I argue that we should ameliorate the concept of pain. The currently predominant concept, focused primarily or solely on treatment, is too narrow to accommodate the complexity of pain. This concept, when applied in clinical practice and medical research, causes epistemic harms that fall disproportionately on already marginalised groups. I argue that the primary purpose for which we need the concept is recognition, not treatment. To recognise someone in pain is to treat them as the primary episte…
Read moreI argue that we should ameliorate the concept of pain. The currently predominant concept, focused primarily or solely on treatment, is too narrow to accommodate the complexity of pain. This concept, when applied in clinical practice and medical research, causes epistemic harms that fall disproportionately on already marginalised groups. I argue that the primary purpose for which we need the concept is recognition, not treatment. To recognise someone in pain is to treat them as the primary epistemic authority regarding their pain experience and to emphatically see them in their pain experience and its impact. Ameliorating the concept of pain in this way allows us to make space for complex presentations of pain and pains that we do not want or expect to be treated.
