.A significant part of the debate concerning the nature of rational requirements centers on disambiguating ordinary articulations of conditional requirements of rationality. Particular focus has been put on the question of whether conditional requirements of rationality take a wide or a narrow logical scope. However, this paper shows that this focus is misguided and harmful to the debate. I argue that concentrating on syntactic scope renders us more likely to arrive at incorrect formulations of r…Read more
Bayreuth, Bavaria, Germany
Areas of Specialization
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Rationality |
Reasoning |
Reasons |
Practical Reason |
Epistemic Normativity |
Value Theory |
The Nature of Law and Legal Systems |
Areas of Interest
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Philosophy of Action |
Meta-Ethics |
Philosophy of Law |
Social and Political Philosophy |
Normative Ethics |
Value Theory |